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The End of a Four Hundred-Year Boom: The Need
for Major Constitutional Change
by Arthur S. Miller*
... man, proud man,
Drest in a little brief authority,
Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
His glassy essence, like an angry ape,
Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven,
As make the angels weep ...
Measure for Measure
i.33
I.
During the past four hundred years many institutions that Ameri-
cans consider to be the natural order of human affairs were born: rep-
resentative democracy, the private enterprise system of capitalism, and
individualism, among others. Were one to ask why they appeared at
roughly the same time in a quite limited geographical area, what would
be the answer? Even if we accept, as we must, the view that there can
be no simple and complete explanation of any human phenomenon,1 let
alone a set of them, history possibly provides a principal determinant.
The basic premise of this essay in American constitutionalism is that
those "natural" institutions and, indeed, the very concept of constitu-
tionalism itself as it has been received and understood by modern con-
stitutional scholars were in large part consequences of the Great Dis-
coveries that began with Columbus. Wealth in theretofore untold
*Leo Goodwin, Sr., Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Nova University
Center for the Study of Law; Professor Emeritus of Law, National Law Center,
George Washington University. This essay is based on the author's work in progress, a
book tentatively entitled GETrING THERE FROM HERE: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FOR
A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY. Copyright reserved to the author. The author wishes to thank
the Rockefeller Foundation for its kind hospitality at the Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio,
Italy where the first draft of this essay was written.
1. E. NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN THE LOGIC OF SCIEN-
TIFIc EXPLANATION (1961).
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amounts poured into the "metropolis"-Western Europe-and seem-
ingly endless land became available to the hard-pressed peoples of Eu-
rope. They were thus able to escape the ecological trap, with its con-
comitant authoritarian institutions, that had imprisoned them in a rigid
caste system throughout known human history.
With the Great Discoveries, a static society gave way-slowly and
haltingly at first-to one of permanent revolution. The ancient and me-
dieval worlds were closed. Space, rather than being infinite, was consid-
ered to be a solid sphere in which the stars were embedded. Time, too,
was finite: to medieval man the world was four thousand years old and
would end in a short time. Learning was limited: people believed that
the final truth on all subjects had already been written, if not in the
Bible then by Aristotle and Plato and Euclid and other ancients. The
Bible as Holy Writ was the ultimate truth for religion and cosmology.
Those who thought and wrote did so-with rare exceptions (such as
Copernicus)-within a closed body of knowledge; they were confined to
refining the accepted wisdom of the day. The universe was anthropo-
centric: earth was its center and man was the special creature of an all-
knowing and all-wise God. It was an authoritarian, even totalitarian,
age-in economics and politics and religion.
Then came the Discoveries (and the Copernican Revolution) and
following them massive alterations in social institutions. Societal
change started slowly, but accelerated; by the nineteenth century it be-
came characteristic of the social order. Today, it is built into human
affairs. We live at a time when revolution has been made a perpetual
institution-not in the sense of a violent overthrow of government but,
rather, as an apparently permanent feature of socio-economic, and thus
of political, institutions. The underlying assumptions, the metaphysic,
of society have been altered. Human life on earth-I speak here of the
Western world-rather than being thought of as a prelude to heaven or
hell, became an end in itself. It became possible (at least for a time)
"to think of. . .the conquest of the material world in human interest,
of providing the conditions for a good life on this planet without refer-
ence to any possible hereafter." 2 The idea of progress flowered. Rather
than living in the final age, humankind saw itself as participating in a
process of progressive improvement of the human lot. People became
optimistic, rather than having a "sombre melancholy." No problem was
considered to be insoluble, it being the humanistic vision that people
2. Beard, Introduction to J. BURY, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS: AN INQUIRY INTO
ITs ORIGIN AND GROWTH xi (1955).
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through applied reason could not only know, but could solve, all
problems. Faith in an all-wise God was subtly transferred to faith in
scientists and technologists, who were considered to be able to create
technological "fixes" that would ameliorate the harshness of life. Polit-
ics changed: the nation-state replaced feudalism as the characteristic
form of political order. Economics developed from mercantilism-a
Statist economy-to laissez-faire private enterprise capitalism, al-
though the State was still important as a protector of and stimulant to
business. The individual human being was perceived as the basic unit
of society, a belief that crept into and dominated law and legal institu-
tions. In short, the "modern age" was born.
My point is not necessarily that a direct causal connection existed
between all of those developments and the Great Discoveries, but,
rather, that only after the Discoveries did the new ihstitutions and be-
liefs come into existence. An environment was provided in which new
ideas and concepts could flourish. Those who may think that this is an
example of post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacious reasoning should con-
sider what Adam Smith wrote in 1776:3
The general advantages which Europe, considered as a great
country, has derived from the discovery and colonization of
America, consist, first, in the increase of its enjoyments; and sec-
ondly, in the augmentation of its industry.
The surplus product of America, imported into Europe, fur-
nishes the inhabitants of the great continent with a variety of com-
modities which they could not otherwise have possessed ...
The discovery and colonization of America . . . have contrib-
uted to augment the industries, first, of all the countries which
trade to it directly . . . and, secondly, of all those which, without
trading to it directly, send, through the medium of other countries,
goods to it of their own produce.
Without the wealth of the Great Discoveries, modern capitalism could
not have flourished. So, too, with its political counterpart: liberal de-
mocracy. What would have been abnormal before the Discoveries be-
came normal.
No present need exists to buttress what has been said about the
new age, for Walter Prescott Webb in one of the most important, albeit
little noticed, books of this century, The Great Frontier, has provided
3. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 92 (1776).
19831
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ample data to show that the modern age is "an abnormal age, and not
a progressive orderly development which mankind was destined to
make anyway."' 4 Building on Turner's "frontier theory" of American
history,5 Webb saw the Great Frontier as "one of the primary factors
of modern history. . . .The sudden acquisition of land and other forms
of wealth by the people of Europe precipitated a boom on Western civi-
lization. . . .That boom lasted as long as the frontier was open, a pe-
riod of four centuries." A four hundred-year boom took place, a boom
that was unique in time and space. I would vary that, for the United
States at least, to maintain that the boom lasted until about 1970. The
world frontier closed during the first part of this century. The bulk of
public lands had disappeared. An enormous increase in population has
made the density per square mile, both in Europe and in the new world,
on average greater than the density was in Europe in 1500. Turner had
limited his scope to the American frontier only, but Webb took that
analysis to its logical end.
Turner's perspective was too narrow; he concentrated on the avail-
ability of land and solely on the American experience. Webb went fur-
ther: he saw that resources were as important as land and he envisaged
a frontier far larger than Turner's. David M. Potter, in his study of the
American character, criticizes Webb for not recognizing that "advanc-
ing technology" 6 went hand in hand with the bounty of nature to create
what Potter saw as the distinctive American character.
There can be little question that technology had much to do with
the exploitation of the resources of the Great Frontier. Potter correctly
chides Webb for according too much attention to what Potter calls "ge-
ographical determinism."' That raises the question of whether the
means by which humans can order their affairs in a humane way for
everyone-by which, that is, they can create a sustainable society-are
presently available. Is technology the answer? Rather, can it provide an
answer to the problems confronting people everywhere? Can technology
be harnessed in ways adequate to effect a transition to such a society?
The question asks much. We do not know its answer. But what seems
unassailable is this: to harness technology in the quest for a sustainable
society will require a continuing cooperative effort, one that can in final
4. W. WEBB, THE GREAT FRONTIER 14 (1952).
5. F. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1920).
6. D. POTTER, PEOPLE OF PLENTY: ECONOMIC ABUNDANCE AND THE AMERICAN
CHARACTER 161 (1954).
7. Id. at 163.
[Vol. 8
7
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
Four Hundred-Year Boom
analysis only be undertaken by government. Thus, the crucial constitu-
tional question is posed: What changes in present-day politico-economic
institutions are in order?
Even though his analysis is incomplete, Webb's conclusions seem
to be irrefutable. Some questions that they present include: (a) do po-
litical and economic institutions that matured during the four hundred-
year boom, and were adapted to those conditions, require alteration
now that the frontier has closed? and (b) is there somewhere, somehow,
a modern substitute for that boom? The answers, only adumbrated
here, may be simply stated: (a) yes, those institutions--economic and
political and philosophical-must be thoroughly examined anew to de-
termine how they should be changed to fit a radically new, indeed
unique, environment; and (b) no new frontier of comparable signifi-
cance is in the offing. Outer space, whether within or without the solar
system, cannot under any reasonably foreseeable set of circumstances
be a substitute for the Great Discoveries. On the contrary, rather than
providing new resources and new lands, space exploration and settle-
ment (even though theoretically possible) would enormously drain ex-
isting resources. True it is that science and technology-first in the In-
dustrial Revolution and now in the Microprocessing Revolution-have
enabled some of humankind to stave off the imperatives of the end of
the four hundred-year boom, mainly because of vastly improved pro-
ductivity of labor, plus the invention of the art of invention. Some ob-
servers, accordingly, look upon science as an endless frontier. To the
extent that science and technology can be employed to help develop a
new environment, that belief is valid. The rub comes, however, because
science, too, is resource-draining. It cannot create matter; that is a
physical impossibility. And we have learned in recent years that en-
tropy is a universal law that cannot be repealed. The transition to an
"information society" at most means that information can be trans-
ferred without loss, without being in a zero-sum game. But information
is not an end in itself; ultimately, it must deal with resources. The una-
voidable "bottom line" is the humankind-resources ratio. Technology
can be used to provide means to transfer information and employ re-
sources so as to adapt the species to a new type of living-if only it will
be used. Whether it will be is as yet unanswered.
In sum, then, what has seemed to be normal during most of Amef-
ican history--economic growth, relative peace, immense natural re-
sources, the idea of progress and of the perfectability of man-has in
dour fact actually been abnormal-abnormal as compared with how
Homo sapiens lived prior to the Great Discoveries and how it has lived
1983]
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outside of Europe and a few European colonies since the Discoveries.
The Golden Age of the Western world commenced about 1600 and
lasted until about 1970, at which time time-honored institutions began
to become unraveled. Society, ever increasingly and the world over,
cannot be called "sustainable." A "sustainable society" is one in which
human needs and deserts are fulfilled within the constraints of the envi-
ronment. Immense strains created by burgeoning population and rapid
depletion of resources have retrogressed the man-land ratio to a situa-
tion worse than it was in 1650. In the West, population density in 1500
was about 26.7 per square mile; by 1940, that figure had become 34.8
per square mile--and it is far worse today. Only, as has been sug-
gested, the advent of technology enabled humans to have a relatively
abundant economy-and then often at the expense of the poverty-rows
of the Third World. I have already suggested that I do not think that
such technological "progress" can long continue, but it need not.
Enough is now known to keep the ecological trap from closing.
Whether that trap will snap shut or whether it will remain open is one
of the great unanswered questions of the day.
This essay suggests the need for institutional change across the
board, based on the idea that such alterations, when and if made, could
help effect a transition to a sustainable society, a society that is not so
much static as in relative equilibrium, a society that has human dignity
for all as its summum bonum. A preliminary question involves the ex-
tent to which law, however and by whomever promulgated and in
whatever form, can be useful in that transition. It is conceded that lim-
its to effective legal action do exist; and that law, by itself, is a frail
reed upon which to rely. We have had laws and legal institutions for
millenia, and constitutionalism in the normative sense of limitations on
government is central to the American ethos, but candor compels the
admission that they have been relatively impotent-thus far, at
least-in achieving a decent society for all. Law, of course, is not irrel-
evant, but it must take its place with other techniques and mecha-
nisms-those subsumed under the broad rubric of politics-if it is to
play an effective role in the time of troubles that lie dead ahead.
II.
As the United States counts down to the 200th anniversary of its
only constitutional convention, it is becoming increasingly clear that
8. Webb, supra note 4, at 8 n.18.
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major changes are necessary in the oldest written fundamental law. So-
cial institutions-political, economic, legal-are under severe chal-
lenge, so much so that it is by no means certain that a smooth transi-
tion to a sustainable society can be made. The challenge, in sum, is
even greater than the sanguinary strife of the Civil War, the only previ-
ous episode in American history at all comparable to today's time of
troubles. This essay is an argument for basic constitutional alteration,
not only in the Document of 1787 itself but also in the congeries of
customs and practices that have grown up extra-constitutionally. Both
the formal and the living (or operative) constitutions require thorough
study and revamping. My theme comes from a recent statement by
Willy Brandt: ". . . the two decades ahead of us may be fateful for
mankind. . . . Many global issues will come to a head during the
period." 9
"We know we are on an unsustainable path," Dr. Lester Brown
maintains. "We also know that there are no simple technological
fixes." 10 That is not really correct: Some, but far from all, know, and
indeed many dispute, Brown's conclusion. Among opinion leaders, who
should if they thought about it agree with Brown (and Brandt), a per-
vasive attitude of Micawberism may be detected-the sublime belief,
labeled after the character in Dicken's David Copperfield, that some-
thing will always turn up to solve human problems and even to rescue
humankind from its follies. That confidence, that faith, is, as has been
suggested, the consequence of two factors-the Great Discoveries of
the past four hundred years, a part of which were the seemingly inex-
haustible resources of the United States; and a blind, unthinking belief
that scientists and technologists can willy-nilly create technological so-
lutions for specific problems. The age of discoveries has run its course,
and the species, which exists in massive numbers today (and many
more in the future-from the present 4.6 billion world population to
about 6.5 billion in the year 2000), is now entering an ecological trap
similar to that which existed in pre-Columbian times. Unregulated
technology, furthermore, can be both boon and bane, in the sense that
"second-order" consequences of new developments can have harmful
side effects. Only if technology is approached systemically or holisti-
cally can there be hope that it will be an overall boon. And that, as has
been suggested, can only come from government-which points up the
9. W. BRANDT, NORTH-SouTH, A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL: REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IsSUES 7 (1980).
10. L. BROWN, BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 8 (1981).
1983]
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constitutional challenge.
Can familiar societal institutions-capitalism, representative gov-
ernment, constitutionalism-that were developed in the four hundred-
year boom perform adequately in the emergent age? Can they harness
technology? The answer suggested here is a flat negative: They cannot.
And that, I suggest, is so even though they have undergone and con-
tinue to undergo considerable alteration since first they appeared-as
has been said, quite recently as time is reckoned, and in a limited geo-
graphical area. Each was and is a reflection of the environment in
which it has existed. Those institutions were not a priori; rather, they
were a posteriori. They grew, not by design but by reaction to circum-
stances. As such, they do not represent eternal truths about the human
condition. Quite the contrary: they represent, to update Thucydides's
famous comment, human situations where the strong continue to do
what they can and the weak still suffer what they must.
That, it seems to me, is the way that matters have always been.
To be realistic, perhaps it is the way they will always be. The argu-
ment in this essay suggests that it is not an either-or proposition.
Knowledge is available by which a sustainable society can be built. I do
not say that it will be realized, the capacity of humans to order their
affairs with minimal decency for all is by no means certain." Creating
that society will not only require foresight and planning to a degree not
before known, it will also require the strong to perceive what they have
seldom done in the past-that they and the weak are in the same boat
and will sink or float together. The ultimate aim is for a dynamic
euqilibrium between population and resources-worldwide.
Lester Brown asserts quite correctly: "Creating a sustainable soci-
ety will require fundamental economic and social changes, a wholesale
alternation of economic priorities and population policies." Well and
good, but only so far as it goes: Brown does not say how to get there
from here. He does not tackle the immensely difficult problem of insti-
tutional change; nor does he face up to the indispensable requirement
that any discussion of political theory-what he is talking about-must
be based upon an accurate cognizance of the nature of human nature.
In final analysis, Brown is speaking about constitutional matters; the
changes he calls for are those that concern what constitutions are all
about: the governing institutions of society, who benefits from govern-
mental decisions, the relationships with other governments.
11. See D. EHRENFELD, THE ARROGANCE OF HUMANISM (1978).
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I have suggested that a sustainable society is one in which humans
everywhere have their basic needs and deserts fulfilled insofar as the
environment permits. That brief definition, of course, raises more ques-
tions than it answers. Such a society, at the very least, will require that
an equilibrating balance be struck between Homo sapiens and the
planet it occupies and dominates (I do not say subdued, because evi-
dence is growing that nature is rebelling). Humankind must, contrary
to the Judeo-Christian tradition and ethic, perceive that it is an inte-
gral part of nature, at one with it and not superior to it. To be con-
temptuous of nature is to invite disaster. The great and enduring task
of modern constitutionalism is to help create such an equilibrium. Since
1787, American constitutionalism has been largely concerned with
principles of balance-but only within the political order: in the separa-
tion of powers in the national government, in the federal system, in the
relationship of persons to government. That limited conception is no
longer sufficient to the growing need; the notion of balance, of equilib-
rium, must now be taken to the entire social order, and, indeed, to the
entire planet. The balance is between Homo sapiens and nature. That
poses the need for a fundamental reordering of the very concept of
constitutionalism.
In politics, however, balance must give way to a concept of pro-
cess, to recognition that the political, the constitutional, order follows
Darwinian and Einsteinian rather than Newtonian principles. Within
principles of the balance between humankind and the rest of nature,
process rules. Isaac Newton likened the universe to a great clock, with
interacting parts, and with the laws of cause-and-effect playing a pri-
mary role. Darwin and Einstein changed that permanently. The politi-
cal order is a process; it follows the laws of evolution, not "the mechan-
istic world view of Cartesian-Newtonian science," which is
"outdated.''2 And the Constitution has always been relative to circum-
stances. It is, therefore, both Darwinian and Einsteinian. As Carolyn
Merchant, historian of science at the University of California, Berke-
ley, has put it:
In investigating the roots of our current environmental dilemma
and its connections to science, technology and the economy, we
must re-examine the formation of a world-view and a science
which, by reconceptualizing reality as a machine rather than a liv-
12. See F. CAPRA, THE TURNING POINT: SCIENCE, SOCIETY AND THE RISING
CULTURE 15 (1982).
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ing organism, sanctioned the domination of both nature and
women. The contributions of such founding "fathers" of modern
science as Francis Bacon, William Harvey, Rene Descartes,
Thomas Hobbes and Issac Newton must be re-evaluated. 13
That is a relatively new insight, one that is far from totally recog-
nized and accepted by those who study the Constitution. Indeed, it is
fair to say that many constitutional scholars reject constitutional Dar-
winism and that most of them have not thought of constitutional Ein-
steinism. Throughout American history the Constitution has been
viewed mainly through the eyes of lawyers as a legal document, to be
treated as any other legal instrument. That simply is not adequate to
the need.
American constitutionalism has been concerned mainly with the
powers of government to organize itself and its relationships to the indi-
viduals and groups of society-with, that is, a combination of limita-
tions on official power and a tacit expression of the affirmative powers
of government. As lawyers and political scientists know it, constitu-
tional law tended to be interdictory, principally exegeses on a theme of
what government could not do. Until quite recent times, little was rec-
ognized about the affirmative powers of the State. (That lack of theory
of the positive aspect of government was changed in the 1930s and
1940s.) Constitutional theory since the beginnings considered the natu-
ral person to be free-standing, autonomous, answerable chiefly to him-
self and to his God. Insofar as possible the person was to be loosed
from constraints from the State, which was to assist rather than regu-
late. Formal constitutional law, the law of the books, was viewed as one
of limitations or of rights. The law in action, the operative constitu-
tional law, differed. It was one of powers.
Formal constitutional law took a significant turn about a half-cen-
tury ago. It merged with the operative Constitution so as to add a layer
of governmental permissiveness to the palimpsest that is the Document
of 1787. At the same time, some of the limitations on government
finally got judicial recognition. Not always, to be sure, but often. (The
relationship between judicial cognizance of civil rights and civil liber-
ties to constitutional Keynesianism has never been explored.) The new
latitude permitted government was not the same on specifics as it was
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Quite the contrary. For
13. C. MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF NATURE: WOMEN, ECOLOGY AND THE SCIEN-
TIFIC REVOLUTION xviii (1980).
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150 years the operative Constitution permitted massive governmental
aid to business, to the exploitation of the resources of well-nigh virgin
continent, to suppressing internal discontent (large and small), to the
expansion of the American empire. Since the 1930s government has
become "positive" in nature, in the sense that it has undertaken, with
Supreme Court approval, affirmative obligations to the entire popu-
lace.1 4 Those duties are expressed in congressional statutes, which when
enacted were given the imprimatur of the Supreme Court. Thus on a
general level government assumed a new posture. Formal law was still
apparently limitative-I say "apparently" because the Constitution has
always been relative to circumstances-but in fact a Constitution of
powers in a secular state came into existence. The Supreme Court, as
the nation's authoritative faculty of political theory, redefined the na-
ture of freedom from autonomous man individualistically standing
alone to liberty in a social organization. Formal law, that is, acknowl-
edged the group basis of politics and of economics; and the operative
law made the individual person important only as a member of a group
or groups. More recently, yet another layer is being added to the an-
cient parchment, one that expressly validates increasing controls upon
individual behavior. Those controls emanate from both public and pri-
vate governments-from, that is, the organs of the Political and of the
Economic Constitutions. 5
A contemporaneous development involves the judiciary. At times,
but far from always, judges issue commands to other governmental of-
ficers, telling them what they must do (as compared with historically
telling them what they could not do). In some respects, the question in
some constitutional cases has become: If the natural person owes duties
and obligations to the groups of the political and economic orders
(which he does, principally to the nation-state), to what extent does the
group owe correlative duties and obligations to the person? This small
shift in judicial constitution-making should be openly recognized, as-
similated into constitutional theory, and extended into a fundamental
law of basic human needs and deserts. Not that the judges can do the
job alone. They cannot. Such an argument, of course, entails advocacy
of an exponential jump in the theory and practice of American consti-
tutionalism. Hence the requirement, both for cooperative actions
14. See A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1968).
15. See A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE POLITICAL
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1982); Miller, Toward A Definition of "The" Consti-
tution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 633 (1983).
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among all three branches of government (as well as cooperation be-
tween the nation and the states and, of even greater significance, the
nation and the governments elsewhere on the planet) and for a consti-
tutional convention.
Law historically was based upon an assumption about the nature
of man and the environment. Briefly, that assumption was the political
version of Adam Smith economics-the belief that there is a "market-
place" of politics in which the individual actions of persons and the
groups they form result, as by "an invisible hand," in the overall com-
mon good. Nature (the environment) was perceived through John
Locke's eyes as beneficent, not as the harsh and forbidding world of
Thomas Hobbes. It has now become all too clear that humans every-
where, including Americans, are now in a Hobbesian world, in a slowly
closing ecological trap thoroughly familiar to those who lived in medie-
val Europe but only little known in the United States. This is the "cli-
macteric" of humankind. We live, not in a period of crisis, but at a
time when a number of crises are coalescing.16
The formal Constitution, the Constitution of the books, is obsoles-
cent, even obsolete, in substantial part, and therefore in need of sub-
stantial revision. The operative fundamental law is becoming corpora-
tist in a fact, through a process of unannounced but portentous
constitutional alteration. Tensions produced by new environmental con-
straints make it clear that the process of progressive updating of the
Constitution by the Supreme Court and other authoritative decision-
makers is no longer sufficient to the need. The resulting problem is sys-
temic, not aberrational, and cannot be cured by a constitutional Band-
Aid or quick fix. From that it follows that radical constitutional change
is required. Alterations, some quite drastic, in the formal and operative
constitutions are necessary, predicated on the bedrock proposition that
humankind must attain a "oneness" with nature.
Enormous difficulties must be surmounted to get "there" from
"here" by means of institutional change, "there" being a sustainable
society and "here" being the climacteric. There are limits to effective
legal action. Moreoever, since "[p]olitical theory which does not start
from a theory of man . . . is quite worthless, 17 the question of human
nature must be faced. No alteration in the nature of the species is sug-
16. See A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CONSTITU-
TION OF CONTROL (1981); F. CAPRA, THE TURNING POINT: SCIENCE, SOCIETY AND
THE RISING CULTURE (1982).
17. P. RHINELANDER, IS MAN COMPREHENSIBLE TO MAN? 1 (1973).
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gested; rather, I maintain that the irreducible necessity is for those in
positions of power and influence to recognize where their long-term in-
terests lie (it being assumed that they readily perceive their short-term
interests). Finally, it is recommended that a constitutional convention
be convened to consider radical change in the fundamental law.
III.
That much of what is said in this essay is controversial goes with-
out saying. When speaking of constitutions, and particularly of the
American Constitution, one deals with political theory and social eth-
ics, and perhaps of greatest importance, with an aspect of religion-a
civil or secular religion. The Document of 1787 is the basic instrument
of America's civil religion, which in its totality is far more important
than orthodox theological institutions and dogmas. Americans revere
an ancient piece of parchment as much or more than the Bible of the
Talmud. To argue that the Constitution requires rewriting cuts as close
to the nerve as asking that the Bible be redrafted. The time, however,
is long past for Americans to confront the demonstrable fact that
Woodrow Wilson was correct when he said in 1885 that "[tihe Consti-
tution in operation is-manifestly a very different thing from the Consti-
tution of the books";1 8 and therefore that today's fundamental law is
only metaphorically connected to the Document of 1787. A harsh real-
ity must be faced: that the ancient Document solidifies societal institu-
tions, both public and private, that are positive barriers to fair, decent
and efficient government. I do not suggest that a new Bible be written,
although surely a persuasive case can be made for rethinking human-
kind's relationship to the cosmos-which is what the Bible is all about.
A constitution-any constitution, written or unwritten-is concerned
with how humans relate to each other, how their affairs are ordered,
and how they organize themselves into collectivities. At times, those
collectivities are called government, public government, but quite often
they are at least nominally private. The mundane, yet immensely im-
portant, level of juristic theories of politics is the concern of this essay.
Several assumptions underlie what is said here, including the
following:
1. A distinction must be made between society (the aggregate of
essentially atomistic individuals and groups in the nation), the State (a
18. W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLIT-
ics 30 (1885).
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metaphysical concept in the name of which society is governed; al-
though it cannot be seen or touched, it is as real as any natural per-
son-and perhaps more so), and government (the visible apparatus of
the State). This differentiation is seldom made in the literature of con-
stitutional law; judges and commentators alike being content to use the
terms as if they are synonymous. They are not.
2. So far as political economy is concerned, however, the atomistic
individual does not exist as such. A person gathers constitutional signif-
icance only in his relationship with others; he is important both politi-
cally and economically only when he combines his personal strength
with members of a group. Politics, in other words, considers the group
to be the basic social unit. In economics, this is the age of collective
action.
3. Government is both public and private. Public governance con-
sists of those visible organs, legislative and executive and judicial, that
are usually solely considered to be government. The other dimension of
private governance consists of the major pluralistic groups in the na-
tion, of which the giant corporations are the principal exemplar. In
other words, Americans are governed by both a political and an eco-
nomic Constitution, which combine in an emergent corporatist
Constitution.
4. The State (sometimes called the public or the national interest)
is more than the arithmetical sum of the private interests of the nation.
It has its own claims, as President John F. Kennedy acknowledged in a
burst of candor in 1962. Answering a question about a "public inter-
est" in collective bargaining negotiations, he said: "These companies
are free and the unions are free. All we [the Executive] can try to do is
to indicate . . . the public interest which is there. After all, the public
interest is the sum of the private interests, or perhaps it's even some-
times a little more. In fact, it is a little more." '19 That was iterated by
President Jimmy Carter in his farewell address: "the national interest
is not always the sum of all our single or special interests." 20 From time
to time the Supreme Court has echoed that sentiment, as, for example,
in Justice John M. Harlan's 1959 opinion for the Court in Barenblatt
v. United States.21 "In the last analysis," said Harlan, Congress's
power to investigate possible subversions rests "on the right of self-
19. N.Y. Times, March 8, 1962, at 14, col. 5.
20. Miami Herald, Jan. 15, 1981 § A at 16, col. 1
21. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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preservation, 'the ultimate value of any society'. 22 Wittingly or not
(probably not), Kennedy, Carter and Harlan adopted, at least implic-
itly, an important Machiavellian principle: "It is not the well-being of
individuals that makes cities great . .. The common good can be re-
alized in spite of those who suffer in consequence. '23
5. The United States, the theory to the contrary notwithstanding,
has always followed Machiavellian principles. That is particularly seen
in the operative Constitution, but at times may also be seen in the for-
mal Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Machiavelli,
moreover, was one of the most wrongfully maligned political theorists
in history. Far from the murderous Machiavel that so many have
painted him, a careful reading of his best work, The Discourses, and
even of his best-known book, The Prince, reveals that he preferred a
republic over a prince-if it could be obtained. To assert that the
United States has followed Machiavellian principles is simply to say
that throughout its history it has been far more tough-minded than the
myth system would have it.
6. There is what Professor David Ehrenfeld has labeled "the arro-
gance of humanism" 24 -the idea, widely held, that humans have the
capacity to order their affairs with a measure of decency for all; that,
in other words, man can plan and thus control the future. Although it
is doubtless true that the technological future can and will be invented
(with wholly unpredictable consequences), that by no means is proof
that Homo sapiens can guide the course of social events in a reasonable
adequate manner. "Every inventor," Daniel Boorstin maintains, "is a
Pandora"; 25 the first-order consequences, those which are obvious, may
be easily forecast, but the problem lies in the second-order conse-
quences. Scientists and technologists, Alvin Weinberg has said, have
made a "Faustian bargain" with society. That is dangerous (how much
we know not) because it involves "the mounting complexity of technol-
ogy along with the staggering problems of managing the response to
ecological scarcity. . . . These will require us to depend on a special
class of experts in charge of our survival and well-being-a 'priesthood
of responsible technologists'."2
22. Id. at 117-18 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951)).
23. N. MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES 1.6 (1974).
24. Ehrenfeld, supra note 11.
25. D. BOORSTIN, THE REPUBLIC OF TECHNOLOGY: REFLECTIONS ON OUR Fu-
TURE 91 (1978).
26. Weinberg, Technology and Ecology-Is There A Need for Confrontation?
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7. If Weinberg is accurate, that implies the emergence of an overt
class, even caste, society. The beginnings of such a stratified society are
already evident.
8. Ehrenfeld may be correct; but even so, the effort to create a
sustainable society should be made. As with most of man's efforts to
determine his destiny, the quest may in final analysis be futile, even
absurd. We must, however, learn to live with absurdity--"or what's a
heaven for?"
9. Government will remain an active-indeed, a neces-
sary-participant in societal affairs. It will not fade away, despite the
wishes of such deep-thinkers as Milton Friedman. Even if the views of
Friedman and his followers were to prevail, that would merely mean
that the American people would trade visible public governance for the
equally and perhaps greater onerous constraints and restraints of invisi-
ble private governments.
10. Law, including constitutional law, will become more and more
outwardly instrumental, rather than interdictory. It will be overtly tele-
ological-purposive, goal-seeking.
11. The American Constitution, a politico-legal palimpsest, is al-
ways in a state of "becoming," updated by several means to meet the
exigencies faced by succeeding generations of Americans. This means
that government is and has always been precisely as strong as condi-
tions required. The State has a "reserve power" that enables it, operat-
ing through government, to meet every challenge that historically con-
fronted it.
12. That the State will do so in the future seems sure. The ques-
tion is how, not if it will do so. As I have argued in Democratic Dicta-
torship,27 authoritarian government seems likely. Can constitutional
change stave that off? In some respects, the basic problem that consti-
tutionalism faces is how to avoid Arnold Toynbee's doleful forecast: "In
all developed countries, a new way of life-a severely regimented
way-will have to be imposed by a ruthless authoritarian govern-
ment."' 28 That is an even greater constitutional challenge than the Civil
War. There is no neat formula by which the shoals to a humane
steady-state society can be navigated.
13. Simply because of its enormous economic and military power,
the United States will continue to be a major force in world affairs.
23 BIOSCIENCE 41, 43 (1973).
27. Miller, supra note 16 passim.
28. Id. at 151.
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Anything that happens anywhere on the planet, and indeed in outer
space, is of interest and importance to the American political order.
14. There is no such thing as totally unbiased knowledge. "Every
major human activity, including the search for pure and disinterested
knowledge, is norm-governed and value-oriented." 20 The need, there-
fore, is to heed Gunnar Myrdal's advice: social commentators should
"face their valuations," setting them out for all to see.30 Only then can
there be a semblance of objectivity.
15. Burly sinners rule the world, often, to be sure, in well-pressed
clothes and outwardly pleasant demeanor, but sinners nonetheless.
People of thought are not nearly as important as they think or so
Keynes, in a famous passage, asserted "the ideas of economists and
political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are
wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the
world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be
quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually slaves of
some defunct economist."311 The word, not the gun, may be the symbol
of authority; but word mechanics, the people of thought, are in large
part thrall to those who exercise real power in society.
16. One way to control the populace is to use religion, not only as
an opiate, as Marx in a famous passage said, but in its "civil" sense.
He spoke about organized religion. The civil or secular religion of na-
tionalism or patriotism or Americanism is one of the means by which
people en masse are organized and controlled.
IV.
The two hundred-year odyssey of the American people has come
to a crossroads. Is it the end of the beginning? Or is it the beginning of
the end? Which direction will the United States take? Which should it
take? Of one thing we can be sure: the future that looms dead ahead
will not be a mere unilinear extension of the past. "The past is but
prologue." But prologue to what? The American past, as we have seen,
has been based on a unique set of environmental circumstances.
Machiavelli viewed history as neither determined progression nor an
ineluctable cycle of recurring forms. To him, history was constant
29. Rhinelander, supra note 17, at 93.
30. G. MYRDAL, VALUE IN SOCIAL THEORY (1958).
31. J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY
383 (1936).
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change, to which forms of government must adapt, and uncertainty to
which any type of government must be adaptable. In his words:
Since ...all human affairs are ever in a state of flux, and
cannot stand still, either there will be improvement or decline, and
necessity will lead you to do many things which reason does not
recommend. Hence if a commonwealth be constituted with a view
to its maintaining the status quo, but not with a view to expansion,
and by necessity it be led to expand, its basic principles will be
subverted and it will soon be faced with ruin. So, too, should
heaven, on the other hand, be so kind to it that it has no need to go
to war, it will then come about that idleness will either render it
effeminate or give rise to factions; and these two things, either in
conjunction or separately, will bring about its downfall. 2
We may morally object to Machiavelli's implied view that war and
territorial expansion are to be sought for the good of the common-
wealth; but if we change the notion of war to one of economic expan-
sion-to continued economic growth-would those same moral objec-
tions be proffered? All governments today, whether capitalist or
Marxist or with mixed economies, are devoted to continual economic
growth. As Professor Bernard Crick has said, "Most of his [Machiavel-
li's] arguments in terms of military technology are now directly trans-
latable in terms of economic technology. Even when we stay in the
same place, we have to run pretty fast to do it."3' 3 All governments
claim the ability not only to maintain but to raise the scale of living, or
at least the total economic product (the gross national product) of their
inhabitants. Whether they can do it is at best an unanswered question;
at worst, it is highly unlikely. But try governments will, as try they
must, if political officers wish to remain in power.
This essay, in sum, is a preliminary foray both into posing some of
the correct questions about the human condition, without which correct
answers will never be forthcoming, and suggesting some possible an-
swers. In fine, I seek to establish a framework for thinking about major
constitutional change-planned change, that is, not the change that
comes about routinely as each generation of Americans rewrites the
Document of 1787. Mine is a radical approach-nothing less than a
complete overhaul of ancient ideas of how to govern the United States.
Not that the past wisdom, if that it is, can or will be discarded. Adher-
32. Machiavelli, supra note 21, at 1.6.
33. Id. at 53.
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ence to it, however, is neither a duty nor a necessity. We cannot escape
the past but what the constitutional framers said is not revealed truth,
not like Moses coming down from Mt. Sinai; but merely as one datum
among a number of others that must be considered in evaluating Amer-
ican constitutionalism.
Those who wrote the Constitution of 1787 could not have failed.
Everything favored the success of the new nation: an untapped conti-
nent replete with seemingly inexhaustible natural resources, protected
by two oceans and the British navy, was given the unique opportunity
to create something new and lasting. That very success, however,
should be traced to the favorable environment in which American polit-
ical institutions operated, rather than to any sort of special wisdom in
the constitutional framers or in what they wrought. The United States
has waxed large and strong not because of the Constitution but in spite
of it. Or, as Rufus E. Miles, Jr., put it, "[t]he extraordinary affluence
of the United States has been produced by a set of fortuitous, nonrepli-
cable, and nonsustainable factors. ' 34 We now confront a totally differ-
ent social milieu, and the Constitution must be changed to deal with it.
What, then, are the constitutional changes that should be given
serious attention? Time and space permit only a listing of some of the
more obvious.
1. Altering the separation of powers in the national government to
adopt a parliamentary system, based upon but not necessarily a direct
copy of the British system.
2. This would require a new way of electing the president. The
electoral college should be abolished. The president would truly be
head of party, subject to removal on a vote of confidence.
3. Furthermore, the presidency should be divided into one person
being head of government (like a prime minister) and another being
chief of state (like the King of Spain or Queen of England). It is worth
special mention that the United States is the only important nation in
the world that allows one person to wear both of those hats.
4. Congress should be unicameral, with not more than one hun-
dred members.
5. The fifty states should be consolidated into not more than ten or
twelve geographically contiguous regions.
6. The "private" governing power of important social groups, such
as the giant corporations and the two major political parties, should be
34. R. MILES, AWAKENING FROM THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE SOCIAL AND PO-
LITICAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 224 (1976).
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recognized and made a part of the formal constitutional structure.
7. Provisions should be made for cooperation in a constitutional
sense of the fact that the United States exists in an interdependent
world-a "global village"-and has many and growing relationships
with other nations.
8. The idea of a "council of revision," considered in the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787 but rejected, should be resurrected and made
into a "council of state" that would be advisory to the president and
Congress before important decisions are made.3"
9. A "planning" function should be incorporated into the duties of
government.
10. Means should be established for controlling technology, includ-
ing nuclear weapons.
Time and space do not permit more than listing these possible-in
my judgment, necessary-changes in the constitutional mechanism. 6
The fundamental idea is that the Constitution of the United States
should be one of human needs and human rights, as well as one that
sets forth the powers of government. In short, I propose a Constitution
that, by making responsible government possible through streamlining
and updating the present obsolescent mechanism, will enable the
United States to meet the challenges of a zero-sum society. The four
hundred-year boom has ended. The Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm, re-
flected in the writings of the "father" of the American Constitution,
John Locke, is outdated. It is being replaced, all too slowly, by a new
vision of reality: "an awareness of the essential interrelatedness and
interdependence of all phenomena-physical, biological, psychological,
social, and cultural. ' 7 As Americans approach the 200th anniversary
of the constitutional convention of 1787, there is no more important
question confronting them than modernizing the ancient document, so
as to adapt it to the new reality.
35. See A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE POLITICAL
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1982).
36. The details and reasons for these, and other changes, will be set forth in the
author's proposed book, supra note *.
37. Capra, supra note 12, at 265.
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Pinkerton v. United States Revisited:
A Defense of Accomplice Liability
by Jon May*
I. Introduction
On May 4, 1982, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal up-
held the robbery and kidnapping conviction of Eugene Martinez even
though Martinez had not actually taken part in a robbery or a kidnap-
ping.' What Martinez had done, however, was to introduce a prospec-
tive buyer of marijuana to two sellers who subsequently kidnapped and
robbed the buyer when it came time to produce the drug. Martinez'
liability for these acts was predicated solely on the legal theory which
holds conspirators responsible for the natural and probable conse-
quences of their acts.2 The court stated, "[g]iving appropriate consider-
ation to experience in this community, we think . . . that robbery and
kidnapping are a foreseeable consequence of conspiracy to effect a
large drug transaction. . .. "s
This principle of accomplice liability, popularly known as the Pin-
kerton rule,4 has been almost universally condemned by the academic
community. 5 Yet since the early 1970s it has been applied with increas-
ing frequency, particularly in the context of narcotics prosecutions.6 Al-
*B.A. , Emory University; J. D. , University of Florida. The author is an assistant
United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida. The views expressed in
this article are not necessarily those of the Department of Justice nor of the United
States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida.
1. Martinez v. State, 413 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
2. Id. at 430.
3 Id.
4. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
5. Note, Vicarious Liability For Criminal Offenses of Co-Conspirators, 56 YALE
L.J. 371 (1947); Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 920, 998 (1959); W. LAFAVE & A. Scott, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 515
(1972); Note, Liability for Co-Conspirators Crimes in the Wisconsin Party to a Crime
Statute, 66 MARQUETTE L. REV. 344 (1983).
6. When W. Lafave and A. Scott published their HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW
in 1972, 'they reported at page 515 that the Pinkerton rule had "never gained broad
acceptance." This assertion is no longer correct. The Pinkerton rule has become en-
trenched in federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Raffone, 693 F.2d 1343, 1346 (11th
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though the principle applied in Martinez was known at common law, it
was not widely recognized until the United States Supreme Court de-
cided Pinkerton v. United States in 1946.7 In that case, two brothers,
Walter and Daniel Pinkerton, were charged with conspiring to evade
the payment of taxes on whiskey and, additionally, with numerous spe-
Cir. 1982) (prosecution for conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to dis-
tribute marijuana. The court held that liability cannot rest upon Pinkerton unless jury
is given a Pinkerton charge); Government of Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 633 F.2d 660,
666 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 960 (1980) (prosecution for conspiracy to commit
bank robbery and assault occurring as a result of the bank robbery); United States v.
Rosado-Fernandez, 614 F.2d 50, 53 (5th Cir. 1980) (prosecution for conspiracy to pos-
sess and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The court notes that responsibility
extends even to those co-conspirator acts of which the defendant has no knowledge.);
United States v. Wilner, 523 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975) (prosecution for conspiracy to
possess and possession with intent to distribute marijuana. "[W]here there is a continu-
ing conspiracy which contemplates and encompasses the illegal act performed, each
conspirator is responsible for the acts of his co-conspirator." Id. at 72-73.); Poliafico v.
United States, 237 F.2d 97, 116 (6th Cir. 1956) (prosecution for conspiracy to possess
and possession of heroin.).
The doctrine of accomplice liability has also been widely accepted by the states.
See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 413 So. 2d 429, 430-31 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(defendant marijuana broker held responsible where sellers of marijuana robbed buyer
of funds to be used for purchase); State v. Barton, 424 A.2d 1033, 1038 (R.I. 1981)
(conspiracy to break into building and steal precious metals. Defendants held liable for
destruction of communication lines by co-conspirators done in furtherance of the con-
spiracy.); Commonwealth v. Roux, 350 A.2d 867, 871-72 (Pa. 1976) (defendant held
responsible for murder where he conspired with others to rob and beat victim); State v.
Stein, 70 N.J. 369, 360 A.2d 347, 359 (1976) (defendant, an attorney, held responsible
for robbery and assault, where he provided information to robbers for what he believed
would be a burglary of an unoccupied residence); Pendleton v. State, 329 So. 2d 145,
149 (Ala. Ct. App. 1976) (conspiracy to commit murder. Defendant held responsible
for murder based on prearrangement and presence alone); Johnson v. State, 482
S.W.2d 600, 605 (Ark. 1972) (defendant held vicariously liable for death of little girl
during burglary attempt); State v. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 527,__ 129 N.W.2d 155, 169
(1964) (presence of weapons supports inference that defendants wanted to avoid any
contact with police and thus assault or.police officer was a natural consequence of their
unlawful agreement); Lusk v. State, 64 Miss. 845, 2 So. 256 (1897) (defendant held
responsible for arson where he combined with two others to frighten a man and his wife
away from their house); The Anarchist's Case, 122 Ill. 1, 12 N.E. 865 (1887) (defen-
dant held responsible for death resulting from conspiracy to overthrow government).
North Carolina and New York have rejected the doctrine. See State v. Small, 272
S.E.2d 128 (N.C. 1980); People v. McGee, 49 N.Y. 2d 48, 399 N.E.2d 1177 (1979).
Massachusetts has never ascribed to the doctrine; see Commonwealth v. Stasium, 349
Mass. 38, 206 N.E. 2d 672 (1965).
7. 328 U.S. 640.
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cific acts of tax evasion. Although the evidence at trial established the
existence of a conspiracy, there was no evidence that Daniel Pinkerton
participated directly in the commission of any of the substantive of-
fenses and, in fact, he was in jail when some of these acts took place.8
At trial the court instructed the jury that if they found that the
defendants had been engaged in a conspiracy they could also find the
defendants guilty of any substantive offense which was a natural and
probable consequence of that conspiracy.9 Daniel Pinkerton was found
guilty of conspiracy and six substantive counts of tax evasion. His con-
viction was upheld by the Fifth Circuit 0 and the Supreme Court af-
firmed in an opinion written by Justice Douglas. The Supreme Court
held that a party to a conspiracy may be prosecuted for the substantive
crimes of a co-conspirator, committed in furtherance of the conspiracy,
even though the person did not participate in the crime and even if he
did not intend for that specific crime to occur."1
This rationale, known as the doctrine of accomplice liability, was
rarely utilized until the 1970s, when it became extremely popular
among state and federal prosecutors. Critics have argued that the ra-
tionale of Pinkerton represents an unwarranted extension of the civil
doctrine of respondeat superior into criminal jurisprudence;12 that it
violates the basic tenet of criminal law which holds that persons are
responsible only for their own conduct and not that of others;'3 that the
decision itself is flawed because Justice Douglas confused a rule of evi-
dence with a rule of criminal responsibility and relied on authorities
which upon close inspection do not stand for the broad proposition for
8. Id. at 648 (J. Rutledge dissenting).
9. Id. at 646 n.6.
10. 151 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1945).
11. 328 U.S. at 647-48.
12. Justice Rutledge, in his dissent in Pinkeiton, complained that holding Daniel
Pinkerton liable for the acts of his brother amounts to "vicarious criminal responsibility
as broad as, or broader than, the vicarious civil liability of a partner for acts done by a
co-partner in the course of the firm's business." Id. at 651.
13. "[I]t seems clear that the doctrine of respondeat superior must be repudiated
as a foundation for criminal liability. For it is of the very essence of our deep-rooted
notions of criminal liability that guilt be personal and individual; and in the last analy-
sis the inarticulate subconscious sense of justice of the man on the street is the only
sure foundation of law." Sayre, Criminal Responsibility For The Acts of Another, 43
HARV. L. REv. 689, 717 (1930); "[A]ny doctrine of vicarious criminal liability is re-
pugnant to common law concepts." Note, Vicarious Liability For Criminal Offenses of
Co-Conspirators, 56 YALE L.J. 371, 374 (1947).
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which they were cited. 14 Finally, it has been said that no court has put
forth an adequate rationale for the doctrine,15 and that because of the
real danger that jurors may confuse the issues in a conspiracy prosecu-
tion, the doctrine should be abandoned.1
This article argues that the critics of Pinkerton have confused the
civil doctrine of vicarious liability17 with the criminal doctrine of ac-
complice liability. It first explores how the common law treated various
parties to a criminal act and how some courts have recently analyzed
these common law precepts. It examines the relationship between these
precepts and the law of conspiracy. It then addresses the various critics
of Pinkerton, concluding that the doctrine of accomplice liability is not
an aberration, but rather, a reaffirmation of some basic tenets of the
common law.
II. The Parties to a Crime
A. At Common Law
The terms used at common law to describe the parties to a crime
arise naturally from the roles played by the various participants in the
commission of a criminal act. At common law there can be only three
parties to a crime-the principal in the first degree, the principal in the
second degree, and the accessory before the fact. Each is responsible
for the natural and probable consequences of his actions. The individ-
ual most directly responsible for the commission of a criminal act is
known as the principal in the first degree. Generally he is the person
who pulls the trigger or who utters the forged instrument; "the actor,
14. Recent Decisions, Criminal Law -Conspiracy and Substantive Offenses - Dis-
tinctions Between Conspirators and Accomplices - Conviction of Conspirators for Sub-
stantive Offenses, Although He Did Not Actually Participate in Them, 16 FORDHAM
L. REV. 275 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Recent Decisions].
15. Note, Developments in the Law - Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV.
920, 998 (1959).
16. Note, supra note 13, at 377 (The author of this article believes that conspir-
acy prosecutions are likely to confuse'the jury because of the greater number of defen-
dants and the admissibility of the co-conspirator statements to show membership in the
conspiracy. Attenuated theories of liability therefore increase the chances of prejudicial
error.).
17. The tort doctrine of vicarious liability holds persons responsible for the acts
of others solely on the basis of their relationship as principal and agent. W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS 467 (4th ed. 1971).
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or absolute perpetrator of the crime."18 At common law, an individual
who employed an intermediary to commit a crime could not be consid-
ered a principal, even though he might have been the one most respon-
sible for the crime in the sense of having originated or initiated it.19
This did not mean that an individual who employed an intermediary
would be without criminal liability. As an accessory or a principal in
the second degree he would be subject to the same punishment as the
principal in the first degree.20 What it did mean, however, was that
common law jurists distinguished criminal actors, not in terms of their
ultimate legal or moral responsibility, but in terms of the specific acts
they performed.
Frequently a principal in the first degree is present at the time
that an offense is committed. Presence, however, is not required. If A
employs a child to pass a counterfeit check,2" or if A leaves poison for
another who subsequently drinks it,2 A is considered a principal in the
first degree under a theory of constructive presence.23 Similarly, if A
and B combine together to forge an instrument, each individually forg-
ing a separate part, both are principals in the first degree, even if they
were not present together when the instrument was completed.24
One who aids, counsels, commands, or encourages the principal in
the first degree is a principal in the second degree, more frequently
known as an aider and abettor.2 5 Fundamentally, what distinguishes a
principal in the second degree from a principal in the first degree is the
fact that without the acts taken by the principal in the first degree, the
18. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *34. "A principal in the first degree may
simply be defined as the criminal actor. He is the one who, with the requisite mental
state, engages in the act or omission concurring with a mental state which causes the
criminal result."'W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, 496 (1972).
19. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 18, at 496-7 (an exception to this rule is
where the intermediary is a child, is insane, or has been mislead as to the true nature of
his acts.) See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 35.
20. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 18, ("[A]ccessories shall suffer the
same punishment as their principal.") 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 39.
21. Commonwealth v. Hill, 11 Mass. 136 (1814).
22. Rex v. Harley, 172 Eng. Rep. 744 (1830).
23. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 18, at 497; State v. Deyo, 358 S.W.2d
816, 821 (Mo. 1962); W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 34, 35.
24. Rex v. Bingley, 168 Eng. Rep. 890, 891 (1821).
25. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18 at 34 ("A principal, in the first degree, is he
that is the actor, or absolute perpetrator of the crime; and, in the second degree, he
who is present, aiding, and abetting the act to be done." Id.).
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conduct of the principal in the second degree would not be criminal.2"
Thus, if A provides B with a ride to a bank, knowing that B intends to
rob the bank, A would not be guilty as an aider and abettor unless a
robbery actually took place.27
It is easy to identify the principal in the second degree when one
person acts while the other merely encourages. But when an individ-
ual's involvement is extensive, as where B restrains C so that A can
shoot C, the distinctions become blurred. 8 Generally, one must be pre-
sent at the commission of a criminal offense to be an aider and abet-
tor.29 Presence, however, may be constructive as well as actual. Thus,
where B is in a position to alert A30 or prevent others from interfering
with A3 or where B's actions are such as to make A's job easier,32 B is
held to be constructively present, no matter how far away he is from
26. United States v. Rodgers, 419 F.2d 1315, 1317 (10th Cir. 1969) (the govern-
ment's failure to show that anyone instigated a riot precluded the defendants' convic-
tions for aiding and abetting in the instigation of a riot); Shuttlesworth v. City of Bir-
mingham, Ala., 373 U.S. 262, 265 (1963) (where trespass conviction of principal was
held to be constitutionally infirm, conviction of aider and abettor was likewise infirm);
United States v. Horton, 180 F.2d 431, 437 (7th Cir. 1950) (the government's failure
to show that the principal was not registered to distribute marijuana precluded the
defendants' conviction for aiding and abetting in an unlawful distribution).
27. Today persons who engage in a conspiracy, solicit others to commit an of-
fense, or attempt to commit an offense themselves, may be subjected to punishment
even when no substantive crime has occurred; this was not so at common law. Because
ancient law exacted reparations for harm done, no punishment was exacted where
harm was attempted, but none occurred. Reparations consisted of a fine paid to the
injured party and to the king. Thus, early criminal law shared the same purpose and
origin as early tort law. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 509 (1898).
28. Consequently, most jurisdictions have abolished the distinctions between ac-
cessories and principals in the first and second degrees. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1981)
which defines principals as "[W]hoever commits an offense against the United States
or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as
a principal."
29. United States v. Molina, 581 F.2d 56, 61 n.8 (2d Cir. 1978); W. LAFAVE
AND A. SCOTT, supra note 18, at 497.
30. Vincent v. State, 220 Md. 232, 239, 151 A.2d 898, 903 (1959); Mitchell v.
Commonwealth, 33 Va. (1 Gratt) 845, 867 (1880).
31. State v. Tally, 102 Ala. 25, 76, 15 So. 722 (1894); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,
supra note 18, at 498.
32. Dean v. State, 85 Miss. 40, 42, 37 So. 501, 502 (1904); State v. Tally, 102
Ala. 25, 76-76, 15 So. 722, 740 (1894); State v. Poynoir, 36 La. Ann. 572, 575 (1884);
State v. Hamilton, 13 Nev. 386, 391 (1878).
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the scene of the crime.3 One who enters into an agreement which
counsels, commands or encourages the commission of a crime but who
is not present at the crime, either constructively or actually, is known
as an accessory before the fact.3 4
What distinguishes the accessory before the fact from the princi-
pal in the second degree is primarily the lack of presence. In some cir-
cumstances, however, the two are distinguishable on the basis of the
existence of an agreement.3 5 It is always necessary for there to be an
agreement between an accessory and a principal in order to hold the
accessory liable.36 A principal in the second degree, however, may be
held liable based on his intent and his actions independent of any inter-
course between him and the principal. 7 It is sometimes said that what
the principal in the second degree shares with the principal in the first
degree is a "community of unlawful intent."38 But as the Fifth Circuit
has observed, community of unlawful intent, while similar to an agree-
ment, is not the same.3 9 A defendant may voluntarily aid the principal
in the commission of a criminal act and be liable as principal in the
second degree, but not be liable as a conspirator or an accessory before
the fact because of the absence of an actual agreement to do an unlaw-
33. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 18, at 497-98.
34. An accessory before the fact is one "who being absent at the time of the
crime committed doth yet procure, counsel, or command another to commit a crime." 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 36.
35. Sams v. Commonwealth, 294 Ky. 393, 396, 171 S.W.2d 989, 991 (1943).
36. See, e.g., Morei v. U.S., 127 F.2d 827, 830 (6th Cir. 1942) (where the ab-
sence of an agreement between the defendant and the principal led the Sixth Circuit to
hold that the defendant was not responsible for the principal's sale of narcotics even
though the defendant's actions enabled the buyer to contact the seller).
37. In State v. Tally, R. C. Ross made the fatal mistake of seducing Anne Skel-
ton. Skelton's three brothers became enraged at what had happened to Anne and set
out to murder Ross, who lived nearby. The whole community was aware of what the
Skelton clan had set out to do and Ed Ross, a relative of R. C. Ross, sent him a
telegram, stating, "[flour men on horseback with guns following. Look out." John B.
Tally, a judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Alabama who was Anne's brother-in-law
became aware of Ed's telegram and sent his own telegram to the telegraph officer who
was a personal friend. "Do not let warned party get away. Say nothing." As a result of
this telegram R. C. Ross never received Ed Ross's warnings. Even though the Skeltons
were not aware of his assistance Tally was still held to be an aider and abettor. 102
Ala. at 70, 15 So. at 739.
38. U.S. v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804,813 (5th Cir. 1980).
39. United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1980). But see Russell
v. United States, 222 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1955) (where the court confuses commu-
nity of unlawful intent with agreement.).
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ful act. For example, where C encourages B to murder X and A de-
cides to help B independent of any encouragement by C or communica-
tion with B and B does in fact murder X with A's aid, A is a principal
in the second degree because he was present, he aided B, and he shared
in B's intent. C is an accessory before the fact because he was not
present and because he entered into an agreement with B. A, though
present at the scene, is not a principal in the first degree because his
liability is dependent upon B actually killing X.4"
The distinctions made by the common law based on the roles
played by the participants in a crime do not explain, however, why the
common law treated accessories differently from principals. Although
each was held equally liable for an offense, and subject to the same
penalty, common law jurists erected numerous barriers to the prosecu-
tion of accessories. Some of these barriers were undoubtedly designed
to limit the imposition of the death penalty, which was the punishment
for all felonies at common law.,1 An accessory, for instance, could only
be tried in the jurisdiction where the crime of accessoryship occurred."2
Thus, the accessory who committed his acts in France could not be
prosecuted for the resultant crime in England because venue for him
lay only in France.43 Similarly, an accessory could not be convicted
under an indictment charging him as a principal. Where the extent of
an individual's participation was unknown, this rule operated to relieve
the party of any liability at all."
The rule that an accessory could not be convicted unless the prin-
cipal was also convicted probably had a different and more ancient ori-
gin. Since, at early common law, guilt or innocence was determined by
a supernatural process, such as trial by water, the medieval mind could
not risk the contradiction that would occur if any accessory were found
guilty where the principal was found innocent.4 5 "What should we
think of the God who suffered the principal to come clean from the
40. If A's assistance was solicited by C but his presence in no way aided B, that
is, if A with no intent to aid B goes to the scene of the crime and, unknown to B,
watches as B murders X, A would not be an aider and abettor. His liability, if any,
would rest upon his prior agreement with A and would be that of an accessory. W.
LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 18, at 498, 503.
41. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 18.
42. People v. Hodges, 27 Cal. 340, 341 (1865).
43. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 18, at 499.
44. Id. at 499-500.
45. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 27, at 509.
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ordeal after the accessory had blistered his hand. 46 Modern legisla-
tures, less troubled by such contradictions, have for the most part elim-
inated these rules. Nevertheless, most statutes still employ common-law
terms to describe parties to a crime. When a statute uses a common-
law term without defining it, the legislature is presumed to have in-
tended the common law meaning.47 Therefore, "it is still necessary to
apply the common law rules in order to determine whether a person,
who is absent when a crime is committed by another, is guilty as a
principal. 48
B. Some Modern Interpretations of the Common-Law Concepts
of Parties to a Crime
In Morei v. United States,'49 a physician, Dr. Matthew Platt, was
convicted of various charges arising out of the sale of heroin to an in-
former. Dr. Platt, who was well known for his interest in horse racing,
was approached by Paul Beach, who was acting under the direction of
government narcotics agents. Beach asked Platt if he would supply her-
oin to stimulate horses. Platt told Beach that he did not have any her-
oin but gave Beach the name of Louis Morei.50 Platt instructed Beach
to tell Morei that the doctor had sent him; and Platt assured Beach
that Morei would take care of him. 1 On appeal to the Sixth Circuit
the doctor contended that he was not guilty of any crime and the court
agreed. It rejected the government's argument that Platt was a princi-
pal because Morei could not have been in contact with Beach except
for Platt's actions. The court reasoned that this theory would open up
"a vast field of offenses that have never been comprehended within the
common law."' 2 It cited to the decision by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Peoni,5 3 and concluded that the definitions of aid,
abet, induce, and procure have nothing to do with the probability that a
result will flow from certain conduct.' Rather, these terms refer to the
46. Id. at 509.
47. U.S. v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957).
48. Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827, 830 (6th Cir. 1942).
49. 127 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1942).
50. Id. at 829.
51. Id. at 830.
52. Id. at 831.
53. 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938).
54. Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d at 831.
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specific conduct of the accused.55
There was no evidence of an agreement between Platt and Morei
(which would have made Platt an accessory) nor was Platt actually or
constructively present when the crime was committed (which would
have made him an aider and abettor). Platt's actions, which undoubt-
edly contributed to the crime, were insufficient, in the eyes of the
Morei court, to establish the doctor's criminal responsibility. Thus, in
the court's view assistance alone may not be sufficient to make one ac-
countable for the commission of an offense. Assistance must be joined
with some sort of mental element. In Morei, Dr. Platt clearly knew
that Beach wanted heroin. But the court did not believe that merely
knowing that one's services or products would be used for illicit pur-
poses was sufficient to establish liability. 56 To be held accountable, it
ruled, the accomplice must have the same intent as the principal. 57
Fundamentally, what was missing in Morel was any evidence of an
agreement on Platt's part to aid Morei in distributing heroin. Such evi-
dence was required since Platt was charged only with being an acces-
sory to Morei's crime. But what if Beach had been charged with an
offense? That is, what if Platt had been accused of being an accessory
to Beach's crime? There were, after all, direct talks between Platt and
Beach. 58 The Ninth Circuit faced this very situation in Robinson v.
United States.59 The defendant, Jesse Robinson, was charged as an
aider and abettor to the purchase of heroin by Tom Lowe. Robinson's
only involvement, however, was providing Lowe with a telephone num-
ber."' The government argued that providing the telephone number
made it easier for Lowe to commit his crime.6 1 Relying on Morei, the
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument. According to the court, Robin-
son's aid was no different from the aid given Lowe by the telephone
company or even by the company that manufactured Lowe's automo-
bile.62 The Robinson court conceded that these acts could be consid-
ered links in the chain of causation, but refused to extend criminal lia-
bility to such acts. 3
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 829.
59. 262 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1959).
60. Id. at 647.
61. Id. at 649.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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Surely there is a difference between a person who knowingly pro-
vides the telephone number of a source of heroin and a person who
ignorantly provides a service to one who, in part aided by that service,
goes out and commits a crime. The analogy in Robinson is faulty be-
cause there was no evidence that the telephone company knew that
Lowe intended to use their equipment to purchase heroin. Where a ven-
dor knows that his goods or services will be used for an illegal purpose
his liability depends upon whether that knowledge can be equated with
intent." This is because society holds liable only those accessories who
actually intend for a crime to occur.6 5 A better rationale for absolving
Robinson of responsibility would be that the act of giving Lowe a tele-
phone number, even with the knowledge of how Lowe intended to use
it, was not sufficient to show that he wanted Lowe to purchase heroin.66
Lowe's actions were insufficient evidence of an agreement between the
two. Where a crime occurs as the result of a criminal conspiracy, how-
ever, the situation is quite different. There, at least for some purposes,
the conspirator does share the same criminal intent as the principal in
64. Peoni, 100 F.2d at 403.
65. Id.
66. Where a vendor knowingly profits from the use of his goods or services for
the commission of a crime it seems reasonable for that vendor to be subject to some
form of liability. Lafave and Scott, citing Jindra v. United States, 69 F.2d 429 (5th
Cir. 1934) and Vukich v. United States, 28 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1928), discuss the liabil-
ity of the vendor who "sells with knowledge that the subject of the sale will be used in
commission of a crime," and note that, "The earlier decisions generally held that aid
with knowledge was enough. . . ." They argue, however, that the better view, as ex-
pressed in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938), is that the vendor must
himself wish the crime to occur. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 18, at 508.
Not everyone subscribes to this view. See, e.g., Backnm v. United States, 112 F.2d
635 (4th Cir. 1940) ("The seller may not ignore the purpose for which the purchase is
made if he is advised of that purpose, or wash his hands of the aid that he has given the
perpetrator of a felony by the plea that he has merely made a sale of merchandise. One
who sells a gun to another knowing that he is buying it to commit a murder would
hardly escape conviction as an accessory to the murder by showing that he received full
price for the gun. . .") Id. at 637.
A compromise between these two views is reflected in the Criminal Code Reform
Act of 1981. If enacted it would create a new category of offense which would punish
those who knowingly (as opposed to intentionally) facilitate the commission of an of-
fense by providing substantial assistance to the principal. This offense applies only to
persons who provide substantial assistance and limits punishment to that applicable to
offenses two grades below the offenses facilitated. Report of the Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, To Accompany § 1630, Criminal Code Reform Act of
1981, S. REP. No. 97-307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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the first degree.
III. The Law of Conspiracy
Most jurisdictions define a conspiracy as a combination between
two or more persons formed for the purpose of doing either an unlawful
act or a lawful act by unlawful means. 7 The gist of the offense is the
agreement and thus conspirators may be punished even where the pur-
pose of the conspiracy is not achieved.68 What distinguishes the acces-
sory before the fact from the conspirator is that the accessory's liability
depends upon the completion of a substantive offense while the conspir-
ator's liability begins from the moment that he enters into an unlawful
agreement.6 9 The terms accessory and principal are therefore merely
descriptive of a role played by a party to a crime, while the term con-
spiracy describes a crime itself. An accessory before the fact will al-
ways be chargeable as a conspirator although not every conspirator will
be chargeable as an accessory. This fact is significant for two reasons.
From the standpoint of prosecutorial discretion, it means that whenever
the purpose of a conspiracy is achieved, an individual conspirator may
be charged with two offenses; a substantive offense, based upon his role
as an accessory to a completed crime, and a conspiracy by virtue of his
entry into an unlawful agreement. From an evidentiary standpoint, it
means that in establishing an individual's liability for the commission
of a crime, a finder of fact may consider an individual's membership in
a conspiracy in order to determine whether that individual is an acces-
sory before the fact. In other words, liability for the commission of a
substantive offense does not flow from membership in a conspiracy, but
rather evidence of one's membership in a conspiracy may establish
one's role as an accessory before the fact.
Although closely related, there exists a fundamental difference be-
tween the liability of the conspirator and that of the accessory. A con-
67. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 18, at 454; United States v. Hutto, 256
U.S. 524, 528-29 (1921).
68. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 18, at 454; United States v. Rabino-
wich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915).
69. Compare United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78 (holding that a conspira-
tor may be punished even when the purpose of the conspiracy is not achieved) and
Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1945) (noting that an overt act was not re-
quired at common law) with United States v. Rodgers, 419 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1969)
(holding that the failure to show that anyone had instigated a riot precluded the defen-
dants' convictions for aiding and abetting).
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spirator's liability attaches from the moment he enters into the conspir-
atorial agreement.7 0  Although a jurisdiction may require the
commission of some overt act7" as a condition for a conspiracy prosecu-
tion, and although, as an evidentiary matter, the acts and statements of
co-conspirators (even those occurring before the defendant joined the
conspiracy) may be introduced against other co-conspirators, it is the
agreement and nothing else which society finds offensive.7 2 An acces-
sory's liability, however, depends upon the completion of an actual
crime.73 Contrary to what most critics of accomplice liability maintain,
an accessory is responsible only for the acts of his confederates which
occurred subsequent to and as a result of the accessory's actual assis-
tance or encouragement.
The relationship between conspiracy and accessories before the
fact was recognized by the Supreme Court of Illinois in a case which
arose out of the infamous Haymarket Square Massacre. In The An-
archist Case,4 the defendants, members of a revolutionary society,
convened an open air meeting near Haymarket Square in Chicago.
Bombs were manufactured and distributed by one of the defendants
before the meeting and speeches began.75 The crowd became excited
and when the police attempted to disperse them a bomb exploded, kill-
ing a large number of police. There was no evidence that any of the
defendants threw the bomb.7 6 Nevertheless, each was convicted of mur-
der. In upholding the defendants' convictions, the court first noted that
each was a member of a conspiracy which preached the overthrow of
the government and which manufactured bombs to be used in the
revolution. The defendants' liability, however, did not flow from their
membership in the conspiracy. Rather, the evidence of the conspiracy
was used to show a common design to encourage the violence which
occurred. Its purpose at trial was to establish the position of the mem-
70. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 18, at 459.
71. While the common law did not predicate conspirational liability on the com-
mission of an overt act, see, e.g.. Fiswick v. U.S., 329 U.S. 211, 216 n.4 (1946) , many
modern statutes do. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1981), which predicates liability on the
doing of any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, with 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1981)
which has no such requirements.
72. U.S. v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 88.
73. See supra note 26.
74. 122 Ill. 1, 12 N.E. 865, affid on other grounds, 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
75. Id. at 100, 12 N.E. at 914.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 119-20, 133-34, 12 N.E. 923-24, 930-31.
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bers of the conspiracy as accessories so that they could be found liable
for the crime of murder under an accomplice liability theory."8
IV. An Analysis of the Pinkerton Rule
Although the evidence presented at trial in Pinkerton v. United
States 9 demonstrated the existence of a conspiracy, there was no evi-
dence to connect Daniel Pinkerton to any action taken in regard to the
untaxed whiskey.80 Nevertheless, the jury was instructed that if they
found the defendants to be members of a conspiracy they could, on that
basis alone, convict the defendants of any substantive act committed infurtherance of the conspiracy."' In upholding Daniel Pinkerton's con-
victions for substantive violations of the Internal Revenue Code, Justice
Douglas focused upon that body of conspiracy law which holds that the
overt act of one partner to a crime is attributable to all. 2 Since an
overt act is an essential ingredient in the crime of conspiracy, the Court
did not "see [any reason] why the same or other acts in furtherance of
the conspiracy . . . [should not be] attributable to the others for the
purpose of holding them responsible for the substantive offense."8"
The Court's reliance on those authorities that attribute to all
members of a conspiracy the overt acts of any one conspirator has been
severely criticized." As critics of Pinkerton have correctly pointed out,
the purpose of the overt act rule is simply to establish that a conspiracy
has passed beyond mere words; that it has reached a point where it
poses a sufficiently real threat to society that sanctions should be im-
posed.85 Its function is solely to prevent persons from being prosecuted
for making assertions that they had no intention to act upon. The overt
act, which may be purely innocent and lawful in itself, is wholly sepa-
rate from the conspiracy.88 Contrary to the dicta in Pinkerton, 7 it is
78. Id. at 102, 225-26, 12 N.E. at 915, 974.
79. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
80. Id. at 645.
81. Id. at 645, n.6.
82. Id. at 647.
83. 328 U.S. at 647.
84. Note, supra note 15, at 998; Recent Decisions, supra note 14, at 277.
85. Recent Decisions, supra note 14 at 277. People v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 48, 58,
399 N.E.2d 1177, 1182 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. Quamina v. New York, 446 U.
S. 942 (1980).
86. Recent Decisions, supra note 14, at 277.
87. While the court's statement at page 647 that "an overt act is an essential
[Vol. 8
37
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
A Defense of Accomplice Liability
not even an essential element of a conspiracy."8 To the extent that
Douglas relied upon the overt act rule, the opinion is flawed. But Doug-
las relied as well on "[t]he rule which holds responsible one who coun-
sels, procures, or commands another to commit a crime .. ."I9 This
second ground is the real authority for the Pinkerton rule and is merely
a restatement of the common law doctrine which holds accessories lia-
ble for the natural and probable consequences of their acts.
Many critics claim that the doctrine of accomplice liability is an
extension of the doctrine of vicarious liability to criminal prosecution
and that this is foreign to the common law. But these two doctrines
differ substantially from each other. The tort doctrine of respondeat
superior did not develop in its present form until just prior to the end
of the seventeenth century.90 Between 1300 and 1700 a master's liabil-
ity for the acts of his servant was confined to those situations where the
master specifically commanded or authorized a servant to commit a
tortious act.91 After Boson v. Sanford9 2 and Turberville v. Stamp,93 the
requirement of an express or implied command disappeared. From
1700 on, the doctrine was expanded to hold principals civilly liable for
any tortious act of their agents committed within the scope of their
employment and during the course of business." But in 1730, not long
after the development of the doctrine of respondeat superior, an En-
glish court determined in Rex v. Huggins9" that this doctrine had no
place in criminal law. A warden was held not to be criminally responsi-
ble for the death of a prisoner where the death resulted from the acts
of a deputy warden who acted without the command or knowledge of
the defendant.9"
It is important to distinguish the doctrine of vicarious liability,
ingredient of the crime of conspiracy under § 37 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. §
88" was literally correct it cannot be said that this requirement bears any relation to
the doctrine of accomplice liability, a doctrine which developed at a time when there
was no overt act requirement.
88. It was not required at common law and it is not required under federal law
unless specified by statute. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1945); United
States v. Cuni, 689 F.2d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir. 1982).
89. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. at 647.
90. Sayre, supra note 13, at 692.
91. Id. at 691.
92. 91 Eng. Rep. 382 (1689).
93. 92 Eng. Rep. 944 (1697).
94. Sayre, supra note 13, at 693.
95. 92 Eng. Rep. 518 (1730).
96. Sayre, supra note 13, at 700-01.
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which holds persons responsible solely on the basis of their business
relationship, from the doctrine of accomplice liability, which holds per-
sons liable only for those events which occur as a foreseeable conse-
quence of a criminal agreement.97 Those critics of Pinkerton who have
failed to understand this distinction have failed in part because of
Judge Hand's faulty analysis in Peoni. Judge Hand erred when he con-
cluded that common law jurists did not intend for accomplice liability
to include results which were the probable consequence of a criminal
agreement.98 His conclusion appears to be based solely upon his own
understanding of the words used to describe the accomplice's acts and
not upon a consideration of actual cases. An examination of case law
reveals that over a hundred years before the doctrine of respondeat
superior appeared, the principle of accomplice liability was well
developed.
In Regina v. Saunders,9" decided in 1573, two individuals, Saun-
ders and Archer, were charged with the murder of Saunders' daughter.
Saunders, who wanted to kill his wife, confided in Archer, who sug-
gested that Saunders poison her and who then procured the poison for
his friend. The poison was placed in an apple intended for the wife but
eaten instead by the daughter. Upholding the conviction of Saunders,
the court acknowledged that he did not intend for his daughter to die.
Nevertheless, ". . . it is every man's business to foresee what wrong or
mischief may happen from that which he does with an ill intention, and
it shall be no excuse for him to say that he intended to kill another, and
not the person killed." 100 The court, however, reversed the conviction of
Archer, finding that the death of the daughter was never intended by
Archer and was distinct from the agreement to which he was privy.10 1
While Judge Hand would undoubtedly have approved of this result, the
court's reasoning was very different from what he would have expected.
Plowden, who reported the decision in Saunders, analyzed the case in
unmistakably causative terms, "it seems to me reasonable that he who
advises or commands an unlawful Thing to be done shall be adjudged
Accessory to all that follows from the same Thing, but not from any
other distinct Things."102
97. Sayre, supra note 13, at 703-04.
98. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402.
99. 75 Eng. Rep. 706 (1573).
100. Id. at 708.
101. Id. at 709.
102. Id.
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Nearly 125 years later Saunders was cited in Rex v. Plummer.103
In Plummer, eight persons attempted to smuggle a quantity of wool
from England to France. Before they could get this wool aboard ship,
they were stopped by a company of the king's officers. A weapon was
fired and one of the smugglers was killed. It was not known which of
the eight fired a weapon; nevertheless Plummer was found guilty under
an accomplice liability theory. In reviewing the defendant's conviction,
the court noted that:
[t]he design of doing any act makes it deliberate; and if the fact be
deliberate, though no hurt to any person can be foreseen, yet if the
intent be felonious, and the fact designed, if committed, would be
felony, and in pursuit thereof a person is killed by accident, it will
be murder in him and all his accomplices.104
It was not known whether the smuggler was shot by a bullet meant for
one of the king's men or because of some motive unconnected with the
smuggling operation. The court held that it could not determine
whether the killing was a natural and probable consequence of the
crime, and therefore, Plummer's conviction was reversed.1"5 It was re-
versed not because the common law did not view accomplice liability in
terms of probabilities, but precisely because it did. It was this principle,
long recognized at common law, which led the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois in The Anarchist Case,106 to conclude that the defendants were
guilty of murder, not merely because of their membership in a conspir-
acy, but by virtue of their status as accessories before the fact, estab-
lished through evidence of their conspiracy.1 07
Commentators Lafave and Scott, two of the severest critics of Pin-
kerton, claim that the main justification in support of accomplice liabil-
ity lies in the fact that crimes occurring as a result of a conspiracy are
frequently performed as part of a larger division of labor; by declaring
allegiance to a particular common object, a conspirator has implicitly
assented to the commission of foreseeable crimes in furtherance of the
object.108 Critical of this rationale, they argue that criminal responsibil-
ity should depend upon "something more than the attenuated connec-
103. 84 Eng. Rep. 1103 (1701).
104. Id. at 1107.
105. Id.
106. See The Anarchist Case, 122 Ill. 1, 12 N.E. 865 (1887).
107. Id. at 915.
108. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 18, at 514.
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tion resulting solely from membership in a conspiracy and the objective
standard of what is reasonably foreseeable. [Otherwise, the] . ..law
would lose all sense of just proportion. ' 09
[E]ach prostitute or runner in a large commercialized vice ring
could be held liable for an untold number of acts of prostitution by
persons unknown to them and not directly aided by them. Each
retailer in an extensive narcotics ring could be held accountable as
an accomplice to every sale of narcotics made by every other re-
tailer in that vast conspiracy.11°
This critique, however, assumes that a conspirator's liability for a sub-
stantive offense flows solely from his role as a member of a conspiracy.
Membership in a conspiracy, however, is merely evidence tending to
establish the conspirator's status as an accessory before the fact."' It
serves as evidence of an agreement connecting the accessory to the
principal. Absent that direct connection, one can be in a conspiracy
with the principal but not be an accessory to a crime committed by the
principal.
Critics of Pinkerton frequently misinterpret the case as having an-
nounced a doctrine of liability predicated upon one's mere membership
in a conspiracy.11 2 For example, in State v. Small,1 3 the defendant
109. Id. (quoting from 1 National Comm'n on Reform of Federal Criminal Law
Working Papers 156 (1970)).
110. Id.
111. State v. Small, 272 S.E.2d 128, 136, 139 (N.C. 1980). The National
Comm'n on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws has recommended that the Pinkerton
Rule be abandoned because it raises problems which could otherwise be avoided: (a) Is
the co-conspirator liable for crimes committed before he joined the conspiracy, as he is
for overt acts (a principle which serves another purpose)? (b) Do different rules of
evidence apply to his liability for conspiracy and his liability for the specific offense?
(c) Can he be acquitted for conspiracy and re-tried for the specific offense? (d) Should
the test of withdrawal from the conspiracy be the same as for terminating liability for
the specific offense?
National Comm'n on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers 157 (1970)
as quoted in W. LAFAVE & A. Scott, supra note 18, at 514 n.14.
Each of these objections is the result of the Commission's faulty understanding of
Pinkerton. The doctrine of accomplice liability flows from one's status as an accessory
before the fact as evidenced by one's membership in a conspiracy. Properly understood,
the doctrine is not susceptible to any of these objections.
112. In his dissent in Pinkerton, Justice Rutledge argued that the majority had
violated both the letter and spirit of what Congress did when it separately defined the
three classes of crime. According to Justice Rutledge, "[t]he gist of conspiracy is the
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solicited someone to murder his wife. Although the defendant was not
present when the killing took place, he was indicted for first degree
murder. Under North Carolina law an accessory before the fact is held
to be distinct from the principal in the first and second degree. " 4 One
must be specifically indicted as an accessory, and an accessory to mur-
der can only be sentenced to a maximum of life imprisonment.1 5 Al-
though Small was unquestionably an accessory before the fact, the jury
was charged that if they found the killing to have been in furtherance
of the agreement, it was their duty to return a verdict of first degree
murder." 6 Small was found guilty as charged and sentenced to death.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina was asked to con-
sider whether the doctrine of accomplice liability could render a party,
whose conduct would otherwise be that of an accessory before the fact,
a principal in the first degree. The court said no and reversed the con-
viction. To the extent that Pinkerton, as well as its own decisions, had
announced an independent principle of substantive liability, the court
held that those cases were inconsistent with traditional common law
limitations on liability.1 7 Thus, under no acceptable theory could the
court consider Small to be a principal. Although finding the Pinkerton
rule to be unsound," 8 the court correctly held that, to the extent that
agreement. . ." While "that of aiding, abetting or counseling is consciously advising
or assisting another to commit particular offenses .... But when conspiracy has rip-
ened into completed crime, or has advanced to the stage of aiding and abetting, it
becomes easy to disregard their differences and loosely to treat one as identical with the
other . . . ." 328 U.S. at 649.
What Justice Rutledge failed to recognize, however, is that Congress itself blurred
the distinctions when it placed aiders and abettors and accessories before the fact
within the same statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1981). While it is true that the gist of
conspiracy is the agreement and that there are significant differences between a con-
spirator and an aider and abettor there is no difference between what a conspirator
does and what an accessory does. A distinction arises only when a substantive crime is
committed as a result of an agreement.
113. 272 S.E.2d 128 (N.C. 1980).
114. Id. at 132-133.
115. Id. at 131 n.2.
116. Id. at 131.
117. Id. at 134.
118. Id. at 134.
"Such a broad reading [of Pinkerton] leads to the rather startling result
that a conspirator's criminal liability for the act of another may be based
less upon the circumstances of his personal participation than upon his
presumed status as 'partner' in all actions which proximately result from
the venture originally agreed upon. Fictions and presumption derived from
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an individual's membership in a conspiracy is evidence of that individ-
ual's status as an accessory before the fact, he may be held responsible
for the acts of the principal committed in furtherance of the criminal
agreement.11 9
In a dramatic fashion Small demonstrates the importance of un-
derstanding the true nature of accomplice liability. At common law
there are only three parties to a crime. Each party is responsible for the
natural and probable consequences of his acts. A principal in the first
degree is responsible for the death of any human being if that death
results from his attempt to kill a specific human being. A principal in
the second degree is likewise held responsible for any act done by the
principal in the first degree with his assistance. An accessory before the
fact is held responsible for any act taken by the principals which is a
natural and probable consequence of their criminal agreement. This is
the doctrine of accomplice liability. Membership in a conspiracy does
not make a conspirator automatically a party to a substantive offense.
Membership in a conspiracy, however, is evidence of his status as an
accessory before the fact and, to the extent that he is an accessory
before the fact, he is responsible for the natural and probable conse-
quence of his actions. 2°
the civil law of agency and partnership thus commingle with tort law no-
tions of foreseeability and proximate cause to provide a stew of expanded
criminal liability."
id.
119. Id. at 136-37-.
In sum, a defendant's conspiratorial involvement may often be strong evi-
dence of his liability as a party to a crime which arose out of the conspir-
acy. His status as a party- whether he is to be deemed a principal or an
accessory before the fact - will nevertheless turn upon his presence at or
absence from the place of the crime's commission. His involvement in con-
spiracy itself will not alone make him a principal, or, for that matter, an
accessory either. . . . For reasons stated earlier and for those which follow,
we conclude that the co-conspirator rule in this state is not and has never
been intended to be taken as a separate rule of substantive liability which
erases the common law distinctions among criminal parties. Any indica-
tions in our case law to the contrary are expressly disapproved.
Id.
120. The critics of Pinkerton are not the only ones who have made this mistake.
The Criminal Reform Act of 1981, § 1630 codifies Pinkerton on the belief that Pinker-
ton announced a theory of conspiratorial liability independent of the common law doc-
trine of accomplice liability. The Committee's conclusion that, "the Pinkerton rule...
is firmly rooted in the principles underlying the law of conspiracy. . . ." Report of the
Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 66, though understandable, is fundamentally
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V. Conclusion
Pinkerton does no more than restate the outer limits of criminal
responsibility, limits which were explored as early as 1573. Should
these limits be constricted? Lafave and Scott argue that criminal liabil-
ity should not attach where a criminal act was not specifically contem-
plated and intended by the accused. 2 But there exists a fundamental
difference between an individual who with knowledge of a crime pro-
vides a service to a criminal and one who intentionally enters into a
criminal agreement. The argument that Pinkerton makes persons crim-
inally liable as a result of their negligence ignores the fact that persons
who voluntarily enter into a criminal conspiracy do not do so through
any act of negligence. The Pinkerton rule limits liability to those acts
which are done in furtherance of the criminal agreement and this pro-
vision protects accessories from the acts of principals done indepen-
dently of the conspiracy.1 22 Where, however, the principal commits an
act which was both foreseeable and in furtherance of the unlawful
agreement, the doctrine of accomplice liability does no more than hold
the accessory accountable for initiating or maintaining an otherwise
avoidable chain of events.
In Martinez v. State,123 although the defendant may not have in-
tended for a robbery and a kidnapping to occur, it is not likely that he
would contest the observation that violence is a foreseeable conse-
quence of a narcotics conspiracy.124 Of course, foreseeability is not the
same as intent, and to equate the two may be a fiction, but it is no
flawed.
121. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 18, at 516.
122. The felony murder rule is both a descendant and a mutation of the doctrine
of accomplice liability. Where the doctrine of accomplice liability requires a jury to
find that the crime was a natural and probable consequence of the criminal agreement,
the felony murder rule irrebutably presumes that death is a foreseeable consequence of
certain violent felonies. Where the doctrine of accomplice liability requires a jury to
find that the crime was committed in furtherance of the criminal agreement, the felony
murder rule will in some circumstances hold accomplices liable for a killing done by a
third party. The felony murder rule is thus susceptible to far more serious objections.
W. LAFAVE & A. Scott, supra note 18, at 560.
123. Martinez v. State, 413 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
124. Indeed as the Second Circuit has observed: "Experience on the trial and
appellate benches has taught that substantial dealers in narcotics keep firearms on their
premises as tools of the trade almost to the same extent that they keep scales, glassine
bags, cutting equipment and other narcotics equipment." U.S. v. Weimer, 534 F.2d 15,
18 (2d Cir. 1976).
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more a fiction than the principle which holds one responsible for mur-
der when the person killed was not the person intended.125
Fundamentally, where Lafave and Scott and other commentators
have erred is in their attempt to apply the principle of personal respon-
sibility to crimes committed as a result of a criminal agreement. The
general rule that persons are accountable only for those acts which they
intend and in which they participate makes sense when an individual
takes it upon himself to bring about a certain result. But where an
individual associates with others and his associates commit acts which
are a foreseeable consequence of their agreement, that individual
should not be permitted to hide behind his associates and escape liabil-
ity. Critics who have claimed that there is no sound rationale for the
Pinkerton rule fail to understand that society has the right to establish
the highest standards of accountability. The fact that this principle of
accomplice liability has been a part of our jurisprudence for over four
hundred years demonstrates not only its endurance but its position as a
fundamental tenet of the common law. Far from a radical departure,
Pinkerton v. United States is a reaffirmation of this principle. The Pin-
kerton rule continues to be a viable theory of criminal liability.
125. Regina v. Saunders, 75 Eng. Rep. 706 (1573).
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The Judicial System of Postrevolutionary Cuba
Luis Salas*
I. Introduction
Cuban justice is a subject which has captured the attention of nu-
merous American writers. Unfortunately, "few of them attempt to ana-
lyze Cuban legal institutions in detail and do not discuss what Cuban
legal writers have said about ... [the system] or how the new legal
texts compare with the actual practice of courts and administrators."1
This article examines some of the major changes which have occurred
in the structure of the Cuban judicial system since the rise of Castro
and how these changes have affected the courts and those who partici-
pate in the judicial system.
Cuban justice is not an isolated concept which can be understood
solely in reference to institutions and codes. The Cuban revolutionary
*B.S., North Carolina State University; J.D., Wake Forest University; Associate
Professor, Criminal Justice Department, Florida International University.
1. Berman and Whiting, Impressions of Cuban Law, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 475,
476 (1980). See generally L. SALAS, SOCIAL CONTROL AND DEVIANCE IN CUBA
(1979); Azicri, An Introduction to Cuban Socialist Law, 6 REV. Soc. L. 153 (1980); J.
BRADY, The Revolution Comes of Age: Justice and Social Change in Revolutionary
Cuba, CRIME, JUSTICE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT (C. Sumner ed. 1981); Azicri,
Change and Institutionalization in the Revolutionary Process, The Cuban Legal Sys-
tem in the 1970's, 6 REV. Soc. L. 164 (1980).
The only two empirical works which were based on field observations are: Ken-
nedy, Cuba's Ley Contra la Vagrancia: The "Law on Loafing," 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1177 (1973); and Berman, The Cuban Popular Tribunals, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1317
(1969). The most promising work may be that of Douglas Butterworth who cooperated
with Oscar Lewis and others in a thorough study of Cuban slums during 1969-70.
Some of the material involves interviews and observations of popular courts. See D.
BUTTERWORTH, THE PEOPLE OF BUENA VENTURA (1980).
For studies of specific institutions or laws see Brady, Fresh Winds on Rotten Sails:
Spanish Legal Reforms, American Parallels and the Cuban Socialist Alternative -- A
Reply to Antonio Beristain, 9 INT'L. J. Soc. L. 177 (1981); M. Azicri, Crime and Law
Under Socialism: the 1979 Cuban Penal Code, (Nov. 2, 1979) (unpublished paper
presented at the National Conference on Cuba, Center for Cuban Studies, N.Y.); M.
Tigar, The Educative Function of Criminal Law: Cuban Reforms in Comparative Per-
spective, (Nov. 3, 1979) (unpublished paper, National Conference on Cuba, Center for
Cuban Studies, N.Y.); Comment, The Socialist Constitution of Cuba (1976), 17 COL.
J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 451 (1978).
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process has been characterized by flux and internal struggle during its
brief history.2 A useful tool in understanding these developments is to
place them within the context of the political and ideological events
which have shaped them. Scholars, in their discussion of Cuban devel-
opment, have adopted a number of different historical models, grouping
events within different periods.' This article follows a model which di-
vides Cuban legal progress into two major periods: the revolutionary
phase, from 1959 to 1969; and the institutionalization phase, from
1970 to the present.
Changes in Cuban laws may be analyzed within two conceptual
levels: those affecting the judicial infrastructure and those transforming
the statutory scheme. This article concentrates on modifications to the
judicial apparatus, especially those changes which sought to transform
Cuban political culture by utilizing the judicial system as a tool for
change.
II. The Revolutionary Phase From 1959 to 1969:
Major Judicial Innovations
The first phase of Cuban revolutionary development took place
from 1959 to 1963 and was characterized by eradication of the old and
consolidation of power in the hands of the new regime. As portrayed by
Castro, this was a phase marked by "iconoclasticism in relation to laws;
we have to destroy the system, destroy its laws, destroy everything."4
Struggle was the main theme during this period. Conflict permeated
not only foreign relationships but was an integral part of domestic pol-
icy as well.
A. Conflicts with the Existing Judicial System
Clashes with the traditional, multi-level judiciary began early.
These centered on disputes over the exercise of power and intrusion by
the executive into what were previously exclusive judicial arenas. The
case that brought this conflict into the forefront was the trial, which
2. See J. DOMINGUEZ, CUBA: ORDER AND REVOLUTION (1978) and C. MESA-
LAGO, CUBA IN THE 1970's: PRAGMATISM AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION (1978).
3. See generally C. MESA-LAGO, supra note 2. For a discussion of legal periods
see Azicri, An Introduction to Cuban Socialist Law, 6 REV. Soc. L. 153 (1980).
4. Speech by Fidel Castro on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Minis-
try of the Interior, VERDE OLIVO, June 13, 1971, at 4, 63.
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began in February 1959, of forty-five members of Batista's air force
who had been charged with genocide. The trial resulted in the acquittal
of all defendants. Fidel Castro denounced the verdict publicly and
called for another trial. A special review panel was convened which
allowed the prosecution to lodge an appeal. The lower court's decision
was subsequently reversed and a second trial resulted in the defendants'
conviction. Despite protests from the judiciary and the organized bar,
the conviction stood.5
After this incident the government established, and exclusively re-
lied on, "revolutionary" courts for the trial of political cases. Its judges
were selected on the basis of political commitment rather than skill and
were often members of the armed forces subject to military discipline.
As a result of procedural amendments these courts were not bound to
the fundamental guarantees of the rights of the accused, ensuring the
speed, severity and certainty of conviction.' The creation of these
courts reflected a policy of parallelism and avoidance later followed in
the creation of other institutions. The traditional court system was to
handle civil and criminal cases while the new system was to process
those cases in which the accused was charged with a direct challenge to
the integrity of the regime.
Disputes also extended to the enforcement of a number of new
laws affecting proprietary rights. In 1960 the Supreme Court rejected a
number of appeals from The Instituto National de Reforma Agraria
(INRA) 7 and increased the reparations to be paid to expropriated land-
owners in several cases.8 At the same time the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a majority of revolutionary decrees.' The most
serious disagreements arose over jurisdictional issues. The Supreme
Court found unconstitutional, for example, a presidential resolution de-
claring the nullity of a lower court order. 10 It also set aside a law
5. F. MORENO, The Cuban Revolution v. Batista's Pilots, in POLITICAL TRIALS
94 (T. Becker ed. 1971).
6. For a full treatment of the first revolutionary courts and clashes between the
judiciary and the regime see INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, CUBA AND THE RULE OF LAW
(1962).
7. The Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (INRA) was the agency responsi-
ble for implementing land reform.
8. J. DOMINGUEZ, supra note 2, at 250.
9. During 1960 the Supreme Court only made one ruling of unconstitutionality
not related to court organization. Id.
10. La jurisprudencia al dib, sentence no. 5, February 5, 1960 (January 20,
1960).
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prohibiting appeals from decisions of the Ministry of Labor and over-
turned rulings by revolutionary courts which invaded the ordinary ju-
risdiction of the courts. 1
The primary tool for overcoming judicial resistance was the legis-
lature. From January 1959 to August 1961, the cabinet amended the
Fundamental Law, equivalent to the constitution, twenty-two times, or
once every forty-five days.12 In reviewing these amendments, the Inter-
national Commission of Jurists concluded that "all of the reforms to
the Fundamental Law converge in only one point: the concentration of
power in the hands of the governing group."'13
Judicial response to these actions was mixed. Several members of
the judiciary in 1960 began a movement for judicial reform to establish
independence from the other branches of the government. Others vol-
untarily resigned or were unable to resist the pressures imposed.' 4 Be-
tween November 1960 and February 1961, twenty-one of the thirty-
two justices of the Supreme Court resigned or were dismissed.'" A sim-
ilar pattern followed throughout the lower court system.' 6 By 1961, the
executive could boast that "all of the counterrevolutionary judges had
been removed but the judicial system continued to function in the same
manner. Its structure had not been changed."'1
By 1962 Cuba was rapidly moving towards a socialist model of
government. During these early years a debate ensued over possible de-
velopment strategies. At the core of these discussions were the means
11. J. DOMINGUEZ, supra note 2, at 249-53.
12. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 6, at 64-65.
13. Id. at 121-22. Some of the major modifications include authorization of the
death penalty in political cases; retroactive application of new legislation; elimination of
the right of habeas corpus; no appeal rights to the ordinary court system from decisions
of revolutionary tribunals. The justification for many of these actions was set out by
Castro:
We shall be respectful of the law but of the revolutionary law; respectful
of rights but of revolutionary rights - not of the old rights, but the new
rights we are going to make. For the old law, no respect; for the new law,
respect. Who has the right to modify the constitution? The majority. Who
has the majority? The Revolution.
Revolucion, March 23, 1959.
14. J. DOMINGUEZ, supra note 2, at 250.
15. Id. See generally INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 6.
16. J. DOMINGUEZ, supra note 2, at 249-53.
17. Harnecker, Una justicia revolucionaria, BOHEMIA, Aug. 17, 1973, at 48. See
also Roca, 8 A quienes debe servir la justicia revolucionaria?, MEMORIA DEL
SEMANARIO JURIDICO SILVIO MAYORGA 159 (1981).
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by which socialism could be reached. Ernesto ("Che") Guevara, one of
the primary leaders of the revolution, was the exponent of a "moral"
economy with workers being motivated by moral rather than material
incentives.18 Confronting the Guevara position were old-time Commu-
nists who advocated centralized planning based on traditional methods
of economic control, the formation of an efficient and organized bu-
reaucratic cadre, and the development of the Communist Party.19 The
conflict generated by these early years had dire consequences for the
regime. A substantial number of trained legal personnel fled from the
island leaving the courts understaffed and without direction.20 The re-
maining cadre were not fully trusted by the government, with suspi-
cions being directed at both individuals and institutions.
The regime was seeking a radical transformation of Cuban politi-
cal culture within a short period of time and experimentation was nec-
essary. In order to overcome these problems the government bypassed,
but did not eliminate, existing judicial institutions. A second, collateral
system was established which derived its support from populist organi-
zations.21 Creating these alternative forums achieved three important
short-term goals: it bought time for Castro's government to develop
revolutionary institutions to replace the existing apparatus; it provided
a check against concentration of power within any specific faction of
the government; and finally, it allowed the experimentation thought to
be necessary for the achievement of long-term goals of integration and
socialization of the citizenry. Although many organizations might be
discussed none is more exemplary of this than the popular courts. 2
18. See E. GUEVARA, CUBA: UNA REVOLUCION EN MARCHA, (1967); Roca, Cu-
ban Economic Policies in the 1970's: The Trodden Path, 12 STUD. IN COMP. INT'L
DEV. 86 (1977).
19. For a full discussion of this debate see: R. BERNARDO, THE THEORY OF
MORAL INCENTIVES IN CUBA (1971).
20. Cruz, It Took Only Three Years: The Destruction of a Law Firm, 50 A.B.A.
J. 63 (1964). See also J. DOMINGUEZ, supra note 2, at 249-53.
21. Mass organizations, characterized by universal memberships, were estab-
lished during the beginning of the Revolution. The best known are: the Committees for
the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) (see infra note 26), militias, worker groups, and
the Federation of Cuban Women. For a review of the CDR see R. FAGEN, THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN CUBA 69-103 (1969).
22. Another court structure created during this experimental period, largely as a
result of policies advocated by "Che" Guevara, was the Labor Courts. In order to carry
out the production requirements of the new economic system while remaining faithful
to the ideal of moral rather than material incentives, legislation was necessary to re-
ward and sanction labor. Eventually labor councils were established to deal with these
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B. The Development of the Popular Courts
One of the major judicial innovations introduced by the regime
was the establishment of popular tribunals in 1961. These were pat-
terned after comrades' courts in the Soviet Union and charged with
educating the rural poor in correct behavioral patterns.23 As expressed
by Fidel Castro, the goal of these tribunals was "to recognize and re-
solve these problems, not with sanctions, as in the traditional style, but
rather with measures that would have a profound educational spirit."24
Although their beginnings were modest, they rapidly expanded
and by 1968 there were 2,221 such courts, staffed by 8,000 judges, in
operation throughout the island.2 5 The geographical areas served by
these courts closely paralleled those of The Committees for the Defense
of the Revolution (CDR),26 with each neighborhood having a court ex-
ercising jurisdiction and staffed by an average of forty judges sitting in
panels of three.27
From their inception, popular courts were staffed by part-time
judges, selected from the neighborhood or factory where the tribunal
presided. The presence of lawyers was discouraged and formal legal
issues. The councils were composed of panels of five members elected by co-workers
and sought to modify worker behavior, using peer pressure both as a form of general
and specific deterrence. Though penal sanctions were to be avoided these tribunals
came to rely on fines as their primary sanctioning tool; leading the Minister of the
Interior in 1969 to complain that: "these measures do not contribute in any way to the
formation of the New Man . . , or towards the development of the concept that ful-
fillment of social duties is an obligation for all citizens, which is not fulfilled by
money." Risquet, La diciplina laboral es la condicibn indispensable para la victoria,
BOHEMIA, Aug. 15, 1969 at 70, 72. See also Perez-Estable, Institutionalizacion and
Worker's Response, 6 CUBAN STUDIES 40 (1976); C. MESA-LAGO, INVESTIGACIONES
SOBRE LAS CONDICIONES DE TRABAJO: LA EXPERIENCIA CUBANA (1963).
23. Berman, The Cuban Popular Tribunals, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1317, 1347
(1969). This appears to be the best published work on these courts although it is some-
what dated. For a discussion of Soviet comrade's courts see Berman and Spindler, So-
viet Comrade's Courts,. 38 WASH. L. REv. 843 (1963).
24. Cuba, Los Tribunales Populares, Verde Olivo, Oct. 16, 1966, at 24.
25. Villares, El pueblo administrador de justicia, BOHEMIA, Aug. 31, 1973 at
36.
26. The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) were first organ-
ized in September 1960. The committees were set up on every block, building or fac-
tory as a national vigilance system to combat counterrevolutionary activity. Their role
has since been expanded to serve as the primary grassroots political organization. See
generally R. FAGEN, supra note 21.
27. See generally D. BUTTERWORTH, supra note 1.
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participation was only found in appellate panels in which an assessor,
usually a law student, sat as a member of the review board:" Candi-
dates were proposed for these positions by the workers in the area
served and their candidacy was screened by mass organizations to de-
termine their moral fitness and revolutionary commitment. Legal edu-
cation was a barrier rather than an asset for selection.2 9 After initial
selection candidates attended a ten day training course at which there
was further screening. Advanced studies lasting forty-five days were re-
quired prior to taking office.30 All judges served on a part-time basis,
without monetary recompense, and maintained outside full-time em-
ployment in other sectors.
One of the most interesting features of the popular courts is that
their organizational scheme placed them outside the judicial apparatus.
Meanwhile traditional courts exercised jurisdiction over much the same
subject matter as the popular courts but each operated independently
of the other. The jurisdiction of popular courts was ill-defined and lim-
ited largely by territorial boundaries. Thus, courts located in rural ar-
eas were primarily concerned with redistribution of land and grazing
disputes, while those in urban areas concentrated on neighborhood dis-
putes, domestic quarrels and minor criminal cases.31
While popular courts were charged with carrying out traditional
judicial functions, their uniqueness lay in the integrative and educa-
tional role which they were designed to perform. They were left to their
own resources and did not have legal codes to guide them. Their deci-
sions emerged from their everyday experience and common sense. Pre-
siding over courts in store-front buildings or outdoors to encourage at-
tendance, the judges were to make the trial truly an educative function.
Judges were encouraged to inquire into the background of participants
to determine causative factors for their behavior. Sanctions were fash-
ioned in such a way as to personalize them and to reduce the need for
institutional supervision in their implementation. 2 Public reprimands,
intended to serve as a deterrent to both defendant and spectator, were
an integral part of all judicial proceedings.33
28. Berman, supra note 23, at 1338.
29. Janero, j Qub son los Tribunales populares?, Verde Olivo, Nov. 10, 1968, at
12.
30. Marti, Juezas, MUJERES, March 3, 1977, at 50.
31. Berman, supra note 23, at 1318-19.
32. Id. at 1329-32.
33. Id. at 1329. See also Salas, The Emergence and Decline of the Cuban Popu-
lar Tribunals, - LAW & SociETY REv. - (1983).
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It is difficult to fully explain the type of behavior of judges in the
popular courts without giving an example. A woman complained to one
such court that a neighbor had stolen her pants. The woman accused of
the offense maintained that she had purchased the pants. She proffered
to the court her ration booklet which indicated the acquisition of a pair
of pants in May of 1968. One of the judges on the panel interrupted to
state that he worked in the clothing industry and that the pants at issue
were not available in May of 1968 and, therefore, the defendant was
lying and had forged her ration booklet. She was found guilty and sen-
tenced to sixty days confinement at her residence. One of the judges
also pointed out that the daughter of the complainant was not attend-
ing school and ordered her to attend school even though she had never
been charged with any formal offense.34
The administration of justice in popular courts differed in many
important aspects from the traditional judicial process. The offender
need not have been accused of a violation of the criminal code as such,
but could be charged with a violation of socialist norms of conduct.
These offenses were vaguely defined, allowing the court to intervene at
any stage. Defendants were viewed as victims of the capitalist regime
and as such subject to re-education. Re-education was to take place in
a variety of ways with peer pressure being critical to the process. For-
malistic procedure was a barrier to the socialization role and in most
cases was the least important factor of the proceedings.
C. Problems in Transition
While a major goal of the popular courts was integration of the
citizenry into the revolutionary process, many of the policies pursued
during the regime's first ten years had dislocating effects on the popula-
tion and achieved results contrary to those desired.3 5 Revolutionary leg-
islation went beyond transformation of economic and political relation-
ships and initiated changes which struck at the core of long-held
cultural values. Facilitation of divorce and marriage, elimination of ra-
cial discrimination, challenges to religious beliefs and transformation of
34. Berman, supra note 23, at 1319-20.
35. In 1969 the government was facing a serious problem of internal order. Juve-
nile delinquency had become a severe problem and many youngsters had dropped out
of the educational system and were neither studying nor working. Absenteeism and low
productivity plagued the economy and there was broad discontent with the experiments
of the early years. L. SALAS, supra note 1 at 20.
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the role of women generated emotional and psychological strains while
other measures, such as the rationing of food and clothing, and geo-
graphical relocation, aggravated the situation.36 One result of these
changes was drastic increases in family disorganization, delinquency
and neighborhood disputes.
Rising social disorder led the government to call mass meetings to
consider these issues and possible remedies. During these meetings sub-
stantial criticisms were made with some of the most severe complaints
being directed at the judiciary, particularly the popular courts. The fol-
lowing concerns were voiced: 1) inefficiency and conflict resulting from
duplicity of jurisdictions; 2) diversity of sanctions being applied; 3) in-
formality of the proceedings; and 4) lack of judicial and political con-
trol over the actions of diverse branches of the judiciary.3 7
The difficulties in the maintenance of order were not isolated and
reflected serious problems in the economic model pursued during these
years. In August of 1970, Castro formally broke with the policies advo-
cated by "Che" Guevara and announced that Cuba was now "entering
a new phase; a much more serious profound phase."38 He admitted to
having made a number of serious mistakes, which he attributed to revo-
lutionary zeal, and called for reformation of the economic and political
model in line with established lines of Marxist thought.3 9 From that
point, Castro declared, decisions would be made based upon pragmatic
rather than ideological considerations. Planning became the watchword
of the new system with jurists being called upon to "play a more im-
portant role with the advancing perfection of our State and the new
mechanisms of the Economic Direction System. We shall need more
jurists, better prepared and specializing in different branches of law. ' '40
III. The Institutionalization Phase From 1970 to the Present:
Reformation of the Judicial Structure
In order to reform the judicial structure, commissions had been
36. See generally J. DOMINGUEZ, supra note 2.
37. The primary complaints were voiced against the popular counts with the
President and Minister of the Interior leading the charges. Del Valle, Speech at closing
of First National Forum of Internal Order, VERDE OLIvo, April 27, 1969, at 24.
38. F. Castro, Discurso en el decimo aniversario de la constitucibn de la Federa-
cibn de Mujeres Cubanas, GRANMA REVISTA SEMANAL, Aug. 30, 1970, at 4-5.
39. Id.
40. F. CASTRO, FIRST CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA (1976).
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formed in 1969.41 The work of these commissions gave rise in 1973 to a
new law reorganizing the judicial structure. 2 The primary reforms
were: unification of the judicial system into a pyramidal structure con-
sisting, in ascending order, of base courts, regional courts, provincial
courts, and the Supreme Court; integration of the judiciary into the
political structure by making it subordinate to the Council of Ministers;
collegiality of all courts which were to be integrated by law; profes-
sional judges who would all be subject to election and recall; right of
appeal in all cases; reorganization of the prosecutorial apparatus; and
abolishment of the private practice of law.4 3 Further modifications were
necessary in 1976 when the new Constitution was adopted44 because of
reforms in the politico-administrative structure.4 5 The new changes
finalized the unification process begun in 1973 by adding appellate
competence to lower courts over decisions of administrative tribunals
and merging the duties of base and regional courts into municipal
courts.46 Figures 1 and 2 provide the reader with some comparison of
these changes by presenting diagrams of the Cuban judicial structure
prior to 1973 and after 1977, when it took its present form.
41. Roca, El nuevo sistema judicial, Verde Olivo, Jan. 21, 1973, at 36.
42. Ley de Organizaci6n del Sistema Judicial, GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPUB-
LICA DE CUBA, June 23, 1973 at 57-58 (arts. 1-177).
43. Id.
44. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA, GACETA OFICIAL DE LAW REPUBLICA DE
CUBA, Feb. 24, 1976. In order to comply with the political changes in the Constitution,
a new law on the organization of courts was adopted in 1977. Ley de Organizacibn del
Sistema Judicial, GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA, Aug. 25, 1977 at 489
(arts. 1-154) [hereinafter cited as Ley de Organizacibn]. For a comprehensive review
see Comment, The Socialist Constitution of Cuba (1976), 17 COLUM. J. OF TRANS-
NAT'L. L. 451 (1978).
45. The new Constitution substantially changed the political structure of the
country by redefining the number and types of political divisions (e.g. provinces and
municipalities) within the country.
46. Ley de Organizaci6n, supra note 44, at arts. 33-50.
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A. The New Court Structure
Municipal courts are the lowest trial courts within the system and
exercise jurisdiction over certain civil and criminal cases.47 Trials are
presided over by a three-judge panel, composed of one professional
judge and two lay judges, with all members being elected by municipal
assemblies from nominations made by the Ministry of Justice.48 The
minimum qualifications for judges differ depending on the court in
which they serve. Professional judges must have practiced law for at
least three years as well as fulfilling other age and general require-
ments.4 9 Professional judges are expected to serve full-time while lay
judges maintain other employment and serve only during two noncon-
secutive one-month terms a year. °
Provincial courts are at the next level, serving as the primary trial
courts for serious cases as well as exercising appellate jurisdiction over
the rulings of the municipal courts.51 Unlike the lower courts, which
hear a variety of cases, these courts are divided into four branches: a
criminal division, a civil and administrative division, a labor division
and a division to deal with crimes "against the security of the State.15 2
A plenum of all judges acts as a supervisory body over their affairs.53
Provincial assemblies conduct the election of judges after they have
been nominated by the Ministry of Justice. Professional judges serve
five-year terms while lay judges serve two-and-one-half-year terms.5 4
The Supreme Court exercises ultimate judicial authority over all
inferior tribunals; distributing its responsibilities among five branches,
47. Their jurisdiction extends over criminal cases in which the maximum penalty
does not exceed nine months imprisonment or fines exceeding 270 quotas, as well as
indexes of precriminality and contraventions (minor crimes). Ley de Procedimiento Pe-
nal, GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA, August 15, 1977, art. 8 [hereinafter
cited as Ley de Procedimiento Penal]. Civil jurisdiction is exercised over cases in which
the disputed amount does not exceed 1000 pesos, family disputes, child support cases,
as well as hearing appeals from decisions of Labor Councils. Ley de Procedimiento
Civil, GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA, August 26, 1977, art. 5 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Ley de Procedimiento Civil].
48. Municipal assemblies are the lowest legislative bodies within the Cuban po-
litical structure.
49. Ley de Organizaci6n, supra note 44, at arts, 66-67.
50. Id. at arts. 68-69.
51. Id. at arts. 79, 83.
52. Id. at art. 3.
53. Id. at art. 36.
54. Id. at art. 75.
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similar to those found in the provincial courts, with the addition of a
military division. All the member justices, the Procurator General,55
and the Attorney General, 58 constitute the full Court, exercising super-
vision over the Cuban judiciary and making recommendations to the
National Assembly,57 the Cuban legislature. Justices of the Court are
appointed by the National Assembly upon nomination by the Ministry
of Justice. The President and Vice-President of the Court however,
while appointed by the assembly, are nominated by the President of the
Council of State and Chief of Government. The only other exception is
the judges serving in the military branch who must hold military rank
and are nominated by the Armed Forces Ministry. 8
In addition to these supervisory duties, the Court also exercises
appellate jurisdiction over all decisions of the provincial and military
courts. Original jurisdiction is accorded all cases brought against high-
ranking political functionaries. These may only be pursued with the
approval of the body of which the accused is a member and are heard
by the full court.59 All other cases are heard by randomly selected five
judge panels.
B. The New Role of the Judiciary: Lay and Professional Judges
Incorporation of the judiciary into the political structure was car-
ried out after a great deal of thought and negotiations. Proponents of
the new scheme questioned the whole notion of judicial autonomy,
claiming that judicial independence arises
from their abidance with the law. After all they are independent to
the effect of applying justice, that is their judicial function. But not
that type of independence, in the abstract, which has been pro-
claimed by bourgeois idealists. . . . Here the judicial system is an
organ of the State, just like any other, which has been assigned a
55. The Procurator General heads the Procuracy, the government agency
charged with upholding the law in all branches of public and private life. For further
discussion, see infra notes 106-117 and accompanying text.
56. The Attorney General may participate but may not vote in these meetings.
The Procurator General has full membership rights. Id. at art. 20.
57. Id.
58. Id. at art. 74.
59. The following persons are included: 1) members of the Political Bureau of
the Communist Party; 2) the President, Vice-President and Secretary of the National
Assembly; 3) members of the Council of State; 4) justices of the Supreme Court; and,
5) all procurators attached to the General Procuracy.
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specific task to fulfill.6"
New legislation achieved further control of the judiciary through
new reporting procedures and sanctioning mechanisms. 61 Under these
provisions courts must issue annual reports to their electing assembly
and be ready to answer questions regarding their activities.62 Assem-
blies may make recommendations to the courts and may remove any of
its judges at any time without cause.63 The judiciary may also take
other actions against its own members under certain procedural rules . 4
One of the major innovations introduced by the popular court
movement was the concept of the lay judge. This has been retained
under the new structure. The purpose of retaining lay judges in the new
formalization movement is twofold: the influence which popular notions
of justice might have on professional judges and the impact which par-
ticipation might have on the populace, with both groups seen as educat-
ing each other.65
Cases presented before Cuban tribunals are heard by a panel of
three justices, two lay judges and one professional judge.66 While lay
and professional judges are legislatively equal, in actuality they often
are not. Professional judges serve throughout the year while lay judges
only serve during two nonconsecutive one month terms. In addition,
professional judges preside over all proceedings and give legal training
to their lay counterparts. Indeed the term "lay judges" may be some-
what misleading. All lay judges receive some legal training prior to as-
suming office and must participate in continuing legal education classes
60. Sanchez, Participacibn popular en los nuevos tribunales, BOHEMIA, July 20,
1973, at 72, 73. See also Guma, The National Judicial System: An Integral Part of
Revolutionary Power, GRANMA WEEKLY REVIEW, September 5, 1971, at 8. The argu-
ment is settled by the Cuban Constitution, art. 122, which states that "[t]he courts
constitute a system of State organs structured with functional independence from any
other organ and subordinate only to the National Assembly of People's Power and the
Council of State."
61. Ley de Organizaci6n, supra note 44, at arts. 79-82.
62. Id.
63. The presence of the Procurator General and Attorney General on the Su-
preme Court provides further checks on the judiciary.
64. Ley de Organizaci6n, supra note 44, at arts. 87-91.
65. Speech by Bias Roca, in 3 REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 39 (1974). The
emphasis on this institution is not merely rhetorical. The Cuban Constitution, for ex-
ample states that "[iln view of their social importance priority should be given to the
judicial function assigned to the lay judges." CUBAN CONST. art. 127 (1975).
66. Ley de Organizaci6n, supra note 44, at art. 9.
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during their term, with prior service being taken into consideration in
assignments to higher courts.67
While the primary role of the lay judge has been to popularize the
judiciary, professional judges have progressively moved toward speciali-
zation.68 This is product of the need for a bureaucratic cadre within the
complex structure of Cuba's new economic and political structure.
Fidel Castro recognized this when he outlined the role of the judiciary
as "growing with the development of our State and with the mecha-
nisms of our new system for plannification [sic] of the national econ-
omy. We will need more judges, better prepared and specialized in the
different branches of the law."69 Adding impetus to professionalization
has been the creation of the National Association of Cuban Jurists,
formed in 1977. The organization seeks to bring within its ranks all
professional judges and attorneys and to represent their interests. 0 The
decision to exclude lay judges and the failure to establish a comparable
organization for them is indicative of the difficulty in simultaneously
emphasizing both the professionalism and the popularization of the ju-
diciary. A direct result of the emphasis on popularization during the
early years has been the dramatic increase of women in the judicial
branch. In fact, twenty-nine percent of the organizing committee of the
National Association of Jurists and thirty-five percent of the executive
committee were women. 1
Communist party membership is not officially required of judges
but revolutionary militancy is stressed in their selection and promotion.
In the courts we have comrades who are members of the Party, we
have comrades who are members of the Union of Young Commu-
nists and we have members who are not in either organizations but
are simply participants in our revolutionary society, ready to work
honestly in accordance with their knowledge and convictions. But
all of them need to know Marxism-Leninism, whatever their beliefs
may be, because Marxism-Leninism gives us the foundations to un-
67. L. SALAS, supra note 1, at 232-35.
68. The major trial courts and all appellate courts are divided into specialized
branches with judges serving lengthy periods in them. L. SALAS, supra note 1, at 221-
25.
69. F. CASTRO, FIRST CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA, 293
(1976).
70. Jorge, Congreso constituyente de la Union Nacional de Juristas de Cuba,
BOHEMIA, June 3, 1977, at 22.
71. Alvarez, La Union Nacional de Juristas de Cuba, VERDE OLIVO, May 30,
1976, at 16.
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derstand the phenomenoms of life and the phenomena of this
society.7 12
The foregoing raises questions as to the autonomy of the Cuban
judiciary, a common criticism of Marxist regimes, and a factor which
is undoubtedly applicable to political trials. While direct interference is
common in' such cases, the majority of Cuban cases involve common
crimes in which intervention is less direct and takes place in the form
of general direction rather than interference in specific cases. Actions
taken by the Cuban regime are indicative of this trend. In a recent
speech, Castro decried rising crime rates and called on the Cuban judi-
ciary to impose higher sanctions. After all, "[o]ur judges are revolu-
tionary judges. . . [T]hey come from the people to whom they are
responsible in the corresponding assemblies. [I]n the future [these
judges] will sanction with the corresponding severity those who commit
repugnant crimes as well as recidivists or those who maintain danger-
ous anti-social conduct. 73 The day after the speech a Supreme Court
justice was interviewed in a newspaper and announced his complete
agreement."'
Following the Castro speech a number of actions were taken. The
Political Bureau of the Communist Party and the Council of State is-
sued directives to the Procuracy" and the courts regarding procedural
changes necessitated by the struggle against crime. 6 Both groups re-
sponded swiftly to these directives." Similar results were obtained
when Castro complained about the leniency of the courts in dealing
with common criminals. Referring to one specific case, Castro was
quick to point out that "we can't simply act in an arbitrary manner to
correct an arbitrary action, we cannot commit an illegal act, especially
now, when we are exhorting all of the people to obey the law."'7 8
A review of the disposition of cases within the Cuban court system
provides a better picture of the independence of the judiciary: forty-
72. Roca, supra note 64, at 41.
73. Granma, January 31, 1978, at 2, col. 1 (speech by Bias Roca, president of
Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, Jan. 27, 1978 (quoting Fidel Castro)).
74. Id.
75. See infra notes 106-117 and accompanying text.
76. Repfiblica de Cuba, Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, Acta: Primer
Periodo Ordinario de Sesiones, 28, 29 Y 30 de junio, 1978, 231-272 (hereinafter cited
as Acta).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 216.
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three percent of all cases filed by the Procuracy during 1977 were dis-
missed by the courts as a result of poor investigations by the police and
the Procuracy.7 9 Thirty-nine percent of those persons tried in base
courts were acquitted, as were thirty-seven percent of those tried in
regional courts and twenty-eight percent in provincial Courts.80 The
Supreme Court attributed these rates to poor preparation by the
Procuracy, police and defense attorneys and refused to acknowledge ju-
dicial leniency as one of the factors.81 These practices extend to appel-
late courts which have overturned lower court decisions in thirty-three
percent of the cases. 82
Judicial autonomy is not only evidenced in leniency but is also
seen in those decisions by the courts which are contrary to policies es-
poused by government leaders. This is especially true when dealing
with the pretrial release of accused persons which in turn impacts on
governmental resources as well as it affects policy considerations negat-
ing the use of monetary measures. The figures released by the
Procuracy for 1977 reveal that the most prevalent pretrial measure was
imprisonment, being used in over fifty-one percent of the cases with less
than one percent of the defendants being released on their own recogni-
zance.8 These actions prompted severe criticisms from the executive
and resulted in new directives aimed at changing this trend." The fore-
going indicates considerable independence on the part of the Cuban
judiciary, probably resulting from renewed emphasis on professional-
ism. Party interference appears to be directed at dictating broad policy
decisions while attempting to remain aloof from everyday control over
judicial actions.
C. Procedural Innovations
The road followed by Cuban courts in establishing their proce-
dural norms has been inconsistent and rocky. During the first years,
procedural niceties were abandoned in favor of political necessity.
Criminal law was applied retroactively. The principle of double jeop-
ardy was violated at will. Suspension of the right of habeas corpus and
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. A comparison of statistics on reversals in U.S. appellate courts would be
misleading.
83. Id.
84. L. SALAS, supra note 1, at 231.
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expansion of sanctions resulted in ever increasing punishments.85 In or-
der to further expand these powers, revolutionary courts were estab-
lished as a separate entity from the traditional courts and defendants'
rights were further weakened. 6 The introduction of these popular
courts signalled a move away from the formalism of the civil law sys-
tem of prerevolutionary Cuba. No formal legislation was ever enacted
bringing these courts into existence and the absence of formal proce-
dure was one of its primary features. The emphasis of the popular
courts on example brought these courts closer to common law tribunals
than their traditional counterparts.
The 1973 and 1977 efforts to institutionalize eliminated many of
the experimental features of the early years. Cuban procedure is now
formalistic and adheres to traditional norms. The following safeguards,
under the new code of criminal procedure, are exemplary: 1) the pre-
sumption of innocence, requiring that crimes be proven independently
of statements by the accused; 17 2) the public nature of court proceed-
ings except in cases of national security or those in which the rights of
the victim demand privacy;88 3) the right to appointed or retained
counsel; 9 4) the presence of the accused during the proceedings; 90 and
5) the recognition of the privilege against self-incrimination.91
Under the new Code of Criminal Procedure, the criminal proceed-
ing is divided into two main parts: the preparatory stage and the oral
trial. During the preparatory stage features of the inquisitorial system
predominate, while the accusatorial system dominates the trial process.
The procurator 2 conducts the majority of pretrial proceedings under
the supervision of an investigating magistrate. A substantial modifica-
tion of this system is the transfer of this judicial function from the
hands of a legal functionary to a police official who plays the part of
investigating magistrate.93
85. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 6, at 85-114.
86. H. THOMAS, CUBA: THE PURSUIT OF FREEDOM 1458-60 (1971). Revolution-
ary courts, staffed with military personnel established with military personnel serving
as judges, were established to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over political cases. No
right of appeal to traditional courts was available.
87. Ley de Procedimiento Penal, supra note 47, at art. 3.
88. Id. at art. 305.
89. Id. at art. 281.
90. Id. at art. 132.
91. Id. at art. 312.
92. See supra note 55 and infra notes 106-117 and accompanying text.
93. Ley de Procedimiento Penal, supra note 47, at art. 105.
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Once the preliminary stage has been completed, a three judge
panel is constituted to hear the charges against the defendant. Strict
guidelines determine the order and manner of procedure within this
process. The trial concludes with the sentencing stage during which the
findings of fact and sanctions to be imposed must be considered. These
findings must be arrived at by a majority of the court with the panel's
range of judicial options limited by the crime charged and the sanction
sought by the prosecution."
Appeals take place by complaint, petition, appeal or cassation.95
Complaints are interlocutory appeals from decisions made during the
preparatory phase while petitions are interlocutory appeals from trial
court decisions. Appeals from final decisions take the form of appeals
or cassation, with the latter being the most common form of relief. 8
This indicates a return to procedural patterns common throughout civil
law jurisdictions and the adoption of a procedural scheme which has
more commonalities with prerevolutionary Cuba than with other social-
ist nations.
D. The New Role of the Courts
The role to be played by Cuban courts, within the new political
structure, is similar to that of traditional courts with one significant
difference: their educational purpose. 7 The goal of the court system
extends beyond mere propagation of legal knowledge. It ultimately
seeks the transformation of political culture, modifying Cuban citizens
into "new men" emphasizing collectivism and unselfishness. It is the
assignment of this role to the courts that makes socialist systems differ-
ent from their capitalist counterparts. 8
94. Id. at arts. 349-58.
95. Cassation is a civil law appeal procedure which seeks to overturn a final
sentence.
96. Ley de Procedimiento Penal, supra note 47, at art. 67.
97. The Constitution speaks of the following: 1) upholding socialist legality; 2)
safeguarding the Marxist nature of the State; 3) protection of common and individual
property; 4) safeguarding State rights; 5) while also preventing abuse of individual
rights; 6) prevention of crime and reeducation of offenders; and 7) to "increase the
socio-juridical awareness of the people, stressing the fact that the law must be strictly
obeyed, making timely comments in their decisions aimed at educating all citizens in
their conscientious and voluntary fulfillment of their duty of loyalty to the country, the
cause of socialism and the standards of socialist living." CUBAN CoNsT. art. 122
(1976).
98. Ley de Organizaci6n, supra note 44, at art. 4 (8). See also: Berman, The
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The Cuban courts accomplish this task in two ways: first, through
propaganda designed to enhance popular knowledge and interest in le-
gality; and, second, by "re-educating" those who appear before them.
The first method is carried out in a fairly straightforward manner with
the most active participants being members of the Procuracy. While
traditional approaches such as conferences or roundtables are used to
encourage popular discussion, the most innovative approaches have
taken place in the usage of the mass media." At least four radio pro-
grams weekly are devoted to discussions of legal matters with similar
patterns being followed in the print media and television.100 Perhaps
the most imaginative concept has been the establishment of literary
contests for the publication of novels which deal with crime investiga-
tion and prevention. 10 1 All of these approaches are directed both at ed-
ucating the public about correct notions of legality and upgrading re-
spect for the judicial system and its functionaries.
One of the principal mechanisms for carrying out the transforma-
tion of the political culture by the courts has been the legislative pro-
cess. Every new major law is thoroughly discussed at local levels prior
to implementation. The Law on Loafing, for example, was discussed by
more than three million persons in over 115,000 assemblies.10 2 Comple-
menting these discussions are serious efforts to arrive at a final product
which is easily understood by the masses.103
Educational Role of Soviet Criminal law and Civil Procedure, in CONTEMPORARY So-
viET LAW: EssAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN N. HAZARD 1 (1974).
99. During 1977 over 3,347 conferences were presented at worker and student
meetings with attendance running at slightly under 110,000 persons. They were di-
rected primarily at leaders of mass organizations with the expectations that they would
return to their membership and share their experience. Acta, supra note 75, at 291.
100. Id. "Sintesis del informe a la Asamblea Popular sobre el trabajo de la Fis-
calia General de la Repfiblica en el afto 1977," at 290-91.
101. Most of these contests are sponsored by the Ministry of the Interior. The
first one was held in 1972 and has since become an annual affair. Under the rules of
the contest anyone may submit a novel dealing with crime which will then be judged
not only on the basis of its literary quality but also on the image which it presents of
crime and functionaries. These novels have been published and distributed widely and
have become extremely popular throughout the island. Dramatizations on television,
movies, and radio are another source of propaganda and achieve similar results. See L.
SALAS, supra note 1, at 280-81.
102. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 1186. (The Law on Loafing was a quasi-criminal
law sanctioning laborers for inefficiency and absenteeism).
103. The following statement, in reference to the new law on court organization
is illustrative: "we have tried to draft the Code in such a way that it becomes a legal
text which can be understood by everyone, thus contributing to the struggle for socialist
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In addition to mass education, the courts also seek to transform
legal culture through the judicial process itself. Under Cuban law it is
not only the task of the court to decide on facts but also to "formulate
in their decisions opportune pronouncements aimed at the education of
the citizenry in the conscious and voluntary observance of their du-
ties. .. ."104 Courts are further encouraged to make findings on the
impact which the judicial process has on popular consciousness by in-
quiring as to the background of participants and the factors which mo-
tivated their behavior. 10 5 Courts have responded by protesting that they
are not in a position to gauge judicial impact and pointing out the deli-
cate balance which must be struck between education and safeguarding
a defendant's rights.10" The present emphasis on utilization of the judi-
cial process as a central tool in popular education is reminiscent of the
popular courts. It likewise faces the same obstacles. For example, while
it may be desirable to hold court sessions in outdoor sites to encourage
attendance, as the popular courts did, an undesirable by-product may
be disrespect toward the judicial process, something which is anathema
to the formalism introduced by the new court structure. While it is still
too early to measure the effect which the court system has had on pop-
ular culture it is clear that the system has encountered significant bar-
riers in achieving this goal.
E. The Procuracy: A New and Powerful Judicial Functionary
One of the major changes brought about by the new court system
has been the creation of a new and previously unknown judicial agency,
the Procuracy. Its duties extend beyond the traditional duties of attor-
ney generals' offices; it is charged with supreme supervisory power over
the execution of all laws.107 A great deal of latitude has been extended
to the Procuracy in carrying out this supervisory function. All adminis-
legality. The empire of socialist legality is based on a socio-juridical consciousness, it
demands that, not only there exist legal norms but that they are also widely known and
that everyone be aware of what they can and cannot do without risking a sanction. It
requires that everyone know and understand the law. One of the primary means of
achieving these objectives is the adoption of legal codes characterized by clarity and
simplicity in the language utilized by the drafters of the legislation." Roca, supra note
41, at 39.
104. Ley de Organizaci6n, supra note 44, at art. 4(8).
105. Acta, supra note 76, at 163.
106. Id. at 225-226.
107. Ley de Organizaci6n, supra note 44, at art. 108.
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trative and governmental bodies fall within its jurisdiction, allowing it
to review not only past conduct but also prospective actions of all or-
gans of State power.108 In some instances, as in the case of penal insti-
tutions, it has responsibility over day-to-day supervision to insure that
judicial and legislative orders are being properly carried out.109
The powers of the Procuracy are even broader with respect to the
judicial system. It supervises pretrial investigations and has arrest pow-
ers.110 Adverse decisions by the investigating magistrate may be ap-
pealed to the Procuracy which exercises ultimate authority in these
matters as well as the decision to prosecute.1 The Procuracy may ap-
peal any decision of a lower court. 12 In addition to its prosecutorial
role, the Procuracy shares a number of supervisory functions with the
judiciary. The Procurator General sits as a voting member of the ple-
num of the Supreme Court and is charged with drafting all new
legislation. 1
Another factor which adds considerable power to this office is the
independence which it possesses from all other State organs. The Na-
tional Assembly appoints the Procurator General upon nomination by
the Council of Ministers. '14 To assure independence from local legisla-
tive assemblies, the office is completely centralized and responds only to
the National Assembly.11 5 Regardless of their conduct, correctional
measures may be imposed on procurators only by their superiors. 16
The judiciary's power is limited to making recommendations alleging
misconduct to the Procurator General.'"
108. Administrative agencies must forward to the Procuracy copies of all resolu-
tions and orders for inspection and approval. If the Procuracy finds some illegality it
may complain to the superior involved and demand a formal reply within twenty days.
This complaint mechanism may be followed up to the Council of Ministers. Id. at Art.
148-50. In addition, the Procuracy is encouraged to hear citizen complaints alleging
administrative misconduct or abuse. During the year 1977, for example, 48,286 com-
plaints were lodged by citizens with some action being taken in over 10,000 of these
cases. Acta, supra note 75, at 284.
109. Ley de Organizaci6n, supra note 44, at art. 106(9).
110. Ley de Procedimiento Penal, supra note 47, at art. 105.
111. Id. at arts. 250, 261.
112. Ley de Organizaci6n, supra note 44, at art. 106.
113. Id. at art. 20, 106.
114. Id. at arts. 119-20.
115. Id. at art. 108.
116. Id., at art. 133.
117. Ley de Procedimiento Penal, supra note 47, at art. 93.
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The Procuracy is primarily a Soviet innovation."" Its broad pow-
ers are dictated by the complex apparatus necessary to manage Cuba's
centralized economy. Its role extends beyond traditional prosecutorial
duties and is one of facilitator, ensuring that national policies are com-
plied with while trying to maintain some function over a mammoth
bureaucracy.
F. Attorneys: Changes in the Legal Profession
From the inception of the revolutionary takeover there were seri-
ous clashes between the legal profession and the new government. Prior
to the revolution, law was one of the preferred professions for the Cu-
ban upper class and, as in most Latin American countries, there was an
abundance of trained legal technicians.1 ' As with the judiciary,120 the
case which triggered open conflict between the government and the or-
ganized bar involved the Batista aviators who were accused of geno-
cide. 1 21 A power struggle, for control of the bar association, ensued in
July, 1960 when a group of lawyers, dressed as militia men, took over
the offices of the bar association seeking recognition from the Supreme
Court which they subsequently received. 122 By 1961 a substantial num-
ber of Cuban lawyers had fled the island and most law firms were
depleted.123
The government's position toward lawyers was one of distrust. Nu-
merous speeches associated lawyers with the ruling classes which the
regime had deposed.1 24 In addition to the political connotations at-
118. For a full discussion of the Procuracy's history see H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN
THE U.S.S.R. (1963).
119. The College of Lawyers of Havana is one of the oldest professional associa-
tions on the island, having been established more than 100 years prior to the revolu-
tionary takeover. By 1960 it claimed more than 4,300 Havana lawyers as its members.
INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 6, at 67.
120. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
121. See F. MORENO, supra note 5.
122. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 6, at 63-9.
123. See generally Cruz, supra note 20.
124. The following statement is exemplary: "The prerevolutionary bar associa-
tions, in spite of the efforts of some of its members, were not capable of even protecting
the interests of individual lawyers in light of unemployment and low income. They
represented the interests of the large law firms. In the dispute between the powerful
rich client and a party of low or moderate means, the lawyer who represented the latter
was almost sure to lose. All of the advantages of the prior regime were in favor of the
wealthy and all the disadvantages were placed on the poor even though he/she were a
[Vol. 8
69
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
Cuban Judicial System
tached to lawyers, there were other reasons which contributed to their
decline: the importance placed on technical professions by the economic
demands of the "moral economy"; the view of lawyers as the consum-
mate bureaucrats so repugnant to "Che" Guevara's policies; and, the
potential threat that they posed to the political survival of the regime.
As a result, enrollments in the law faculties declined from a high of
2,853 in 1958-59 to 135 in 1970-71.125
Even though the importance of the profession was downgraded
during the early years, practitioners were able to adapt and even inno-
vate. In 1965 the first attempt to discourage private law firms and es-
tablish collective ones was introduced through the Havana Bar Associa-
tion as an experiment. 2 By 1969, twenty to thirty percent of lawyers
remained in private practice and had refused to join the new law
firms.1 27 In conjunction with the new law commissions, the Ministry of
Justice asked the commissions to study the possibility of establishing
collective law firms throughout the island.1 28 As a result of these meet-
ings the new law on court organization dictated the adoption of this
model.129
Under the new regulations, collective law firms were established as
autonomous social organizations whose day-to-day operations are su-
pervised by the Ministry of Justice.1 30 Members of law firms receive
salaries in accordance with employment contracts entered into between
,the law firm and the lawyer. This guarantees to each a minimum wage
while allowing rewards based on productivity.131 Fees charged vary in
accordance with a fee schedule developed by the national organization
and approved by the Ministry of Justice.13 2 Although general require-
ments for licensure must be met, primary control over entry occurs at
the law school level which demands high standards, both academic and
political, of applicants. 3 '
lawyer." Congreso Nacional de Bufetes Colectivos, 3 REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO
64, 66 (1974).
125. J. DOMINGUEZ, supra note 2, at 257.
126. Resoluci6n Nfimero 18 del Ministerio de Justicia, GACETA OFICIAL DE LA
REPUBLICA DE CUBA, February 4, 1965, at 130.
127. Berman, supra note 23, at 1339.
128. Congreso Nacional de Bufetes Colectivos, supra note 123, at 66.
129. Ley de Organizaci6n, supra note 39, at arts. 145-153.
130. Id. at art. 149.
131. A. PRIETO MORALES, DERECHO PROCESAL PENAL 142-45 (1976).
132. Id. at 142.
133. Together with the School of International Relations, supervised by the Min-
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In accordance with the Cuban Constitution and Code of Criminal
Procedure, all criminal defendants are entitled to the assistance of
counsel. 3 Counsel may be appointed by the court or retained by the
accused. Appointments are made on a rotating basis from the rolls of
collective law firms with lawyers serving pro bono. In almost all civil
cases, the Code of Civil Procedure requires that counsel be employed
by a party appearing before the court.13 5
The role of lawyers has been redefined during different periods of
revolutionary rule. By 1969 the criminal defense attorney was expected
not to argue "that his client is innocent, but rather to determine if his
client is guilty and, if so, to seek sanctions which will best rehabilitate
him." 136 The new legislation demands that attorneys define "appropri-
ately the interests that they represent, avoiding abusing appellate
mechanisms and the means of defense which the law guarantees in
such a way as to prevent justice from performing its social function.""',
This is not to say however that the defendant's interests are not repre-
sented, "not because we are afraid that these officials would use their
powers incorrectly but because this departs from the adversarial system
established in our procedure as a guarantee of an effective judicial
system."188
At the present time Cuba is in the unique position, among Latin
American countries, of having a shortage of lawyers. The earlier poli-
cies, combined with the flight of many members of the profession, have
produced some unexpected results. Women, for example, are heavily
represented within present ranks.13 9 In recent years, the new emphasis
on socialist legality and the need for more trained legal personnel have
led to renewed interest in the profession. This has resulted in high en-
istry of Foreign Relations, law school entrance is subject to a high degree of political
scrutiny, with a great deal of emphasis being placed on the applicant's degree of "revo-
lutionary integration."
134. CUBAN CONST. art. 58; Ley de Procedimiento Penal, supra note 47, at art.
281.
135. Ley de Procedimiento Civil, Administrativo y Laboral, GACETA OFFICIAL
DE LA REPOBLICA DE CUBA, Aug. 20, 1977 (arts. 1-738), at art. 66.
136. BERMAN, supra note 23, at 1341.
137. Ley de Organizaci6n, supra note 44, at art. 143.
138. Speech by Armando Torres Santrayll, Congreso Nacional Constitivo de los
Bufetes Colectivos, 3 REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 64, 70 (1974).
139. During the first years of revolutionary rule the importance of the legal pro-
fession was downplayed and men were encouraged to enter technical fields. Women
filled many of the vacancies left by the flight of men to other professions. Salas, supra
note 33.
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rollments at law faculties and a renewed sense of professionalism. 40
IV. Conclusion
The development of the Cuban legal system since the revolution
has followed a rocky road, paralleling the establishment of the political
and economic system. While the popular courts of the early days at-
tracted many foreign admirers, they did little to contribute to the insti-
tutionalization of reforms. Modifications in procedure and judicial
structure have supplanted many of the experiments of the early years
resulting in a legal system reminiscent of traditional Latin American
institutions.
Experimentation was only possible during the early years when the
primary goals were destruction of the old and survival of the new. Once
the revolution entered a stage of institutionalization, those qualities
which were the mainstay of the preceeding period became anathema to
the formalism and accountability which the State sought. Fidel Castro
spoke of this in 1971:
In this revolutionary process there is a paradox characterized
in the first phase by iconoclasticism in relation to laws; we have to
destroy the system, destroy its laws, destroy everything. We now
have two truths: the first is that capitalist legality must be de-
stroyed and the second is that we must establish a socialist legality.
And to us revolutionaries corresponds this dual role of abol-
isher of laws in one phase of the revolution and creators and de-
fenders in another phase of the revolution. And this is in agreement
with another law: the dialectic of history. So that we must all live
in these very two dialectical phases: destroying first and later creat-
ing. From the first phase a certain illegal spirit which downgrades
arises and this contempt is also applied as well to revolutionary
laws. 1"
It is still too early to forecast the ultimate shape which the legal
apparatus will realize but it is clear that it will not return to the tur-
moil and change of the revolutionary period. The leadership has
140. The number of law students had fallen from 2,853 in 1958-59 to 135 in
1970-71. J. DOMINGUEZ, supra note 2, at 257. During a visit to Cuba in 1979 this
author found law school enrollment to be rising quickly with more than 1,000 students
enrolled.
141. Speech by Fidel Castro on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the
Ministry of the Interior, supra note 4, at 63.
1983]
72
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss1/9
70 Nova Law Journal [Vol. 8
learned, at a high cost, that a judicial system cannot be counted on to
rapidly, if ever, transform the political culture of the citizenry which it
serves.
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I. Introduction
Equitable distribution is a method of dividing marital property ac-
cording to the relative contributions of the partners upon dissolution of
the marriage. As the name of the doctrine implies, fairness and equity
in the division of property are the primary objectives. In 1980 the Flor-
ida Supreme Court handed down the landmark decision of Canakaris
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v. Canakaris1 which formally introduced the equitable distribution doc-
trine to Florida. However, for the last three years the district courts
have given such an array of interpretations to Canakaris that it would
be inaccurate to say that Florida has definitely adopted the doctrine of
equitable distribution as an independent vehicle for dividing marital
property. Moreover, the courts making equitable distributions are pro-
ducing such diverse results that the outcome of a dissolution proceeding
is practically impossible to predict.
The objective of this note is twofold. First, an analysis of the pre-
sent state of Florida law in the area of property distribution will be
made. The reasons underlying the current state of confusion will be
discussed by reviewing the most significant decisions in this area. Sec-
ond, a proposal for statutory clarification of equitable distribution will
be made. The type of statute, as well as the factors and guidelines that
must be included, will be proposed.
II. Historical Perspective: Development of Traditional
Vehicles for Property Distribution
Dissolution of marriage2 has become an all too frequent occur-
rence in American society. There were one million dissolutions last year
and more than one million are expected in the current year.3 One of the
most rapidly changing issues in the area of dissolution is property dis-
tribution. Currently the law on property distribution in Florida is in a
state of confusion. The confusion is attributable to Florida's uncertain
emergence from a common-law title state to an equitable distribution
state.
In order to understand the development of equitable distribution in
Florida, it is necessary to consider the evolution of the traditional vehi-
cles used by the courts to distribute property and fashion dissolution
decrees. The traditional vehicles are exclusive possession of property,
special equities and alimony.4 Far more than any other reason, the in-
consistent use of these vehicles is causing confusion in the Florida
1. 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980).
2. In 1971 the Florida legislature changed the title of the divorce statute to "Dis-
solution of Marriage." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61 (West Supp. 1983). Thus, in this note the
term dissolution will be used instead of divorce in post-1971 references.
3. Divorce American Style, NEWSWEEK, January 10, 1983, at 42.
4. Child support is another vehicle the courts utilize to fashion divorce decrees,
but consideration of it is beyond the scope of this article. Child support has the most
indirect influence on the property distribution area.
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courts.
A. Alimony
At common law, the English eccelesiastical courts did not readily
authorize severance of the marital bond.5 Rather, the courts authorized
a type of separation by allowing the husband and wife to live apart,
while remaining legally married.6 Despite the judicially recognized sep-
aration, the husband was not released from his duty to support the
wife. Thus, as a concomitant grant of the separation, the courts
awarded alimony to the wife.7
American law incorporated the practice of granting alimony as an
incident to dissolution. Traditionally alimony was an award for support
and maintenance, 8 which the wife received with such unquestioned con-
sistency that it practically arose to the level of an undeniable right.9
The criteria for an award of alimony were the wife's need and the hus-
band's ability to pay.10
Permanent alimony is the traditional vehicle of awarding support
to the wife. Unlike temporary alimony which is, "an allowance made"
to a spouse "for maintenance during the pendency" of the dissolution
proceeding,"1 permanent alimony is awarded by the final decree of dis-
solution. The word permanent is used in contradistinction of the word
temporary to designate the character of the alimony.'2 The word per-
manent does not indicate "the amount to be paid or time during which
the payment should continue.' 3
Not only was permanent alimony the traditional type of alimony
awarded, it was traditionally made in periodic payments. The Florida
Supreme Court has stated that permanent periodic alimony is "not a
5. FLORIDA DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 187 (The Florida Bar Continuing Legal
Education 1976).
6. Id. at 190.
7. H. CLARK JR., DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASES AND PROBLEMS 446 (1980).
8. Bredin v. Bredin, 89 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1956); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 50 So. 2d 169,
173 (Fla. 1951) (alimony signifies nourishment or sustenance).
9. Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719, 722 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
10. Id. at 722.
11. Floyd v. Floyd, 91 Fla. 910, 915, 108 So. 896, 898 (1926); See also Duss v.
Duss, 92 Fla. 1081, 1087, 111 So. 382, 383 (1926) (temporary alimony is merely an
interim allowance given until final decree).
12. Soule v. Soule, 4 Cal. App. 97, 105, 87 P. 205, 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 1906).
13. Id. at 105, 87 P. at 208.
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sum of money or a specific proportion of the husband's estate given
absolutely to the wife . . . [but] a continuous allotment of sums paya-
ble at regular periods for her support from year to year." 14 These peri-
odic payments may be modified according to a significant change in
circumstances 15 and generally terminate upon the death of either
spouse or remarriage of the receiving spouse."'
In 1947 the use of lump sum payments of permanent alimony was
statutorily authorized." Lump sum payments can be in cash or prop-
erty of a determined sum, on a single or multiple payment basis., This
method of payment, as distinguished from periodic payments, is final
and non-modifiable.19 According to the 1947 statute the court could not
order both periodic and lump sum payments. A choice between the
payment methods was required. This continued until 1963 when the
statute was amended to allow the court to award permanent alimony in
"periodic payments or payment in lump sum, or both, in its
discretion. 2 o
The Florida alimony statute remained relatively unchanged from
1963 to 1971. Then, in 1971, the Florida legislature significantly
changed its divorce statute as a whole.21 The new statute is titled "Dis-
solution of Marriage," instead of "Divorce." The prior grounds for di-
vorce required a showing of fault, such as adultery, cruelty, impotency,
or desertion.22 The new statute abolishes these requirements and only
requires the parties to declare that the marriage is irretrievably bro-
ken.23 The no-fault concept is a recognition of the need to "preserve the
14. Phelan v. Phelan, 12 Fla. 449, 456 (1868).
15. See, e.g., Ruhnau v. Ruhnau, 299 So. 2d 61, 65 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1974).
16. See, e.g., Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1980).
17. Act of June 3, 1947, ch. 23894, 1947 Fla. Laws 539 (amended 1963).
18. See, e.g., Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 401 So. 2d 1372, 1374 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
19. See, e.g., Yandell v. Yandell, 39 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1949).
20. Act of Sept. 1, 1963, ch. 63-145, 1963 Fla. Laws 306, amended by Act of
June 27, 1967, ch. 67-254, § 16, 1967 Fla. Laws 560, 606-613, to delete the phrase "in
its discretion." Also, the 1967 act renumbered the alimony statute from § 65.08 to §
61.08.
21. 1971 Fla. Laws 1319, ch. 71-241.
22. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.041 (West 1969).
23. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052 (West Supp. 1983). Even though fault was re-
moved from the statute as a ground for dissolution, fault remains a consideration in
other aspects of the dissolution proceeding. See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying
text.
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integrity of the marriage" 24 while "promoting the amicable settlement
of disputes that have arisen between the parties to a marriage .... ,,26
To be consistent with Florida's emergence as a no-fault state, the
Florida legislature significantly changed its alimony statute. As
changed, the statute specifically states that the court may grant ali-
mony of a type that is either "rehabilitative or permanent in nature. "26
Further, the statute states that with either award of alimony, the court
may order "periodic payments or payments in lump sum or both."127 As
evidenced by the language of this statute, the legislature recognized
permanent and rehabilitative as two distinct types of alimony.28 In ad-
dition the legislature specifically designated two methods of payment.
Periodic and lump sum are not referred to as types or distinct catego-
ries of alimony in the statute, but rather as methods of making pay-
ments of the previously designated types of alimony, permanent or re-
habilitative. However, Florida courts have not interpreted the statute
precisely in this manner. In addition to designating lump sum as a pay-
24. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.001(2)(a) (West Supp. 1983).
25. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.001(2)(b) (West Supp. 1983).
26. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(1) (West Supp. 1983) reads:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may grant
alimony to either party, which alimony may be rehabilitative or permanent
in nature. In any award of alimony, the court may order periodic payments
or payments in lump sum or both. The court may consider the adultery of
a spouse and the circumstances thereof in determining whether alimony
shall be awarded to such spouse and the amount of alimony, if any, to be
awarded.
27. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(1) (West Supp. 1983).
28. Kahn v. Kahn, 78 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1955), has been credited with the intro-
duction, in this state, of the concept of rehabilitative alimony. Brown v. Brown, 300 So.
2d 719, 723-24 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974). The following statement by the Kahn
court illustrates the belief that women no longer are dependent upon men for support:
Times have now changed. The broad, practically unlimited opportunities
for women in the business world of today are a matter of common knowl-
edge. Thus in an era where the opportunities for self-support by the wife
are so abundant, the fact that the marriage has been brought to an end
because of the fault of the husband does not necessarily entitle the wife to
be forever supported by a former husband who has little, if any, more eco-
nomic advantages than she has. We do not construe the marriage status,
once achieved, as conferring on the former wife of a ship-wrecked mar-
riage the right to live a life of veritable ease with no effort and little incen-
tive on her part to apply such talent as she may possess to making her own
way.
Kahn, 78 So. 2d at 368.
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ment method, the courts are characterizing it as a distinct type of
alimony.
Although the concept of rehabilitative. alimony was not new to the
courts, it was not statutorily authorized until the 1971 amendment of
the alimony statute. The theory underlying rehabilitative alimony is
that if a means of extrinsic support is provided for a defined period of
time, the receiving spouse, within that period, will develop skills which
will provide the capacity for self-support." The use of rehabilitative
alimony "assumes necessarily either a previous potential or actual ca-
pacity for self-support" that has been dormant or lost during the mar-
riage, "and should be limited in amount and duration to what is neces-
sary to maintain that person through his training or education, or until
he or she obtains employment or otherwise becomes self-supporting."30
Whether the type of alimony is permanent or rehabilitative and
whether the method of payment is periodic or lump sum, the factors to
be considered by the court for making a proper award are set out in the
alimony statute.31 These factors assist the court in determining whether
the requisite need by the receiving spouse and concomitant ability by
the paying spouse exist for an award of alimony.
B. Special Equities Doctrine
The introduction of the doctrine of special equity significantly
29. See, e.g., Reback v. Reback, 296 So. 2d 541, 543 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1974).
30. Id. at 543.
31. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2) (West Supp. 1983) reads:
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony or maintenance, the
court shall consider all relevant economic factors, including but not limited
to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage..
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties.
(d) The financial resources of each party.
(e) Where applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable him or her to find appropriate
employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not
limited to, services rendered in homemaking, child care, education and ca-
reer building of the other party.
The court may consider any other factor necessary to do equity and justice
between the parties.
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changed the law affecting property distribution. Originally the Florida
Supreme Court used the idea of special equities in order to avoid the
statutory rule that an adulterous wife could not be awarded alimony.32
As such the use of the doctrine was "to describe a vested interest in
property brought into the marriage or acquired during the marriage
because of a contribution of services or funds over and above the nor-
mal marital duties."33 As a vested interest, a special equity was entirely
separate from alimony. 34
However, the courts have misapplied the doctrine of special equity
to justify an award of alimony, usually in lump sum. 5 Generally the
doctrine is used incorrectly when the courts are confronted with a case
in which the marital property is titled in one party's name, yet the
other spouse has made significant contributions to accumulating the
property. The courts recognize that the parties deserve a fair distribu-
tion of the assets accumulated during the marriage. Thus, an award of
property in the form of lump sum alimony is made to the non-titled
spouse, based on a finding of a "special equity." When the courts refer
to this type of "special equity" a vested interest is not involved. Rather
reference is being made to the general equities of the situation that
justify an award of the property to the non-titled spouse. This inconsis-
tent use of the term special equity has led to confusion among the
courts. Even though the Florida Supreme Court has unequivocally
stated that, "[t]he term 'special equity' should not be used when con-
sidering lump sum alimony; rather, it should be used only when analyz-
ing a vested property interest of a spouse," 36 the confusion persists.
32. See Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796 (1932) (award of alimony
made to adulterous wife):
The provisions of section 4987, Comp. Gen. Laws, section 3195, Rev. Gen.
St., to the effect that no alimony shall be granted to an adulterous wife, do
not preclude the ascertainment and allowance by the court of an amount
to the wife for her special equity in property and business of the husband
toward which she is shown to have contributed materially in funds and
industry through a period of years while the marriage remained
undissolved.
Id. at 1075, 138 So. at 797.
33. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1200 (Fla. 1980) (emphasis
added).
34. Id. at 1200.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1201.
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C. Exclusive Possession of Property
Another vehicle used by the courts in property distribution and
fashioning dissolution decrees is an award of exclusive possession of
property. Prior to the decision of Duncan v. Duncan,8 7 the Florida Su-
preme Court held that an award of exclusive possession of the marital
home must be for the benefit of the spouse with children and must
terminate when those children reach the age of majority.8 In Duncan
the Florida Supreme Court expressly rejected this assertion because it
is too inflexible. Duncan holds any exclusive possession award should be
either directly connected to the obligation to pay support, or necessary
to avoid a reduction in the property's value. An award of exclusive pos-
session should be for a specified period of time and must serve a special
purpose.89 It is subject to modification upon a change in circum-
stances.40 "The critical question is whether the award is equitable and
just given the nature of the case." 41
III. Emergence of the Equitable Distribution Doctrine in
Florida
Historically a common-law property state,42 Florida courts ex-
amined record title to determine who should be awarded the marital
property upon divorce. 8 If there were no record title, the courts traced
the acquisition of the property. Since the husband usually worked and
acquired his personal estate, while the wife worked inside the home,"
37. 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980).
38. See McDonald v. McDonald, 368 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1979).
39. Duncan, 379 So. 2d at 952. See also Richardson v. Richardson, 315 So. 2d
513 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (husband with custody of minor children awarded
exclusive possession over wife's petition to partition); Lange v. Lange, 357 So. 2d 1035
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (wife's award of exclusive possession justified by her
mental problems); George v. George, 360 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(wife with custody of a child, not a minor, awarded exclusive possession because as a
result of the child's handicap he would remain dependent on wife).
40. Duncan, 379 So. 2d at 952.
41. Id.
42. FLORIDA DIssoLUTION OF MARRIAGE, supra note 5, at 441.
43. Id.
44. If examined from a historical perspective, women have been at a great disad-
vantage relative to property distribution. At common law the husband was regarded as
the guardian of his wife. The husband acquired seisen in any estate in which the wife
was seised by his right of marriage, jure uxoris. Upon the birth of a live child, the
[Vol. 8
81
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
Equitable Distribution
this method of analysis traditionally resulted in an award of the prop-
erty to the husband. The wife was typically left with an award of
alimony.
Slowly, Florida courts have acknowledged the inequities of this sit-
uation. There has been a progression from the common-law view that
the husband is the sole contributor to the accumulation of the marital
assets, to the more contemporary view that the marriage relationship is
a partnership. 5 As a partnership, marriage is a voluntary contract "for
the mutual participation in the profits which may accrue from the
property, credit, skill or industry, furnished in determined proportions
by the parties.' '46 The view of marriage as a partnership has gained
momentum since the new alimony statute was passed in 1971. The
emergence of equitable distribution in Florida is a logical extension of
this partnership view.
A. Brown v. Brown: The Partnership Concept
The foundation for equitable distribution in Florida was laid by
the First District Court of Appeal in the 1974 case of Brown v.
Brown,47 where property accumulated during a 21-year marriage was
at issue. In this marriage, one partner contributed time to the home
and children, while the other pursued the accumulation of material
wealth. The parties entered the marital venture with no estate of mate-
rial value. Shortly thereafter, the wife exchanged her career as a regis-
tered nurse for the role of housewife and mother, while the husband
successfully pursued a career as an accountant. The husband accumu-
lated the material wealth in his name.
Had the Brown court analyzed this marriage from the common-
husband could use, occupy and even sell the land, free from any claim of the wife. See
generally C.J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1962).
The Married Women's Property Act finally created equality between spouses when
property was held by the entireties. King v. Green, 30 N.J. 395, 153 A.2d 49 (1959).
However, the concept of record title still remains. The inequities are apparent.
45. In Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973) the
court stated, "[t]he new concept of the marriage relation implicit in the. . .. 'no fault'
divorce law ... places both parties to the marriage on a basis of complete equality as
partners sharing equal rights and obligations in the marriage relationship and sharing
equal burdens in event of dissolution . . . ." Id. at 585.
46. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2801 (West 1952) (current version at LA. CIv.
CODE ANN. art. 2801) (West Supp. 1983).
47. 300 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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law perspective, the wife would have surely been given a blind award of
alimony, while the husband would have been given a blind award of all
property titled in his name. However, recognizing that marriage is a
partnership, the Brown court declared that "a new day has been cre-
ated. .... 1"48 The court stated that periodic alimony should no longer
be awarded in an automatic fashion, "in the nature of an obligation to
a stranger. ' 49 Rather, it should be awarded only upon a showing of
need and ability to pay. In addition, Brown emphasized that special
attention should be given to the advisibility of an award of rehabilita-
tive alimony, where, as here, the wife has the capacity for self-support.
Most significantly, the Brown court approved the use of lump sum
alimony as a means of adjusting the material wealth of the parties at
the time of dissolution of the marriage.50 The court said, the salient
factual concern is not the name in whom title is recorded, but "each
spouse's contribution to the marital partnership."51 Despite the fact
that the property was titled in the husband's name, the court of appeal
instructed the trial court to enter an award of lump sum alimony suffi-
cient to compensate the wife for her contributions to the marriage.
Brown v. Brown represents a critical step toward recognizing the
marriage partnership theory as-it relates to distributing the material
wealth of the parties in accord with equitable principles. However, by
using lump sum alimony as the vehicle for distributing property, Brown
significantly contributed to nearly a decade of confusion in the courts.
The court used lump sum alimony, which had been a technical and
traditional method of making alimony payments, and made it an inde-
pendent vehicle for distributing property.
After Brown, Florida courts became more willing to take special
recognition of the contributions of both parties to the marriage. The
courts sometimes made awards of the marital property according to
48. Id. at 725.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 726. Contra the dissenting opinion of Judge Boyer in Brown. He
stated:
Alimony came about during the era that women ...were placed on a
pedestal by male chauvinists. Women apparently found being worshiped
on a pedestal to be distasteful and commenced a virtual worldwide drive to
be removed from their place of superiority to a. . .lower postion of equal-
ity . . . "Success" has been marked by loss of many heretofore existing
superior rights, among them being dower and alimony as a matter of right.
Brown, 300 So. 2d at 727.
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these contributions, yet no vehicle was consistently employed to effectu-
ate these distributions. Some courts used the lump sum alimony vehi-
cle. 2 Some courts used the special equity doctrine. 3 Other courts used
a combination of lump sum alimony and special equity;54 while still
others declined to use any or all of these for the purpose of property
distribution. 55
B. The Trilogy of Landmark Decisions: Introduction of Equi-
table Distribution
In 1980 the Florida Supreme Court handed down the landmark
opinions of Canakaris, Duncan, and Ingram.56 Examining this trilogy
of cases, all of which concern the property distribution issue, the su-
preme court acknowledged the current state of confusion. The supreme
court stated, "[t]he decisions in this subject area, both of this Court
and of the district courts of appeal, are not reconcilable. It is our in-
tent, . . . to the extent possible, [to] bring some stability to this area of
the law.' ' 57 The Florida Supreme Court perceptively attributed the con-
fusion to the inconsistent uses of lump sum alimony, permanent peri-
odic alimony, rehabilitative alimony, special equity and exclusive pos-
session of property. In an effort to bring some stability to the area of
52. See Harrison v. Harrison, 314 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert.
denied, 334 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1976) (award of $100,000 lump sum alimony); Linares v.
Linares, 292 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (award of marital home as lump
sum even though no special equities were shown); Goldman v. Goldman, 333 So. 2d
120 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (case remanded for award of lump sum because wife
shortchanged).
53. See Hendricks v. Hendricks, 312 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(special equity in home due to contribution of funds by wife); Olson v. Olson, 321 So.
2d 462 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (wife awarded home due to special equity based
on loan made by wife to husband for pilot training, reversed and found to be within
realm of ordinary duties).
54. See In re Marriage of Arnold, 335 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(award of home as lump sum reversed because no special equity shown); Cann v. Cann,
334 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (lump sum alimony should not be
awarded unless there is a finding of special equity).
55. Niemann v. Niemann, 294 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert.
denied, 312 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1975) (holding courts are not allowed to simply divide
assets equitably).
56. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980) (the most noteworthy
and frequently cited of the three cases); Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla.
1980); Ingram v. Ingram, 379 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1980).
57. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1200.
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property distribution, it set forth definitions and proper uses of each
vehicle.
In Canakaris, the trial court had awarded the wife the husband's
one-half interest in the marital home using the vehicle of lump sum
alimony by finding she had a special equity due to her marital contri-
butions. The court of appeal reversed, holding the lump sum award
improper because the record revealed no special equity of the wife in
the marital home. The supreme court upheld the award of lump sum
alimony, but stated that the application of the special equity doctrine
was improper. Therefore, Canakaris holds the use of lump sum ali-
mony is not limited to "instances of support or vested property
interests." 58
Referring to Florida's alimony statute, the supreme court stated
that in granting lump sum alimony, the trial court should be guided by
all relevant circumstances to ensure equity and justice between the par-
ties.59 The court established new criteria for granting lump sum ali-
mony. "A judge may award lump sum alimony to ensure an equitable
distribution of property acquired during the marriage, provided the evi-
dence reflects (1) a justification for such lump sum payment and (2)
financial ability of the other spouse to make such payment without sub-
stantially endangering his or her economic status."60 Prior to this deci-
sion, need was the element required for lump sum alimony. Now, when
using lump sum alimony to ensure an equitable distribution, only justi-
fication is required.'
This statement by the Florida Supreme Court led the majority of
courts to believe that the proper vehicle for making an equitable distri-
bution was lump sum alimony.' The Canakaris court did not indicate,
however, that the use of lump sum as a method of making permanent
alimony payments should be terminated. To the contrary, the use of
lump sum payments for spousal support was upheld. The Canakaris
court stated, "[i]n our opinion, the award of the marital home as lump
sum alimony may be coupled with other lump sum alimony or perma-
nent periodic alimony awards if justified by the evidence." 3 In essence,
the court established two distinct criteria for the award of lump sum
58. Id. at 1201.
59. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (West Supp. 1983).
60. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201 (emphasis added).
61. Frumkes, Florida's Flight to Fairness (pt. 1), 56 FLA. B.J. 351 (1982).
62. Id. at 351.
63. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201.
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alimony. One criterion permits an award of lump sum alimony on the
basis of need plus ability to pay. Additionally, in the interests of equita-
ble distribution, a further lump sum award might be made based on the
criterion of justification plus ability to pay.
The newly endorsed use of lump sum alimony was to make an
equitable distribution. However, permitting ability to pay to remain a
criterion for making this type of lump sum award is contrary to the
basic theories of the equitable distribution doctrine. The first criterion,
justification, allows the court to make property distribution as justified
by the relative contribution of the marital partners. In fact, justification
provides for the use of guidelines to systematically determine what is
equitable. On the other hand, the second criterion, ability to pay, indi-
cates that the marital property actually belongs to one spouse who is
required to give this property to the other spouse to discharge a duty of
support. In the legal sense, payment is the performance of a duty or
obligation by the delivery of money or other value by a debtor to a
creditor.64 By including the payment element the Canakaris court has
interwoven the alimony theory into the equitable distribution doctrine.
By implication, one spouse is still making a payment to the other. Ar-
guably, this can only impede the proper use of the doctrine. Equitable
distribution should be used to promote the partnership concept of mar-
riage where property is acquired by the combined efforts of both par-
ties and divided accordingly upon dissolution."5
C. Canakaris: Confusion in the District Courts of Appeal
When Canakaris was first published, it was pronounced that equi-
table distribution had been adopted in Florida.66 However, within a
year, the district courts of appeal had given such an array of interpre-
tations to Canakaris that there remained as much, if not more, confu-
sion than in the pre-Canakaris days. In most cases, regardless of the
district, it is difficult to determine whether an award of lump sum was
used as alimony or in an equitable distribution of property. Also, it is
difficult to determine how the courts have applied the special equities
doctrine.
The First District Court of Appeal seemingly approved the doc-
64. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1016 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
65. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974).
66. Frumkes, supra note 61, at 351.
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trine of equitable distribution in Conner v. Conner.67 The court stated,
"[a]fter Canakaris, trial courts now have the discretion to use lump
sum alimony to ensure an equitable distribution of property acquired
during the marriage." 68 Similarly, the Third District Court of Appeal
approved the doctrine in Roffe v. Roffe69 asserting "the trial court's
power to fashion . . . an equitable distribution of the parties' property
. . . which we think has been granted by Canakaris ... .
Initially the Second District Court of Appeal gave approval to the
use of the equitable distribution doctrine. In Neff v. Neffl1 the court
stated, "Canakaris confirms the fact that marriage may indeed be a
partnership. . . . If, as often happens, the harvest resulting from mu-
tual efforts winds up in the hands of one partner, the equitable share of
the other can be allocated by a award of lump sum alimony."72 How-
ever, this district ultimately announced that the equitable distribution
doctrine does not constitute "an independent vehicle for an award of
property in a dissolution of marriage proceedings. '73 Similarly, the
Fifth District Court of Appeal has given both approval74 and disap-
67. 411 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
68. Id. at 901. See also Jacobs v. Jacobs, 400 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (award of lump sum may be made to ensure equitable distribution if requested).
But cf. Drozak v. Drozak, 424 So. 2d 120 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (where the
circuit court denied the wife's petition for either periodic or lump sum alimony. The
district court reversed and remanded because "the requisite factors of the need for and
ability to pay permanent alimony, either periodic or lump sum" were not respected. Id.
at 121. The district court made no notice of the court's ability to use lump sum ali-
mony to ensure an equitable distribution.).
69. 404 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (however, this court may have
furthered confusion relative to the proper vehicle for making an equitable distribution
by referring to the use of reciprocal lump sum awards).
70. Id. at 1096. See also Blum v. Blum, 382 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (holding court can divide assets fairly between partners using alimony); Cuevas
v. Cuevas, 381 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding court can use lump
sum alimony to ensure equitable distribution).
71. 386 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
72. Id. at 319.
73. Powers v. Powers, 409 So. 2d 177, 178 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (distri-
bution should have been made by resort to alimony or special equities); Sec also Hu v.
Hu, 432 So. 2d 1389 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
74. See, e.g., Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 401 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (award of $200,000 lump sum awarded as an equitable distribution); Thompson
v. Thompson, 402 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (award of lump sum
upheld as valid equitable distribution of marital property). These cases are reported as
being illustrative of the cases in this district.
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proval to the doctrine. 5
The Fourth District Court of Appeal approved the use of equitable
distribution 76 but later rejected its use in Sangas v. Sangas.77 In San-
gas the court announced that the circuit court had erred in disposing of
and transforming the marital property "by use of the theory of equita-
ble distribution as an independent vehicle for an award. 17 8 To deter-
mine the final judgment the trial court had used the vehicles of child
custody, child support, alimony, and equitable distribution. The district
court of appeal pronounced that property should only be disposed of by
resort to the vehicles of alimony and special equities, equitable distribu-
tion being an "end or purpose rather than a vehicle or remedy. '7 9
Thus, Sangas defined the equitable distribution doctrine as the out-
come to be achieved by the use ot the established vehicles of lump sum
alimony, permanent periodic alimony, rehabilitative alimony, child sup-
port, a vested special equity in property and an award of exclusive pos-
session of property. However, Sangas did not clarify whether alimony,
when used as a vehicle to dispose of marital property, employed the
traditional use of alimony based on need and ability or the more con-
temporary use based on justification and ability.
The Fourth District, after approing the doctrine and then disap-
proving it, has now re-adopted the doctrine, in Tronconi v. Tronconi.80
The Tronconi court stated:
[I]n Sangas we opined that Canakaris did not create a totally new
vehicle for the division of property; however, we now think . . .
that although the Supreme Court [sic] continues to quote tradi-
tional concepts in the vernacular of lump sum, periodic and reha-
bilitative alimony, we believe it has adopted the doctrine of equita-
75. See, e.g., Gorman v. Gorman, 400 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(where home is only substantial asset, and there is no finding of need or special equity,
property law concepts should be used for distribution rather than equitable distribution
doctrine).
76. See, e.g, Bird v. Bird, 385 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (lump
sum alimony award upheld as equitable distribution); Hurtado v. Hurtado, 407 So. 2d
627 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (when considered together, award of lump sum
alimony, permanent alimony and child support upheld as equitable distribution).
77. 407 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
78. Id. at 633.
79. Id.
80. 425 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (en banc). This case is now
pending before the Florida Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari.
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ble distribution de facto if not de jure.81
Although the Tronconi decision puts an end to the confusion over adop-
tion of the doctrine, at least in the Fourth District,82 the question re-
mains whether equitable distribution is "a vehicle . . . to effect equity
and justice between the parties or . . . [the] goal to be achieved by
awards of lump sum alimony .... 88 Tronconi quotes Canakaris that
"a judge may award lump sum alimony to ensure an equitable distribu-
tion,"18 4 but added that an equitable distribution may "take the place of
lump sum alimony or any special equity."8 5 These two statements ap-
pear to be directly in conflict and are difficult to resolve.
Although Tronconi and Canakaris agreed that an equitable distri-
bution must be justified, they disagreed on what criteria should be used
to establish the justification. As its criteria, the Canakaris court quoted
the last paragraph of the alimony statute that says "[t]he court may
consider any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between
the parties."' The Canakaris court indicated the trial judge has broad
scope in granting lump sum consistent with this statutory mandate.87
On the other hand, when Canakaris discussed the criteria for establish-
ing the need requirement for permanent periodic alimony, reference
was made to the elements in subsection (2)(a) through (f) of the ali-
mony statute.88 It may be assumed from this distinction that the su-
81. Id. at 548 (citations omitted).
82. Contra Hu v. Hu, 432 So. 2d 1389 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (acknowl-
edged the Tronconi decision but respectfully disagreed and held equitable distribution
is not an independent vehicle for property distribution).
83. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d at 552-(Glickstein, J., concurring). Judge Glickstein,
with whom Judge Hurley joined, suggested this precise question be certified to the
Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance: "Was the term Equitable
Distribution as initially used in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980),
intended as a vehicle or device to effect equity and justice between the parties or as the
concomitant goal to be achieved by awards of lump sum alimony, reciprocal and other-
wise?" Id.
84. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201.
85. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d at 549.
86. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2) (West Supp. 1983).
87. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201.
88. Id. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2)(a) through (f) reads:
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony or maintenance, the court
shall consider all relevant economic factors, including but not limited to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and physical and emotional condition of both parties.
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preme court did not find these elements to be appropriate guidelines for
determining the justification requirement for an equitable distribution.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Canakaris court used subsection
(2)(a) through (f) only as criteria for an award of permanent alimony,
the Tronconi court said, "[w]e see no reason why the provisions of sub-
section (2)(a) through (f) . . . should not also be applicable to an equi-
table distribution ... "89
The Tronconi opinion is clear on one important issue. It is not
mandatory that an equitable distribution be carried out in every case.90
To this end, it is necessary for the party seeking an equitable distribu-
tion to plead it."1 The court gives no guidelines as to how property
should be distributed when an equitable distribution is not made.92
IV. Considerations for Statutory Clarification
A. Statutory Treatment of Equitable Distribution in Other
Jurisdictions
Based on the foregoing discussion of the state of the law in Flor-
ida, it is proposed that the supreme court in the Canakaris decision did
intend to adopt the doctrine of equitable distribution. This would be a
logical conclusion concerning the fact that, according to its proponents,
"'equitable distribution' is a term of art."'93 When "'equitable' and
'distribution' [are] placed in juxtaposition" they have a distinct mean-
(d) The financial resources of each party."
(e) Where applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire suffi-
cient education or training to enable him or her to find appropriate
employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not lim-
ited to services rendered in homemaking, child care, education and career
building of the other party.
The court may consider any other factor necessary to do equity and justice
between the parties.
89. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d at 550.
90. Id. at 549.
91. Id.
92. If an equitable distribution does not have to be carried out automatically in
every case, does, then, the court have the authority to make an inequitable
distribution?
93. Brief on Behalf of the Family Law Section of the Florida Bar as Amicus
Curiae at I, Tronconi v. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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ing, as do "'special' and 'equity', 'community' and 'property', or 'con-
tributory' and 'negligence'." 94 "To suggest that the Supreme Court of
this state utilized a term employed by the courts and legislatures of
. . . its sister states without realizing or recognizing that the term em-
bodies a doctrine would be tantamount to suggesting that the Court
suffers from myopia approaching total blindness."95
In order to make equitable distribution consistent throughout Flor-
ida, the state legislature should enact an equitable distribution statute.
Presently, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have pro-
vided by statute for equitable distribution of property upon dissolu-
tion.9 6 Several of these states have enacted statutes which grant broad
discretionary power to the courts.9 7 The underlying principle for the
discretionary type statute is that a statutorily prescribed set of criteria
94. Id. at 1.
95. Id. at 2.
96. The states providing for equitable distribution by statute are: ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.55.210 (Supp. 1982); ARK STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 14-10-113 (1974 and Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-b-81 (West
Supp. 1983-84); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910
(1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11 (West Supp. 1982-83);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West 1981 and Supp. 1983-84); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
1610(b)(1) (Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.190 (Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (1981); MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-04,-05
(1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 33 (West Supp. 1983-84); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 552.23(1) (West Supp. 1983-84); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (West
Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330 (Vernon Supp. 1983); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 40-4-202 (1981), amended by Act of October 1, 1983, ch. 613, 1983 LEG. REV.
121; NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (Supp. 1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 (1968)
(titled alimony); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1983-84); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 236(5) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (Supp. 1981);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (West Supp.
1982-83); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(d) (Purdon
Supp. 1983-84); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1 (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 25-4-44 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-825 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-
5 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (Supp. 1983); WISC. STAT. ANN. §
767.255 (West 1981); WYO. STAT. § 20-2-114 (Supp. 1983).
97. See, e.g, ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.210 (Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 208, § 33 (West Supp. 1983-84); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.23(1) (West
Supp. 1983-84); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23
(West Supp. 1983-84); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1278 (West Supp. 1982-83); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(c)(d)(e) (1981); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-44 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-825 (1977); Wyo.
STAT. § 20-2-114 (Supp. 1983).
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may prevent the courts from making a well-founded equitable distribu-
tion. The belief is the trial judge needs to be able to fashion each distri-
bution individually as the facts of the particular case dictates. 8 How-
ever, this wide discretion causes judicial inconsistency in the states
adopting these statutes. 9
Other states have enacted statutes that more specifically set forth
guidelines for an equitable distribution. 100 The Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act'01 served as a model for many of them. Statutes of this
type assist the trial judges in narrowing the issues involved in distribut-
98. See Note, Is There a Need for Equitable Distribution of Property Upon
Divorce in North Carolina?: Leatherman v. Leatherman, 11 N.C. CENT. L.J. 156, 161-
62 (1979-81).
99. Id. at 162.
100. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. §
14-10-113 (1974 and Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-81 (West Supp.
1983-84); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910 (1981);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1983-84); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11 (West Supp. 1982-83); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West 1981 and Supp. 1983-84); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
1610(b)(1) (Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 236(B)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (Supp.
1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1983-84); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 751 (Supp. 1983); WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981).
101. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. § 307 (1973). This
section of the Act addresses disposition of property. The 1973 amendment to the Act
divided this section into two alternatives: alternative A for common-law jusrisdictions
and alternative B for community property jurisdictions. Alternative A provides:
(a) In a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage, legal separation, or dis-
position of property following a decree or dissolution of marriage or legal
separation by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent
spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court, without
regard to marital misconduct, shall, and in a proceeding for legal separa-
tion may, finally equitably apportion between the parties the property and
assets belonging to either or both however and whenever acquired, and
whether the title thereto is in the name of the husband or wife or both. In
making apportionment the court shall consider the duration of the mar-
riage, and prior marriage of either party, antenuptial agreement of the
parties, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income,
vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the
parties, custodial provisions, whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in
addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of each for future acquisition
of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution
or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation,
or appreciation in value of the respective estates and the contribution of a
spouse as a homemaker or to the family union.
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ing property.10 2 At the same time, the judge retains discretion to fash-
ion the awards according to the facts.10 3
B. The Separation of Equitable Distribution and Lump Sum
Alimony
Florida can benefit from the experience of her sister states which
have chosen to adopt equitable distribution by statute. Florida's statute
should establish guidelines for making an equitable distribution, yet al-
low judicial discretion to provide for the unique circumstances of each
dissolution.0 In the current state of Florida law the trial judge has
various vehicles which he may use to achieve equity between the par-
ties. These vehicles are lump sum alimony, permanent periodic ali-
mony, rehabilitative alimony, child support, a vested special equity in
property and an award of exclusive possession of property. 0 5 The court
should consider these remedies interrelated when making an equitable
distribution.0 6 "[T]o the extent of their eventual use, the remedies are
102. Note, supra note 98, at 162.
103. Id.
104. The Family Law Section of The Florida Bar suggests the following statute:
(2) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court shall order
such division of marital property as is equitable. The court shall set aside
to each spouse his separate property and shall divide the marital property
in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant
factors including:
(a) The contribution to the marriage by each spouse, including contri-
butions to the care and education of the children and services as
homemaker.
(b) The economic circumstances of the parties.
(c) The duration of the marriage.
(d) Any interruption of personal careers or educational opportunities.
(e) The contribution to the personal career or educational opportunity
of the other spouse.
(f) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition, enhancement,
or improvement of the marital property and the separate property of the
other party.
(g) The existing liabilities of the parties in the acquisition and mainte-
nance of marital property.
(h)The results of any alimony awarded.
Frumkes, Florida's Firm Foundation in Formulating the Doctrine of Eq-
uitable Distribution, 57 FLA. B.J. 327 n.7 (1983).
105. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1202.
106. Id.
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part of one overall scheme." 1 7 Statutorily adopting equitable distribu-
tion would generally leave these vehicles available to the courts. The
proposed equitable distribution statute would clarify the proper use of
these vehicles, and add the factors and guidelines to follow in effecting
an equitable distribution.
Because of the current confusion in Florida courts regarding the
use of lump sum alimony, the equitable distribution statute should ex-
plicate its appropriate use. Basically the statute would require a literal
reading of Florida's alimony statute. Therefore, courts would categorize
an award of alimony as permanent or rehabilitative. In either event, the
alimony award should be based on need and ability to pay, not justifi-
cation and ability to pay. Further qualification of this award would be
with regard to the method of payment. The judge would designate the
payments as either periodic or lump sum. In fact, characterizing an
award of alimony as "lump sum alimony" would be erroneous. Techni-
cally there would be no such vehicle as lump sum alimony. Instead
there would be lump sum payments of permanent or rehabilitative
alimony.
Reading Florida's alimony statute in conjunction with the pro-
posed equitable distribution statute would obligate the courts to recede
from the present position that lump sum alimony may be used indepen-
dently to effect an equitable distribution. Under the equitable distribu-
tion statute there would be no need for courts to employ lump sum
alimony to effect an equitable distribution. An equitable distribution
will be made in every case as a matter of procedure. The following
discussion explicates the paramount factors and guidelines for inclusion
in the proposed Florida equitable distribution statute. Because Florida's
courts and practitioners are in immediate need of clarification in this
area, the Florida legislature should formerly enact an equitable distri-
bution statute without delay. In the interim, it is hoped that the factors
and guidelines as hereinafter set forth will be of help to courts and
attorneys involved in dissolution of marriage cases. 10 8
107. Id.
108. These factors are presented for the purpose of practicality. It is not asserted
that this discussion is exhaustive. Each factor and guideline could be the topic of an
entire note.
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C. Factors to be Included in Florida's Equitable Distribution
Statute
1. Assets to Which Equitable Distribution Will Apply
This factor provides the foundation for each subsequent factor in
the equitable distribution process. Not all the assets owned by the par-
ties, whether individually or jointly, will be subject to an equitable dis-
tribution. Thus, the first step the trial judge must take is to determine
what property is subject to division. This has proven to be one of the
most burdensome tasks for trial judges in effecting an equitable
distribution.
As originally promulgated, Section 307 of the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act1"9 provided that "the court shall assign each spouse's
property to him. It also shall divide the marital property. . . ."o Ac-
cordingly Section 307 provided:
(b) For purposes of this Act, marital property means all property
acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
(1) property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired
before the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by
gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(3) property acquired by a spouse after a decree or legal
separation;
(4) property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
(5) The increase in value of property acquired before the mar-
riage.
(c) All property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and
before a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital prop-
erty, regardless of whether title is held individually or by the
spouses in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, ten-
ancy in comon, tenancy by the entirety, and community property.
The presumption of marital property is overcome by showing that
the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection (b).111
109. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT, 9A U.L.A. § 307 (1970)
(amended 1973).
110. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT, § 307.
111. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, § 307(b) and (c) (1970). See, e.g.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1974 and
Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84).
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According to these provisions property must be designated as ei-
ther marital or separate. The court determines what property is sepa-
rate, which makes it immune from distribution, and proceeds to divide
everything else equitably according to the set guidelines. States follow-
ing this method of designating property are called deferred community
property law systems.112
In the majority of the common-law equitable distribution states,
the designation of property as marital or separate does not completely
limit the court's ability to subject it to an equitable distribution. 113
However, property under the separate category is usually distributed to
the other spouse only in very rare circumstances,' where that spouse
has shown that hardship or inequities will otherwise result." 5 In com-
parison, trial judges in states following the deferred community prop-
erty law system are faced with a smaller pool of assets to distribute
than judges in the common-law equitable distribution states."' Conse-
quently, judges in the common-law equitable distribution states are al-
lowed greater judicial discretion in effectuating property distribution.",
In the current state of the law, Florida recognizes the concept of
separate and marital property through the special equities doctrine.
Florida cases, for example, have found a special equity where property
was acquired with inherited funds of one spouse," 8 and where one
spouse entered the marriage with possession of realty and personalty."9
Further, Florida's case law appears more consistent with the common-
law equitable distribution theory states than the deferred community
property law states. Florida cases evidence the intent that the classifica-
tion of separate property is not made for the purpose of making prop-
erty immune to distribution. Florida, by use of special equities and
112. Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 3 (1978).
113. See, Sharp, Equitable Distribution of Property in North Carolina: A Pre-
liminary Analysis, 6 N.C.L. REV. 247, 248-49 (1983).
114. Id. at 249.
115. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West 1981) (separate property not
available for distribution unless refusal to divide would be inequitable). Wisc. STAT.
ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981) (gifts or property exchanged cannot be subject to division
unless hardship would otherwise result).
116. Sharp, supra note 113, at 249.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976); Evans v. Evans, 398 So. 2d
943 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
119. See, e.g., Merrill v. Merrill, 357 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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lump sum alimony, has allowed separate property which should be
awarded to one spouse to be awarded to the other due to exceptional
circumstances.
A case in point is Schwartz v. Schwartz.120 In Schwartz an award
was made to the wife of a thirty percent interest in a vacation home
even though it "was supplied by the husband from sources unconnected
with the marital relationship.' 121 The award was justified by the court
because the wife had contributed substantial labor to making the vaca-
tion home suitable for family life. On the other hand, in Rosen v. Ro-
sen,'22 the trial court made an award of $125,000 in cash to the wife as
lump sum alimony. Upon review, the court of appeal found no "rele-
vant circumstances" to substantiate this award since the husband's as-
sets "were indisputably willed or given to him"'12 and the wife had not
made significant contributions to overcome the presumption that his as-
sets were separate property. Therefore, where a party can show justifi-
cation or exceptional circumstances, assets received by gift, inheritance,
or a source unrelated to the labors of the marital party "should be a
part of the pie, subject to the judicial slice.' 12 ' This is similar to the
more liberal view given separate property in the common-law equitable
distribution states.
Thus, Florida can remain most consistent with judicial intentions
evidenced by prior case law if it adopts a statute patterned after other
common-law equitable distribution states. Subsections (b) and (c) from
the original Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act appear appropriate for
this purpose as long as one addition is made. In order to provide for the
situations where designating property as separate would result in hard-
ship, the following language should be added after the last sentence in
subsection (c): unless the party against which such presumption is as-
serted shows by a preponderance of the evidence that by designating
the property as separate, hardship or inequities will result.125
Because the concept of separate property is basically consistent
120. 396 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
121. Id. at 807.
122. 386 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
123. Id. at 1272.
124. Frumkes, supra note 61, at 354.
125. Thus the last sentence of the subsection would read: "The presumption of
marital property is overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by a method
listed in subsection (b)", unless the party against whom such presumption is asserted
shows by a preponderance of the evidence that by designating the property as separate
hardship or inequities will result.
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with the theory of special equity, it is superfluous under this type of
statute to retain the use of the special equity doctrine. However, the
two ideas could be used interchangeably if the legislature perceives the
abrogation of the special equity doctrine as inappropriate.
2. Valuation of the Assets
After the court designates the property as separate or marital, the
separate property should be awarded to the appropriate spouse. All the
other property will be subject to division between the parties.126 Before
distribution of the property can commence, the court must be presented
with the net value of the marital assets.227 The attorney is expected to
value the assets acquired during the marriage. These assets include, but
are not limited to, residential and commercial real estate, family and
non-family businesses, stocks, bonds, personal property, pensions, re-
tirement plans, professional degrees, bank accounts, and insurance
policies.128
Property valuation is a highly sophisticated process. "It is neces-
sary [for the attorney] to trace forward the assets which the parties
owned before the marriage, and trace backward those assets which
presently exist. 1 29 Counsel must "obtain full and complete discovery of
all assets and uncover hidden sources."130 The parties may stipulate to
the value of all or part of the marital property.131 When there is a
dispute regarding value the'assistance of experts becomes an integral
part of the valuation process. The number and type of experts that are
126. Of course, either spouse may invoke the proposed addition to subsection (c)
of the statute which allows that party to show that a designation as separate property
would result in hardship or inequities. This could be done at any point during the pro-
ceedings. Therefore, even if the judge excludes a certain property from distribution, the
party may make a showing to later include it, if without it the distribution will not be
equitable.
127. Note, The North Carolina Act For Equitable Distribution of Marital
Property, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 735, 750 (1982).
128. Id. See generally Donahue, Trying Equitable Distribution Can Be Trying,
5 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 225 (1981-82); Mulligan, Inside an Equitable Distribution
Trial, 8 LITGATION 24 (1982); Grosman, Identification and Valuation of Assets Sub-
ject to Equitable Distribution, 56 N.D.L. REv. 201 (1980).
129. Donahue, supra at 228.
130. Knight and Elser, Critical Factors Which Influence Equitable Distribution
Awards, 55 FLA. B.J. 581 (1981).
131. Note, supra note 127, at 750.
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involved depend on the assets involved in the particular case. 132 An ac-
countant is frequently used and is most valuable for purposes of tax
analysis.1 " They are also used as appraisers for purposes of business
valuation.134 Nonetheless, since business valuations vary according to
the nature of the business,1 35 specialized appraisers or financial analysts
are most suitable."" A real estate appraiser should be used to value
real property.13 7 "Additional methods of valuation include truly compa-
rable market sales, reconstruction costs and 'face value of effective in-
surance.' The tax value of the property has been held not to be reflec-
tive of market value."'38
3. Distribution of Assets: Guidelines for Equitable Distribution
Once the property has been classified and the marital assets val-
ued, the court will proceed to distribute the marital property. It is com-
pulsory that the division of property is equitable, based on the particu-
lar facts of the case. The Florida courts have distinguished equitable
from equal. 39 "The two words are not synonymous."' 40 Yet, as the
court in Mahaffey v. Mahaffey14 ' recognized "an equal division of the
assets . . . is a good starting point in most cases."142
The suggestion that there be a presumption of an equal division is
not a suggestion that Florida become a community property state. Un-
like the community property states, there is "no mandate for making
an equal division of the marital acquisitions in all cases."'143 The judge
still has the discretion to do equity according to the circumstances of
the particular case. 44 Beginning with the presumption that the marital
132. Donahue, supra note 128, at 227.
133. Id. at 227. For cases involving intricate tax problems, the tax attorney may
be the most appropriate expert. Id. at 228.
134. Id. at 227. However, the author cautions against use of accountants to value
business. "Accountants should only be used to value business or professional practices
in those instances where no other expert is available." Id.
135. Note, supra note 127, at 751.
136. Donahue, supra note 128, at 228.
137. Note, supra note 127, at 751.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1204 (Fla. 1980).
140. Tronconi v. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
141. 401 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
142. Id. at 1374.
143. Bullard v. Bullard, 385 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
144. Id. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983). This statute re-
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property will be divided equally, the judge will consider each element
in the proposed guidelines that follow. If the facts of the case require
consideration of a given guideline, the judge will adjust the division
accordingly. The equal starting point gives the judge a relative basis by
which to weigh each guideline. 145
The following proposed guidelines are not listed in order of impor-
tance. Some factors may weigh more than others depending on the cir-
cumstances of the particular case. This list of guidelines was compiled
by reviewing Florida's alimony statute and case law, as well as the stat-
utes from the other states that have adopted equitable distribution.1 46
(1) "The duration of the marriage.1 47 In a long marriage the
court should give weight to one spouse's dependence, economically or
emotionally, on the other spouse.1 48 Also, with a long marriage the
courts will have a stronger presumption that the marital assets were
accumulated through the cooperative efforts of both parties. 49 If it is a
short marriage the court will be less likely to find either party depen-
dent on the other.150
(2) "The age of the parties."15
(3) "The physical and emotional health of the parties. '1 52
quires the court to make an equal division unless an equal division would be inequita-
ble. When the court deems an equal division inequitable, the court is given guidelines
to determine how the property will be distributed.
145. See Note, supra note 127, at 752-53.
146. A more specific focus was given to the statutes of North Carolina, New
York, Maine, Illinois, Iowa and the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307.
Citations to states for certain guidelines are not exhaustive, but they are felt to be
representative of the general inclusion in equitable distribution statutes.
147. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2)(b) (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 236(5)(d)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(3)
(Supp. 1981); UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DiVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. § 307 (1979).
148. See Note, supra note 127, at 755.
149. Knight and Elser, supra note 130, at 583.
150. See Note, supra note 127, at 755-56.
151. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2)(c) (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 236(5)(d)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(3)
(Supp. 1981); UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. § 307 (1979);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21(1)(d) (West 1981 and Supp. 1983-84).
152. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2)(c) (West Supp. 1983); IowA CODE
ANN. § 598.21(1)(d) (West 1981 and West Supp. 1983-84). These statutes refer to the
physical and emotional health of the parties, while others refer to the physical and
mental health of the parties. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(3) (Supp. 1981).
The court should ultimately consider all areas of health; physical, emotional and
mental.
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(4) "Any obligation arising out of a prior marriage."153 When a
spouse is paying alimony or child support to a previous spouse, "the
court should compensate the non-paying spouse for any reduction of
marital assets due to this obligation. ' ' x 4
(5) "Any antenuptial agreement or property settlement entered
into by the parties.'1 55
(6) "The need of a parent with" primary parental responsibility
of minor children born or adopted "of the marriage to occupy or own
the marital residence and to use or own its household effects. 1156
This quideline naturally overlaps the vehicle of exclusive possession of
property. The judge should make an award of exclusive possession ac-
cording to the established equities of the situation. Of course, the judge
may order the non-custodial spouse to transfer his title to the home and
contents rather than using the more temporary vehicle of exclusive
possession.
(7) The amount and sources of "income, property and liabilities
of each party at the time the division of property is to become effec-
tive."1 57 The court should consider any loans or mortgages outstanding
on marital property.
(8) "The standard of living established during the marriage. "158
(9) "The vested pension or retirement rights and the expectations
of non-vested pension or retirement rights. '159 As compared to other
guidelines in the equitable distribution list, this one has received a
great deal of judicial attention. The consensus appears to be that pen-
sion and retirement rights are "an economic resource acquired with the
fruits of the wage earner spouse's labors which would otherwise have
been utilized by the parties during the marriage to purchase other de-
153. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(2) (Supp. 1981); UNIFORM MAR-
RIAGE AND DIvORCE AcT, 9A U.L.A. § 307 (1979).
154. Note, supra note 127, at 755.
155. See, e.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. § 307
(1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21(l)(k)(1) (West 1981 and West Supp. 1983-34).
156. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(4) (Supp. 1981); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); IowA CODE ANN. § 598.21(1)(g)
(West 1981 and West Supp. 1983-84).
157. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(1) (Supp. 1981).
158. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2)(a) (West Supp. 1983); UNIFORM
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. § 307 (1979).
159. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(5) (Supp. 1981) (although consid-
ered this factor is designated as separate property under this statute); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83) (this statute also includes the loss
of inheritance).
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ferred income assets."160 Unless some exceptional circumstances are
shown, these assets should be included as marital property.
(10) "Any direct or indirect contribution made by one spouse to
help educate or develop the career potential of the other spouse."' 6'1
Generally, courts do not designate a professional degree as marital,
property. 162 This is largely due to the fact that a professional degree is
not a tangible asset which may be easily divided. Nonetheless, accord-
ing to the partnership theory of marriage, when the marital partners
work together toward a common goal they may both anticipate in-
creased family income as the return on their efforts."'3 The court
should consider the efforts of each party in relation to the probable
future financial circumstances of each party.
(11) "The difficulty of evaluating any component asset of any in-
terest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desir-
ability of retaining such asset or interest, intact and free from any
claim or interference by the other party.9' 'L
(12) "The liquid or non-liquid character of all marital
property.'$1 65
(13) Any award of alimony to either spouse.66 The court should
be guided by Florida's alimony statute when making an award of per-
manent or rehabilitative alimony. The needs of each of the parties
should be provided for under this guideline. Included in this considera-
tion are the occupation, vocational skills and employability of both
spouses.167 The time necessary for either party to acquire sufficient edu-
cation or training to enable him or her to find employment should espe-
160. Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 121, 437 A.2d 883, 888 (1981).
161. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(7) (Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
61.08(2)(f) (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney
Supp. 1982-83).
162. See In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); In re
Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1979); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603
P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
163. See generally Note, The Supporting Spouse's Rights in the Other's Profes-
sional Degree Upon Divorce, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 130 (1983).
164. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(9) (McKinney Supp. 1982-
83); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(10) (Supp. 1981).
165. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(7) (McKinney Supp. 1982-
83).
166. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1982-
83); UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. § 307 (1979).
167. See, e.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT, 9A U.L.A. § 307
(1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21(1)(f) (West 1981 and Supp. 1983-84).
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cially be considered as it relates to rehabilitative alimony.
(14) "Any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect con-
tribution made to the acquisition of marital property. . . including
joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services, or lack
thereof, as a spouse, parent, wage earner or homemaker."1 8 The
direct financial contributions of the parties are easiest to value and di-
vide. The courts may experience much more difficulty when valuing
and dividing the indirect contributions of the parties, especially as it
relates to the services of a spouse as homemaker or parent. The courts
use three methods to value the services of a homemaker. The most
often used is the specific-task approach. It values each job performed
by the homemaker according to the separate marketable value of that
individual skill.169 Basically "the hours per week devoted to each func-
tion is . . . multiplied by the hourly wage a person employed in that
occupation would earn. .... ,1"7o The replacement-cost approach is very
similar to the specific-task method. The difference is that replacement
cost is aggregated. "[T]he total hours an individual is likely to spend in
home production is determined and then valued at the market wage for
domestic help."1 1 The third method is the opportunity-cost approach.
It is based on computation of the wage rate multiplied by the number
of hours of non-market production, resulting in the worth of the home-
maker non-market services.1 72 "This approach leads [to the conclusion]
that the value of the time spent in menial chores, such as doing laun-
dry, of an individual with high earnings is worth relatively more than
the time devoted to these services by individuals who command less in
the marketplace. 17 3 Whichever approach is used by the courts, there
must be consideration given to the contribution made by the home-
168. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(6) (Supp. 1981); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21(1)(e)
(West 1981 and Supp. 1983-84). See generally Kulzer, Law and the Housewife: Prop-
erty, Divorce, and Death, 28 U. FLA. L.R. 1 (1975). According to the Commissioner's
comment to the 1973 amendment of the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DiVORCE AcT, 9A
U.L.A. § 307 (1979), allowance for the contribution of homemaker services is a new
concept in Anglo American law.
169. See Kiker, Evaluating Household Services, 16 TRIAL, February 1980, at
34.
170. Brandes, Proving the Value of a Homemaker (pt. 1), 2 FAIRSHARE, Novem-
ber 1982, at 5, 6.
171. Kiker, supra note 169, at 34. It should be noted, that the specific-task ap-
proach and the replacement-cost approach are used interchangeably by some authors.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 34.
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maker. The idea that the homemaker's contributions are immune to
monetary valuation is pass6.
(15) "The fringe benefits received by the homemaker/spouse."' I 4
The court should consider the benefits the homemaker spouse receives
as a result of the marriage. Such considerations include room and
board, health care, transportation, etc.175
(16) "The tax consequences [of the property distribution or
awards] made to each party.'.7
(17) The cost of attorney's fees. An award of attorney's fees may
be made to avoid an inequitable diminution of the other awards made
by the court.'7
(18) Any contribution by either spouse to the dissipation or de-
preciation of the marital assets.'7 8 Any financial misconduct must be
considered by the court to reduce the distribution to the spouse at fault.
"Financial misconduct involves wasting or dissipating of marital
assets.1 7 9
(19) The value of property set apart to each spouse as separate
property. This guideline overlaps the vehicle of special equity. Usually
separate property (or property awarded to a spouse as a special equity)
is not subject to distribution under the guidelines. However, it may be
considered when the party against which a special equity property
award has been made, shows that hardship or inequities will result
from the award. In this situation the court may consider the value of
the separate property relative to distribution of the remaining marital
174. Knight and Elser, supra note 130, at 584.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(1 1) (Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 598.21(1)0) (West 1981 and Supp. 1983-84). See generally Weissman, Is Equitable
Distribution Incident to Florida Divorce a Taxable Event Under Davis?, FLA. B.J.,
Jan. 1983, at 42. See also U.S. v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1964) (interpreting state law,
the court ruled that a husband realized a taxable gain on the transfer of appreciated
property to his wife pursuant to a negotiated property settlement). As a caveat, it
should be noted that there is currently pending before the legislature a tax reform bill
which, if passed, will cause significant changes in the tax ramifications of property
distributions.
177. See generally Note, supra note 127, at 760. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382
So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1980), indicated the court should follow legislative intent and ensure
that both parties have similar ability to be represented. Further, Canakaris held that
attorney's fees may be awarded to avoid diminution of the wife's fiscal awards.
178. See, e.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT, 9A U.L.A. § 306
(1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84).
179. Note, supra note 127, at 760.
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property.
(20) The effect of marital misconduct on the accumulation or de-
pletion of marital assets. A frequently asked question since the
Canakaris decision is whether its use of the word "justification" rela-
tive to equitable distributions reintroduces fault into dissolution
proceedings. 180
Since the introduction of equitable distribution most cases have
only referred to fault when it is relative to the financial condition of the
parties. In Mendel v. MendeP18 1 the trial court excluded evidence of the
husband's marital misconduct. The district court reversed, stating that
adultery must be considered as it "relates to the husband's expendi-
tures of funds and the relationship of those expenditures to the eco-
nomic situation in which the parties stand before the court. 1 8 2 In
Hurtado v. Hurtado83 the district court considered the husband's mar-
180. When Florida became a no-fault state, it excluded the criterion that fault
be shown before a dissolution would be granted. Yet, fault was not excluded in the
context of monetary awards. Abrahams, The Effect of Marital Misconduct on Mone-
tary Awards, 57 FLA. B.J., Feb. 1983, at 95. Under Florida's alimony statute adultery
may still be considered in determining the amount of alimony, if any, that should be
awarded to the spouse asking for alimony. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2) (West Supp.
1979). Although the statute refers to adultery only in relation to the spouse seeking
alimony, the courts have not retained this limited view. See, e.g., McClelland v. Mc-
Clelland, 318 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (persistent adultery of hus-
band relevant even though he did not petition for alimony); Pro v. Pro, 300 So. 2d 288
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Claughton v. Claughton, 344 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) (husband's marital misconduct was considered since he attempted to
use wife's misconduct as defense to alimony). Generally, adultery has been considered
whenever the court feels it is necessary to do justice between the parties. The latest
Florida Supreme Court decision to consider this issue was Williamson v. Williamson,
367 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1979). The Williamson court denied a general consideration of
marital misconduct in dissolution cases. The court said:
Whether such an inquiry [into marital misconduct] is proper will depend
upon the circumstances of each case. Today we hold only that where an
analysis of the need of one spouse and the ability of the other to pay dem-
onstrates that both parties will suffer economic hardship as a result of any
division of available resources the court might make, the court may then
consider, as an equitable circumstance under section 61.08(2), Florida
Statutes (1975), any conduct of either party which may have caused the
difficult economic situation in which they stand before the court.
Williamson, 367 So. 2d at 1019. This decision gave the trial judge broad discretion
when considering adultery.
181. 386 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
182. Id. at 628.
183. 407 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
[Vol. 8
105
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
Equitable Distribution
ital misconduct to the extent that he was paying rent on the apartment
he shared with his mistress.
Under this equitable distribution statute marital misconduct
should be considered only as it affects the spouse's financial contribu-
tion to the marital partnership. If the fault affects the accumulation or
depletion of the marital assets, an appropriate adjustment should be
made in the relativ, if any, that should be awarded to the spouse asking
for alimony. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2) (West Supp. 1979). n620] to
the distribution of the marital assets.
(21) Any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between
the parties.85 The guidelines are not meant to be "inflexible rules of
law which unduly restrict the trial judge in determining what is equita-
ble and just." 8 ' This catch-all guideline allows the judge to fashion
each judgment as the particular facts dictate, keeping in mind the pre-
viously prescribed guidelines and the ultimate goal of making an equi-
table distribution.
Finally, the court should state its basis and reasons for dividing the
property as it has deemed equitable.187
V. Conclusion
For several years, Florida has recognized the partnership concept
of marriage. Under this concept, the contributions of both parties in
accumulating the marital assets are considered. Equitable distribution
is a logical extension of the partnership view, as it requires a fair divi-
sion of the marital assets according to the relative contributions of both
partners.
Florida has taken definite, yet enigmatic, advancements in Brown,
Canakaris, and Tronconi, towards judicially adopting the doctrine of
equitable distribution. However, the courts have fallen far short of
transforming Florida from a common-law title state to an equitable dis-
tribution state.
Working within the constraints of the existent legislative enact-
ments relative to property distribution and alimony, the courts have
184. Brief on Behalf of the Family Law Section of the Florida Bar as Amicus
Curiae, supra note 93, at 6.
185. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2) (West Supp. 1983); N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20(c)(12) (Supp. 1981); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(10) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1982-83).
186. Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949, 951 (Fla. 1980).
187. Cf., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(a)(1) (Supp. 1983).
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most frequently used the vehicle of lump sum alimony to effect an equi-
table distribution. At the same time, the courts continue to use lump
sum as a payment method of permanent alimony. When making an
award of permanent alimony in lump sum payments, the courts require
a showing of need and ability to pay. When making an equitable distri-
bution by using the vehicle of lump sum alimony, the courts require
justification rather than need. To exasperate the confusion over lump
sum alimony, the same criteria are being utilized to determine need
and justification, which are two inherently opposed principles. In addi-
tion, the interrelation of the special equities doctrine in the process of
equitable distribution is difficult to ascertain.
Accordingly, Florida is in immediate need of clarification on two
issues. First, courts and counsel need a pronouncement as to whether
Florida is truly an equitable distribution state. In December, 1983, the
Florida Supreme Court will hear oral arguments on the Tronconi ap-
peal.188 The supreme court should accept the invitation this case offers
to definitively adopt the doctrine of equitable distribution. Second,
courts and counsel require clarification on the appropriate factors and
guidelines to follow in effectuating an equitable distribution. The Flor-
ida legislature must prescribe these by statute, as have sixty-six percent
of its sister states. Generally, the statute should provide that a trial
judge do the following in a dissolution proceeding:
(1) The judge must provide for the needs of any minor children.
The vehicles available and appropriate for this priority are child sup-
port and/or an award of exclusive possession of property to the parent
with whom the children live.
(2) The judge may provide for the support of a needy spouse. The
appropriate vehicles available are alimony and/or exclusive possession
of property. An award of alimony should be made only if it is set out in
the pleadings and only upon the required showings of need and ability.
An alimony award should be made according to the types and pay-
ments set out in Florida's alimony statute. Thus the judge may award
rehabilitative alimony in periodic or lump sum payments, or both; or
the judge may award permanent alimony in periodic or lump sum pay-
ments, or both.
(3) The judge must distribute, as separate property, the property
and material wealth in which one spouse possesses a vested interest.
188. The Florida Supreme Court has scheduled oral arguments for December 6,
1983. Attorney for appellant is Ira Marcus, P.A., Fort Lauderdale. Attorney for Ap-
pellee is Philip Michael Cullen, III, Fort Lauderdale.
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The appropriate vehicle for this is a special equity. A finding of a spe-
cial equity requires that the property was acquired or brought into the
marriage by a source independent of the efforts of the marital partner-
ship, or that it was acquired by contributions of one marital partner
which are considered to be clearly over and above the normal marital
duties. Thus a special equity will not be found when the contributions
are considered to be required in the normal course of a marital
relationship.
(4) After the awards of child support, alimony, exclusive posses-
sion of property and special equities are made, the court must divide
and distribute the property and wealth acquired in the course of the
marriage. To do this, the court will use the factors and guidelines es-
tablished for effectuating an equitable distribution.
Melinda S. Gentile
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The Current State of Computer Software Protection:
A Survey and Bibliography of Copyright, Trade
Secret and Patent Alternatives
I. Introduction
Our society is becoming more "computer-conscious" by the min-
ute. Whereas only a short time ago the computer was a monstrous,
expensive curiosity used behind the closed doors of major corporations,
today it is not uncommon for a family to own one or more. Computers
are no longer only for experienced professionals, as even children are
learning to manipulate them as tools for learning and playing.
Microcomputer sales will reach an estimated $15 billion by 1987, with
software sales increasing tenfold to $4.8 billion.1 In light of the awe-
some changes experienced by the computer industry in recent years, it
is not surprising that the legal aspects of computer trade are undergo-
ing an evolution of their own.
Behind every computer there is a "brain." This brain, or computer
program, is defined by the Copyright Act as "a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to
bring about a certain result."' In the same way that human language is
capable of numerous combinations to express the same idea, the in-
structions given to a computer to bring about the desired result can
vary. In this sense, the embodiment of the idea in the form of a pro-
gram is creative expression. By the volume of programs on the market
today for home use alone, we see that the fruits of that creativity are in
demand. The ease with which programs can be copied has sparked an
1. Getting Tough on Software Theft, Bus. WK., May 31, 1982, at 28, 29. Some
terms with which the reader may not be familiar will be defined throughout this note.
Software is "[a] set of programs, procedures, rules and possibly associated documenta-
tion concerned with the operation of a data processing system." Data Processing is "the
execution of a systematic sequence of operations performed upon data." R. DORF,
COMPUTERS AND MAN 482, 471 (1977).
2. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981) (as amended by Act
of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028). For a discussion of the
treatment of software under federal copyright law, see generally text accompanying
notes 11-87.
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active interest in the search for adequate insulation from piracy. Com-
puter clubs allegedly make hundreds of copies of programs for use by
their members.3 Persons claiming to be authors have sold infringed
copies of programs to unsuspecting software distributors who in turn
manufacture them for widespread sale. This illegal copying is costly for
original producers, some of whom estimate a loss of half their sales to
piracy.4 Accordingly, these computer programs, known as software,
constitute proprietary information that requires legal protection.
Legal protection for computer software is most visible in the form
of copyrights, trade secrets, and patents. The world is witnessing the
historical development of this area of intellectual property protection,
while a legal system that cautiously expands its limits grapples with an
exploding technology bound only by creative genius. Considering that
setting, this note will present the latest developments in the areas of
copyrights, trade secrets and patents as they relate to software
protection.
In particular, it will be shown how the latest court decisions have
construed recent legislation to conclude that a computer program's ma-
chine-readable object code5 is protectable by copyright law. In addi-
tion, the Copyright Office is seriously considering a change in deposit
requirements which would allow a computer program to be copyrighted
while remaining a trade secret.6 Regarding the application of patent
law to computer programs, the distinction drawn by the United States
Supreme Court between patentable processes and mathematical algo-
rithms is being questioned.7 It is intriguing that these various forms of
protection are each applicable, under certain circumstances, to com-
puter software. Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution
empowers Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors, the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 8 As a re-
sult, exclusive rights were granted to authors for their writings through
the enactment of the Copyright Act,9 and to inventors for their discov-
3. Morgan, How Can We Stop Software Piracy?, BYTE, May 1981, at 6, 10.
4. Getting Tough on Software Theft, supra note 1, at 28.
5. See infra note 24.
6. See infra text accompanying note 114.
7. See generally text accompanying notes 135-56.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. V 1981). See infra note 12 for the statutory
period of the exclusive right granted to authors.
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eries by the creation of the Patent Act.10 The unique character of a
computer program allows it to be considered as the written expression
of a programmer/author, or under the right circumstances as a new,
non-obvious invented process. Consequently, the software developer
needs guidance as to the best available protection for his work. This
note outlines the requirements for software protection under the laws of
copyrights, trade secrets and patents. In addition, it discusses how the
courts view computer programs as fitting into the scheme of intellectual
property protection.
II. Copyright Protection
A. Statutory Construction
In 1964, the Copyright Office announced its position that copy-
right registration for computer programs was permissible under the
Copyright Act.11 In order to meet the requirements for registration, the
program had to be the "writing of an author," the reproduction of
which had to be a "copy" acceptable for registration. Acknowledging
the inconclusiveness of these criteria, while upholding its policy of
resolving doubtful issues in favor of registration, the Copyright Office
presented the following guidelines which would place computer pro-
grams in a class with books:
(1) The elements of assembling, selecting, arranging, editing, and
literary expression that went into the compilation of the program
• . . [must be] sufficient to constitute original authorship.
(2) The program . . . [must have] been published, with the re-
quired copyright notice; that is, 'copies' (i.e., reproductions of the
program in a form perceptible or capable of being made percepti-
ble to the human eye) bearing the notice [must] have been distrib-
uted or made available to the public.
(3) The copies deposited for registration [must] consist of or in-
clude reproductions in a language intelligible to human beings. If
10. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (Supp. V 1981). An inventor is granted an exclusive
right over the use, manufacture, and sale of his invention for a period of 17 years. 35
U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. V 1981).
11. Copyright Registration for Computer Programs-Announcement from the
Copyright Office, 11 COPYRIGHT SOcIETY OF THE U.S.A. - BULLETIN 361 (1964). The
law in effect in 1964 was the original Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-32
(1964).
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the only publication was in a form that cannot be perceived visu-
ally or read, something more (e.g., a print-out of the entire pro-
gram) would also have to be deposited.12
The final words of the Copyright Office announcement indicated that
the procedure regarding computer programs would necessarily evolve
"over a period of time, on the basis of experience." 13
In 1976, a major revision of the Copyright Act was enacted with
an effective date of January 1, 1978.14 The new act eliminated com-
mon-law copyright, simplified procedure, and facilitated the curing of
"6mistakes" in publications without a copyright notice. Under the new
law, statutory copyright takes effect as soon as the writing is complete,
rather than when publication with notice occurs, as with the 1909
Act.1
3
Where a "copy" for registration purposes used to be "a written or
printed record of .. . [the work of authorship] in intelligible nota-
tion,""" the 1976 Act defines "copies" as
material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed
by any method now known or later developed, and from which the
work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, ei-
ther directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term
'copies' includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in
which the work is first fixed.1
12. Copyright Registration for Computer Programs, supra note 11, at 361. The
benefit received from securing registration is that a limited monopoly, through a grant
of exclusive rights, is obtained for a statutory period. (That statutory period is, in gen-
eral: life of the author plus 50 years; for joint works: life of the last surviving author
plus 50 years; anonymous/ pseudonymous/works for hire: 75 years from date of first
publication or 100 years from creation, whichever expires first. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1976).
For works created but not published or copyrighted before January 1, 1978 see 17
U.S.C. § 303.) The rationale behind the grant of an exclusive right is that the rents
obtained from it reward innovation and encourage innovators to create and market new
products. Stern, Present Copyright Law-Little Protection Against Unlicensed Use of
Proprietary Compilers, IEEE MICRO, Feb. 1983, at 67.
13. Copyright Registration for Computer Programs, supra note 11, at 361.
14. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 (1976). Sections 118, 304(b) and Chapter 8 took effect
Oct. 19, 1976.
15. P. HOFFMAN, THE SOFrWARE LEGAL BOOK II-B-I (1982).
16. This definition was used by the Supreme Court in White-Smith Music Pub-
lishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1,, 17 (1908) and adopted by the 1909 Copyright
Act.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added). Under section 101, "[a]
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This terminology also appears in section 102(a) of the Copyright Act, 8
which defines what works are subject to copyright protection.
To appreciate the potential effect of this language, it is important
to understand the phases that comprise a computer program.19 When a
problem is presented for a computer to solve, a flow chart,20 or sche-
matic diagram, is made, which indicates the logical steps involved in
solving the problem. This chart aids in the development of a source
program," written in one of the many source, or high-level languages2'
in which the programmer gives the computer instructions. These source
programs are readable by humans. They follow a specific syntax which
can be interpreted by a compiler, 23 which in turn translates the instruc-
tions into machine-readable code, otherwise known as the object pro-
work is 'fixed' . . . when its embodiment in a copy. . . is sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period
of more than transitory duration." Id. Thus, only the written or "fixed" expression of
an idea can be copyrighted, and not an idea itself.
18. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. V 1981).
19. A computer program is "[a] detailed set of instructions telling the computer
what types of input data it will receive, exactly what operations to perform on it and in
what order, and what type of output to produce." M. HARRIS, INTRODUCTION TO DATA
PROCESSING: A SELF-TEACHING GUIDE 300 (1979).
20. A flow chart is "[a] graphic representation of the definition, analysis, or solu-
tion of a problem, in which symbols are used to represent [such things as] operations,
data, flow, [and] equipment. . ." Dorf, supra note 1, at 473. In essence it is "a 'pic-
ture' of a computer program and how it is intended to operate." Harris, supra note 19,
at 298.
21. A source program is "[a] computer program written in a symbolic lan-
guage." Harris, supra note 19, at 300.
22. Examples of high-level languages are ALGOL (Algorithmic-Oriented Lan-
guage), APL (A Programming Language), BASIC (Beginner's All-purpose Symbolic
Interchange Code), COBOL (Common Business-Oriented Language), FORTRAN
(FORmula TRANslating System), PL/1 (Programming Language One), and RPG
(Report Program Generator). See generally Dorf, supra note 1, and Harris, supra note
19. There are a variety of types of languages in existence, such as algebraic manipula-
tion languages, associative languages, authoring languages, command and job control
languages, formal languages, list processing languages, macrolanguages,
metalanguages, nonprocedural languages, problem-oriented languages, procedure-ori-
ented languages, and string processing languages. For an explanation as to the function
of each, see A. RALSTON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE (1976).
23. A compiler is [a] program that "prepare[s] a machine language program
from a. . .[source] program by making use of the overall logic structure of the pro-
gram, [and/]or [by] generating more than one machine instruction for each symbolic
statement." Dorf, supra note 1, at 469.
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gram. 4 Originally, communications with a computer were done by
manually entering the binary machine language.15 Today, through the
use of high-level languages, the process of translating to object code
occurs within the machine by way of the operating system26 in a com-
piler program. As a result, there is no longer a reason to program at
the machine-language level. Object code has thus been considered by
some courts to be unintelligible to--or not directed toward-humans,
and therefore cannot be protected by copyright under the 1909 Act.28
The words "with the aid of a machine or device" appear, at first
blush, to correct any deficiency in the 1909 Act with regard to object
code. The House Report 29 addressing this language expressed the inten-
tion that this language be read broadly, so as to "avoid the artificial
and largely unjustifiable distinctions, derived from cases such as White-
Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.30 . . . under which statutory
copyrightability in certain cases has been made to depend upon the
form or medium in which the work is fixed." '
24. An object program is "[a] program in absolute machine language," which is
"the language that is understood by a computer; each statement has two parts: a stor-
age address and operation code." Harris, supra note 19, at 297 and 299. A simplified
diagram of the process described is as follows:
FLOW CHART ---- > SOURCE CODE ---- > COMPILER ---- > MACHINE CODE
readable converts standard l's & O's;
by people language into machine-
machine language dependent
for a specific
machine
While the advent of source programming is a tremendous advancement for computer
science, the qualities which make these programs adaptable to more than one computer
arguably facilitate software theft.
25. Binary code is "[a] code that makes use of exactly two distinct characters,
usually 0 and 1." Dorf, supra note 1, at 467. Machine language, or code, is "the lan-
guage understood by a computer." Harris, supra note 19, at 297.
26. An operating system is "[s]oftware which controls the execution of computer
programs and which may provide scheduling, debugging, input/output control, ac-
counting, compilation, storage assignment, data management and related services." Id.
at 478.
27. See supra note 24 and 25.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 43 and 57.
29. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659.
30. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
31. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5665.
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There was a problem, however, in applying the language of the
revised statute to object code. At the time of the Copyright Act revi-
sion in 1976, the legislature was not ready to make a definitive state-
ment regarding computer programs. As a result, section 11732 was
added to the Act, which required that no greater or lesser rights be
afforded to owners of copyrights on computer programs than existed on
December 31, 1977.33 This allowed the revision to pass "without com-
mitting Congress to a position on the computer-related issue until more
study could be undertaken." 4 Not affording owners of copyrights on
computer programs more rights was interpreted to mean that the 1909
definition of a "copy" 5 had to be applied. Since this required that the
"copy" be in a form intelligible to humans, machine-readable object
code was not a "copy" within the meaning of the Act.
Section 117 of the Copyright Act was completely altered in 1980
to allow for back-up copying for one's own software.38 However, if the
32. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. V 1981). The
section, as it existed from 1978 until 1980, was entitled "Scope of exclusive rights: Use
in conjunction with computers and similar information systems." The text was an
follows:
[T]his title does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater
or lesser rights with respect to the use of the work in conjunction with
automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or transfer-
ring information, or in conjunction with any similar device, machine, or
process, than those afforded to works under the law, whether title 17 or the
common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held
applicable and construed by a court in an action brought under this title.
Id.
33. Id.
34. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 39, n.163 (1979) (the Commission is commonly re-
ferred to as CONTU).
35. See supra text accompanying note 16.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. V 1981). The title of this amended section is "Limi-
tations on exclusive rights: Computer programs," and the text reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of § 106, it is not an infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making
of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy of or adaptation is created as an
essential step in the utilization of the computer program in
conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other
manner, or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archi-
val purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in
the event that continued possession of the computer program
should cease to be rightful.
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alleged infringement occurred prior to January 1, 1978-the date the
1976 Act took effect-the courts applied the 1909 Act.
B. Judicial Application
While the statute raised many questions, most courts were willing
to find support for the copyrightability of software. One concern that
surfaced was whether input formats3 7 in computers were equivalent to
forms which communicate information, and which therefore could be
the subject of copyright. In Synercom Tech. v. University Computing
Co.,3' a federal district court decided that input formats are copyright-
able. The formats were distinguished from blank forms which do not
express ideas and are not a proper subject of copyright. 9 It was noted
that code books have been viewed as expressing ideas, thus receiving
the benefit of copyright protection.40 The court reasoned that the same
rationale could be applied to the input format. "The litmus seems to be
whether the material proffered for copyright undertakes to express. At
first glance these input formats are simply devices for the assistance of
the user to facilitate his task-forms. On reflection, however, one must
conclude that they indeed express ideas." '41
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section
may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from
which such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other
transfer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be
transferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner.
Id. Section 101 was also amended in 1980 by adding the definition of a "computer
program" as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981).
37. Id. An input-output routine is a "program which tells the computer how to
take the information which is put into the computer by an operator in one computer
language and translate that information into a more simplified "machine' language
which the computer can understand." Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc.,
524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981). Most digital computers have five functional
components: 1) input; 2) storage of the input by memory; 3) a control unit which re-
ceives data from the memory and gives instructions for the arithmetic; 4) an arithmetic
which carries out the control's commands; 5) output capability. Synercom Tech. v.
University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1005 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
38. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
39. Id., at 1011 (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)).
40. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1011 (citing Reiss v. Nat'l Quotation Bureau,
Inc., 276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)).
41. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1011.
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A 1979 case subscribing to the "human intelligibility" '42 require-
ment is Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc.43 The court in
Data Cash ruled that the read-only memory (ROM)44 object code of
the plaintiff's program was not protected by copyright, even though the
source program was marked correctly. Copying the ROM was held not
to be actionable, since Judge Flaum determined that a program in
ROM does not constitute a true copy within the 1909 Copyright Act.
He determined that "[o]bject programs, which enter into the mechani-
cal process itself, cannot be read without the aid of special equipment
and cannot be understood by even the most highly trained
programmers. 45
Judge Flaum's determination was not entirely accurate. He was
compelled, by the existence of the original 17 U.S.C. § 117,46 to apply
the standards of the 1909 Copyright Act requiring human intelligibil-
ity. But according to a group of technical experts, object code can be
read by man:
Object code in binary form is often intelligible to skilled assembly-
or machine-language programmers. This is certainly true on an in-
struction-by-instruction basis. We feel that object code is no more
obscure in the U.S. than languages such as Arabic or Sanskrit. A
sequence of several thousand bytes of 8080 code, for example,
could be converted byte by byte to an assembly-language source
listing that could be protected by U.S. copyright
laws....
Object code does communicate in fixed messages to humans. Dupli-
cated object code will always be understood in the same way as the
original code by an individual who knows the machine code and the
computer instruction set to which it belongs. 47
42. See supra text accompanying note 16.
43. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. I1. 1979).
44. Read-only memory is "a photochemically imprinted silicon chip which stores
information in the form of minute 'bits.' Bits are simply on-and-off switches. The pat-
tern, sequence and frequency with which these switches are activated gives (sic) in-
structions to the machine and causes (sic) it to function in its various modes." Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 778 (C.D. Cal. 1983). The
memory is permanently stored on the silicon chip and is, for all practical purposes,
immutable.
45. Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1065.
46. See supra note 32.
47. Stern and Squires, Can We Stop Software Theft? IEEE, MICRO, Feb. 1982,
at 13, noting comments on memo submitted in response to the International Trade
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On appeal,48 the trial court's decision was affirmed on different
grounds. Because of this, and perhaps due to the difficulty in recon-
ciling the notion of "human intelligibility" with the 1976 Copyright
Act, Data Cash has not received much of a following in the courts.
However, it is an oft-cited case, mostly by alleged copyright infringers
in search of relief.
In Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc.49 the require-
ment of human readability was rejected by a California district court.
The court, following the 1976 Copyright Act, found a computer pro-
gram to be the required "work of authorship," while the silicon chip
served as the "tangible medium of expression." 50 The court seized the
opportunity to apply the language of 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) regarding the
fixing of words in media "from which they can be perceived. . . either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device."8 1 In support of the
court's application of this statutory language to the object code contro-
versy, legislative history was cited to clarify "the all-inclusive nature of
the definition of 'fixed' form:"
Under the bill it makes no difference what the form, manner or
medium of fixation may be-whether it is in words, numbers,
notes, sounds, pictures or any other graphic or symbolic indicia,
whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed, photo-
graphic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or other stable form, and
whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of any
machine or device 'now known or later developed.' 2
The question of object code copyrightability was still not fully resolved.
The defendant, charged with copying a ROM chip, asserted that sec-
tion 117 required the court to determine whether it was a copy within
the meaning of the copyright laws by applying the law as it existed
before January 1, 1978. The court made it clear that to do so would be
Commission's request for public comment (46 Fed. Reg. 26,589 (1981)).
48. 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980). The judge hearing the case of Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. acknowledged that the district court's holding
in Data Cash was weakened (since it was affirmed on different grounds), and suggested
that the circuit court's affirmance may have revealed its belief that ROMs may be
copyright protected as long as copyright formalities have been satisfied.
49. 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
50. Id. at 173.
51. See supra text accompanying note 17.
52. Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 173 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 52, reprinted in, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5665.)
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an incorrect application of the law:
It was not intended to provide a loophole by which someone could
duplicate a computer program fixed on a silicon chip. It did not
refer to the unauthorized duplication of a silicon chip upon which a
properly copyrighted computer program is imprinted. Such a du-
plication of a chip is not the use of a copyrighted program 'in con-
junction with' a computer; it is simply the copying of a chip. More-
over, any other interpretation would render the theoretical ability
to copyright computer programs virtually meaningless. 53
Less than one year after the Tandy decision, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois specifically stated
that the ROM5 4 of plaintiff's videogame was protected by copyright. In
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Intern, Inc.,55 the plaintiff's motion for a
preliminary injunction was granted. This prohibited Artic from distrib-
uting its videogame, the architecture for which had been structured
around an infringed copy of Midway's ROM chip. Initially, the deci-
sion would seem to overrule Data Cash, which was argued in the same
court. But where the rationale in Data Cash was based on application
of the 1909 Copyright Act, the Midway decision clearly centered on
the language found in the revised Copyright Act in conjunction with
the 1980 amendment. To further support the decision, district court
Judge Decker stated that "a work is no less a motion picture (or other
audio-visual work) because the images are embodied in a video tape,
video disc, or any other tangible form."'56
In July 1982, four months after the Midway decision, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided
the case of Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.57 Judge
Newcomer refused to issue a preliminary injunction sought by Apple to
restrain Franklin "from using, copying, selling, or infringing in any
other way Apple's registered copyrights on fourteen computer pro-
grams that are contained in or sold with the Apple II personal com-
53. 524 F. Supp. at 175 (emphasis in original).
54. See supra note 44.
55. 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
56. Id. at 1013 (quoting NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.09[D], in quote of Memo-
randum from the General Counsel of the Int'l Trade Comm'n to The Commission 7
(June 8, 1981).
57. 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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puter. ' ' 58 Although no conclusion was reached on the copyrightability
question, Judge Newcomer's opinion on the preliminary injunction is-
sue expressed doubt as to the extent of protection afforded by the copy-
rights. In his opinion, Apple failed to show a reasonable probability of
success on the merits, or that it would suffer irreparable harm. On the
contrary, Judge Newcomer indicated that Apple's economic superiority
in the marketplace made it better suited to withstand the burden of
litigation. If Franklin were precluded from selling its major product
pending litigation, the consequences would be devastating.59
Judge Newcomer presented some interesting arguments for both
camps. In support of Apple's position, he noted that
[o]bject code may be said to be the language used by a program-
mer in the same way Hemingway may be said to have used English
to write For Whom the Bell Tolls. A ROM may be considered a
'tangible medium of expression,' fixing an original work much as a
book, record or motion picture film fix a literary work, a musical
work or a motion picture.60
In addition to the "tangible medium of expression," an "original work
of authorship" is needed to satisfy the requirements of copyright regis-
tration. But in the transition from flow chart to source program to ob-
ject code, major transformations take place in the structure of the pro-
gram. Judge Newcomer opined that it was not clear at which stage the
program author's design was in its original form, therefore qualifying
as a work of authorship.61 As noted earlier, programmers can commu-
nicate with a computer in object code. However, they no longer need to
do so since the computer is capable of making its own "translation"
from the source program. Apple thus argued that the "automatic trans-
lation of source to object code established a predictable one-to-one rela-
tionship between the two codes that preserved the programmer's origi-
nal force of authorship."6 "
The court introduced one issue discussed by the Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), the body
created by Congress to aid in the Copyright Act revision of 1976.3 The
58. Id. at 812.
59. Id. at 825.
60. Id. at 819-20 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 820.
62. Id. at 822.
63. See generally CONTU's final report, supra note 34.
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contention was that object code embodied in a ROM is a mechanical
device and is therefore not copyrightable. This was not to suggest, how-
ever, that no protection should be available. Rather, a ROM may be
characterized as firmware, or a combination of software and hard-
ware64 that operate together to control a computer, which may, if other
aspects satisfy statutory criteria, be protectable under patent law.6 5
Judge Newcomer agreed that it is not illogical to treat object code
as an expression, but he added that "[i]f the concept of 'language'
means anything, it means an ability to create human interaction." He
submitted that a limit must be set in place. Otherwise, the court would
ultimately be providing "copyright protection to the programs created
by a computer to run other computers. With that, we step into the
world of Gulliver where horses are 'human' because they speak a lan-
guage that sounds remarkably like the ones humans use. It is an in-
triguing analogy but false." 6 Judge Newcomer's analysis is interesting,
but the code at issue is still the result of a human's creativity.
A mere three days after Franklin was decided, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled on Williams Electronics,
Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc.67 The Third Circuit, which is the same court
that would soon hear the Franklin appeal, upheld a permanent injunc-
tion enjoining Artic (the same Artic that was sued by Midway), from
infringing Williams Electronics' copyrighted program. Artic, relying on
Data Cash, unsuccessfully argued that ROM was not intelligible to
humans, and therefore not a proper subject for copyright. The Third
Circuit, however, relied on section 101 of the Copyright Act for their
decision:
By this broad language, Congress opted for an expansive interpre-
tation of the terms 'fixation' and 'copy' which encompass techno-
logical advances such as those represented by the electronic device
in this case. We reject any contention that this broad language
should nonetheless be interpreted in a manner which would se-
verely limit the copyrightability of computer programs which Con-
gress clearly intended to protect. We cannot accept defendant's
suggestion that would afford an unlimited loophole by which in-
64. Hardware is "[p]hysical equipment, as opposed to the program or method of
use; for example, mechanical, magnetic, electrical, or electronic devices." Dorf, supra
note 1, at 474.
65. Id. at 824. See generally text accompanying notes 135-56.
66. Id. at 825.
67. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
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fringement of a computer program is limited to copying of the
computer program text but not to duolication of a computer
program fixed on a silicon chip."8
In the year following the Franklin and Williams decisions, com-
mentators have attempted to find some justification for the divergent
opinions. But in August 1983, the Third Circuit reversed the Franklin
district judge's refusal to grant a preliminary injunction to Apple. The
court of appeals declared that Apple's copyrights are indeed valid, de-
spite Franklin's argument that a "process," "system" or "method of
operation" cannot be copyrighted. The court predictably relied upon its
decision in Williams, thereby continuing the trend toward accepting
the copyrightability of operating systems and programs embodied in
ROM. 9
In February 1983, another district court was faced with the issue
of object code copyrightability. The court in Hubco Data Products
Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc.70 determined that the certificate
of registration on copyrighted levels of the program served as prima
facie evidence of the validity of the copyright. However, a question still
remained as to the uncopyrighted levels. The court declared that Man-
agement Assistance had the burden of showing that their object code
was an "original work of authorship" under the Act, for which copy-
right registration is not required in order to benefit from protection.7
In response to defendant's argument that the code is used commonly
throughout the industry, it was determined that the originality required
here meant "independent creation," and not "novelty." In other words,
"a work is original and may command copyright protection even if it is
completely identical with a prior work provided it was not copied from
such prior work but is rather a product of the independent efforts of its
author.172
An argument similar to Franklin's 3 was asserted in a California
district court by Formula International in Apple Computer, Inc. v.
68. Id. at 877.
69. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983). See also Freiberger, Apple Has Ace in the Hole with ROM, INFOWORLD, Sept.
26, 1983, at 1; Gillen, Ruling Seen Definitive: Court Upholds Apple's ROM Copyright
Suit, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 12, 1983, at 5.
70. COPYRIGHT LAW DECISIONS (CCH) 18,100 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983).
71. Id. at 18,104 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1976)).
72. Hubco at 18,104.
73. See supra text accompanying note 57.
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Formula Int'l, Inc." Formula took the position that programs which
were integral to the operation of the machine, and which did not di-
rectly produce visual communication, were not copyrightable. Judge
Hill disposed of that argument by suggesting that there was no statu-
tory authority to sustain different treatments for functionally different
computer programs. 5 The opinion included an analysis of Franklin,
where Judge Hill submitted that Judge Newcomer misunderstood
CONTU's position. Judge Newcomer had cited CONTU's report on
the 1976 Copyright Act revision to support his determination that ob-
ject code is not copyrightable. In support of his conclusion, Judge Hill
stated that the Franklin decision was undermined by the Williams
case, since the Third Circuit, in Williams, took a point of view opposite
from that of the district court, in Franklin, only a few days later."6
Additionally, Judge Hill noted that Franklin did not present a clear
holding on the object-code question, and was decided under different
state injunction standards.77
Formula asserted that the grant of a preliminary injunction would
constitute an impediment to free competition. The court disagreed,
claiming that it would in fact be to Apple's advantage to have more
software available for owners of its computer. The defendant would
still be free to create compatible programs, but a byte by byte copy
would not be tolerated. The court stated:
Apple seeks here not to protect ideas (i.e., making the machine
perform particular functions) but rather to protect their particular
expressions of those ideas in the form of specific programs. And
Formula wants the privilege of using and marketing those expres-
sions without having to invest the millions of dollars and thousands
of manpower hours necessary to develop them. Simple economics
suggests that Formula's strategy would hinder, not promote, com-
petition and innovation in the computer market. Few companies
are going to invest the time and resources to develop new programs
if their products can be freely duplicated by anyone. Such 'compet-
itors,' who could undersell the originator simply because they don't
have its development costs, would destroy the market which any
innovator needs to recoup his investment.7 8
74. 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
75. Id. at 780.
76. See supra text accompanying note 67.
77. Formula, 562 F. Supp. at 785.
78. Id. at 783.
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The court did not see this, however, as the final word in software
protection. In fact, Judge Hill submitted that copyright may not even
be the best form of protection for computer programs. He noted that
perhaps a hybrid or an entirely new form of protection would need to
be devised, but that the legislature, not the court, would be the proper
forum for such a determination. "To the extent [the court] is free to
express public policy, its choice is to place computer programs into an
existing category of legal protection as against affording them no pro-
tection at all."'7
C. Current Methodology and Considerations for the Future
The language in Formula adds credence to the indications that
there are strong policy justifications for protecting computer programs.
Apparently, there are a number of persons who agree, for efforts are
being made to enact a more comprehensive amendment to the Copy-
right Act as it relates to computer programs. "A Bill to Improve the
Protection Afforded to Computer Software" was introduced in August
1982 at the request of the Association of Data Processing Service Or-
ganizations (ADAPSO).80 The 1980 definition of "computer program"
would be revised, and definitions would be provided for "program
description," "supporting material," and "computer software." Section
102(a) of the Copyright Act, which gives a non-comprehensive list of
copyrightable subject matter, would be appended with "computer
software." Sections 401(b)(1) and 408(b), concerning the copyright
symbol (0) and registration, would be amended to accommodate pro-
grams. Section 301, on preemption with respect to other laws, would
resolve any conflicts which can arise through the combined used of
copyrights and trade secrets.81
79. Id.
80. Stern, Protecting Computer Software - The ADAPSO Bill, IEEE MICRO,
April 1983, at 58. The amended sections would be §§ 101, 102(a), 301, 401(b) and
408(b).
8 1. 'A computer program' means a set of instructions capable, when incor-
porated in a machine-readable medium, of causing a machine having in-
formation processing capabilities to indicate, perform, or achieve a particu-
lar function, task, or result .... A 'program description' means a
complete procedural representation in verbal, schematic, or other form, in
sufficient detail to determine a set of instructions constituting a corre-
sponding computer program. . . . 'Supporting material' means any mate-
rial, other than a computer program or a program description, created for
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An alternative has been suggested that would require compulsory
licensing for those distributing programs to the public for private use,
and stiffer penalties for known infringers. 2 Another recommendation
calls for an alternative form of protection altogether, that being a regu-
latory statute under the Commerce Clause which would render copying
of object code unfair as offending public policy. 3 On the other hand, it
is arguable that the available laws already provide adequate protection.
Considering the present state of copyright law, simple measures
can be taken to assure the best available protection. Each physical em-
bodiment of the software should be stamped with the copyright symbol
followed by the year the program was first distributed to the public.
Although copyright takes effect when the writing is completed, early
registration can make a difference in the amount of damages available
to a prevailing plaintiff in the event of a suit. Programmers can further
safeguard their work by imbedding "dummy" data into their programs
to aid in detecting an infringement;"" likewise, encrypting the code may
serve to deter a would-be infringer.
Copyrights are now the most common form of protection available
for software today, due to the ease with which registration can be se-
cured, as well as the reasonable $10.00 filing fee. Circular "R61," enti-
tled "Copyright Registration for Computer Programs," is readily avail-
able from the Copyright Office.85 The applicant is advised that
"[c]opyright protection extends to the literary or textual expression
contained in the opinion. Copyright protection is not available for
ideas, program logic, algorithms, systems, methods, concepts, or lay-
aiding the understanding or application of a computer program, for exam-
ple, problem descriptions and use instructions. 'Computer software' means
any or several of the literary works referred to in the definitions of com-
puter program, program description, and supporting material. Stern, supra
note 80, at 59.
82. Note, Software Piracy and the Personal Computer: Is the 1980 Software
Copyright Act Effective? 4 COMPUTER/LAw J. 171 (1983).
83. Stern, Can We Stop Software Theft?, supra note 13.
84. Brown, Software Protection Battle Rages On, ELECTRONICS, Nov. 17, 1982,
at 24. Dummy data is information imbedded into a program which is not essential to
the program's successful performance. Its appearance in a suspect program aids in
proving the likelihood of an infringement.
85. U.S. Government Printing Office: 1983-381-279:572. Forms can be obtained
by writing to Information and Publications Section, LM-455, Copyright Office, Library
of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20559, or by calling the Forms Hotline on (202)287-
9100.
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outs." ' It also includes the definition of a computer program, deposit
requirements and instructions on placing the copyright notice, both for
visually perceptible copies and works reproduced in machine-readable
copies. While source programs are recommended for deposit, it is noted
that "registration will proceed under our RULE OF DOUBT policy
upon receipt of written assurance from the applicant that the work as
deposited in object code contains copyrightable authorship. '87
Since the 1964 announcement by the Copyright Office, copyright
registration for computer software has metamorphosed from a mere po-
sition taken on validity to a relatively well-defined procedure backed by
legislation and case law. While more changes will surely be seen in the
near future, copyrighting can be expected to remain an important force
to be considered when evaluating the alternatives in legal protection for
software.
III. Trade Secret Protection
A. The Basis for Trade Secret Protection
There are programs that do not meet the statutory requirements
for patents, or whose authors wish to protect their idea so as to market
it while a patent application is pending. There are others who desire to
protect their very ideas, and not only the embodiment of those ideas,
rendering copyright protection insufficient. For these purposes, trade
secret protection serves a useful function. Unlike patents and copy-
rights, trade secrecy is a state doctrine. In many states it exists only
through common law,88 and arises from taking precautions to keep
one's idea or methodology a secret. It is commonly secured through
contractual arrangements, with the owner putting the user on notice
that the information being transferred is not to be disclosed, except as
may be authorized. Trade secrecy offers a broad scope of protection
which covers the concept and the expression, it protects against disclos-
ure, and continues in effect until the idea enters the public domain.89
86. Id.
87. Form TX, for published and unpublished nondramatic literary works, is the
correct form to be filed for the registration of computer programs. U.S. Government
Printing Office: 1983:381-278/101.
88. See infra text accompanying note 94.
89. The information need not be "generally known to the public for trade secret
rights to be lost," but may be known within the industry, or available to the public in
print. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS Acv § I comment 5, 14 U.L.A. 537, 541 (1980).
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"Trade secret" is characterized by the Restatement of Torts:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or com-
pilation of information which is used in one's business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical
compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving
materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of
customers.9
This definition has been employed by courts in their discussion of trade
secret protection for software,91 as well as by the United States Su-
preme Court in cases regarding the validity of a proclaimed trade se-
cret. 2 The official comment to the Restatement of Torts acknowledges
that there exists no exact definition of "trade secret," but provides fac-
tors which help determine whether a trade secret has been established
by the product owner. Those factors are:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and
others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by
him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the
information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort
or money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the
ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly ac-
90. RESTATEMENT OF TORT § 757 comment b (1939). The text of section 757
reads:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do
so, is liable to the other if
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence re-
posed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of
the facts that it was a secret and that the third person discov-
ered it by improper means or that the third person's disclosure
of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other, or
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a
secret and that its disclosure was made to him by mistake.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
91. See, e.g., Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Electronics, 564 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Nev.
1983) (see infra text accompanying note 128), and J & K Computer Systems, Inc. v,
Parrish, 642 P.2d 732, 735. (Utah 1982) (see infra text accompanying note 98).
92. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
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quired or duplicated by others."
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act was approved in 1979 by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,94 but as
of 1983 it had only been adopted in Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Min-
nesota and Washington." The act more broadly defines trade secrets as
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or poten-
tial, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
use, and (ii) is the subject of the efforts that are reason-
able under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."
Applying either definition, it is clear that computer programs do
constitute trade secret subject matter.97 Recent case law confirms this,
while attempting to identify the extent of protection offered to trade
secret owners.
B. Case Law
In J & K Computer Systems, Inc. v. Parrish," J & K sued its
former employees and their corporation, alleging wrongful appropria-
tion of proprietary information. Parrish had made an electronic copy of
a program he developed while an employee of J & K, and continued to
use it, in defiance of his employment contract, after he left the coin-
93. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939). These criteria were noted
by the court in M. Bryce & Associates, Inc. v. Gladstone, 107 Wis. 2d 241, 319
N.W.2d 907 (1982). See infra text accompanying note 102. The Restatement Second
of Torts (1978) did not incorporate section 757, but the language of the first Restate-
ment is still controlling, as is evident in the cases cited supra notes 91 and 93.
94. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 537, 539 (1980). The Act was
proposed by a special committee pursuant to recommendations by the Patent Law Sec-
tion of the American Bar Association. The committee's work was done in conjunction
with the Antitrust, Banking and Business, Corporation, and Patent Law sections of the
American Bar Association. Id. at 538-39.
95. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 206 (Supp. 1983).
96. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 537, 542 (1980).
97. For a discussion of trade secrets and computer programs, see Bender, Trade
Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 909 (1969).
98. 642 P.2d 732 (Utah 1982).
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pany. Parrish asserted that the program was not confidential so as to
constitute a trade secret. The Utah Supreme Court, however, disagreed
with Parrish's assertion, noting that the program was unique in that it
could not be found in any text or source book.99 This established the
requirement that the information sought to be protected not be known
throughout the industry.100 Parrish further argued that the program
had been revealed to certain customers and could not therefore be
deemed secret. This argument was rejected by the court, since J & K
had taken steps to inform employees and customers of the secret nature
of programs they had been authorized to use. In addition, the programs
themselves were marked as being proprietary to J & K, and usable by
license agreement only. "That a few of the plaintiff's customers had
access to the program does not prevent the program from being classi-
fied as a trade secret where the plaintiff was attempting to keep the
secret and the program is still unavailable to the computer trade as a
whole."101
In the 1982 case of M. Bryce & Associates, Inc. v. Gladstone,10 2 a
non-disclosure agreement was signed by persons attending a demon-
stration of M. Bryce's management information system. Though no
sale resulted from the demonstration, the persons to whom the system
was shown used the information disclosed to reproduce the system. In
the suit that followed, the defendant asserted that there had been no
misappropriation since the product he issued was not an exact duplicate
of plaintiff's system. The court disagreed, noting the trial court's in-
struction to the jury, adopted from the Restatement of Torts, as to a
"use" of a trade secret:
To subject a person to liability for use of another's trade se-
cret, there is no requirement that he use it exactly in the form that
he received it. He may be liable even if [he] uses it with modifica-
tion-modifications or improvements upon it affected by his own
efforts.
Differences in detail do not preclude liability if substantially
the process used by the actor is derived from the other's secret in
breach of a relationship of trust and confidence.
The liability is avoided only when the contribution by the
other's secret is so slight that the actor's process can be said to be
99. Id. at 735.
100. See supra note 89.
101. J & K Computer Systems, 642 P.2d at 735.
102. 107 Wis. 2d 241, 319 N.W.2d 907 (1982).
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derived from other sources.103
The defendant also argued that since information pertaining to the sys-
tem had been offered to the public in advertisements, trade-secret sta-
tus was lost. The court noted, however, that the advertisement showed
the reader "what" the product was, and not "how" it was put
together.1 '"
For many companies, policy regarding employee conduct may be
the only way to keep information secure. In March 1983, the district
court of Hawaii upheld Honeywell Information Systems' firing of two
employees who formed a computer company while working for Honey-
well.10 5 The dismissed employees argued that their business did not
compete with Honeywell's market, since Honeywell did not sell a cer-
tain type of computer in Hawaii.106 The court's response was that di-
rect competition was not necessary for a finding of conflict:
Honeywell is undoubtedly in possession of valuable trade secrets,
such as software programs, marketing techniques, market studies,
and other valuable information developed perhaps at great cost to
the company. The employment policy here seems to be a reasona-
ble means to prevent the improper and unauthorized use of such
information by persons or businesses which may unjustly benefit
themselves with such information.1
0 7
Company policies are frequently embodied in a written contract
between the employer and the employee. In this manner, the employee
is on notice that information learned as an employee is to be main-
tained in confidence. International Business Machines Corp., for exam-
ple, requires newly-hired employees to sign an "Agreement Regarding
Confidential Information and Intellectual Property."108 The agreement
forbids disclosure of confidential information during and after their
employment; the employee assigns to the corporation his
103. Id. at 252, 319 N.W. 2d at 912. The trial court's instructions to the jury
came from RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment c (1939).
104. 107 Wis. 2d at 250, 319 N.W.2d at 911.
105. Moore v. Honewell Information Systems, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1229 (D. Ha-
waii 1983).
106. Id. at 1233.
107. Id.
108. IBM form, "Agreement Regarding Confidential Information and Intellec-
tual Property" (Rev. 6/80).
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entire right, title and interest in any idea, invention, design of a
useful article (whether the design is ornamental or otherwise),
computer program and related documentation, and other work or
authorship. . . conceived. . . or written wholly or in part by...
[the employee], whether or not such . . . [works] are patentable,
copyrightable or susceptible to other forms of protection ...
[which are] created within the scope of. . . [his] employment.109
Trade secrets have proven effective for a wide variety of products,
such as soft drink formulae, and the process of manufacturing orches-
tral cymbals. 110 Once proper precautions have been taken to guard the
trade secret, products of this nature are put on the market for wide-
spread distribution. Other manufacturers attempt to imitate successful
products. But as long as the producer has taken steps to prevent dis-
closure, the actual process involved in making the original product will
remain a secret. When computer programs are marketed by licensing
them to individual users, the contractual agreement protects the owner
in case of infringement. However, it is impractical to have that type of
arrangement when widespread distribution is desired. The software
manufacturer can distribute his system ,while taking steps to keep his
methodology secret, such as limiting knowledge of the process involved
to his employees. Unlike many other products, however, computer ap-
plications may not receive adequate protection from trade secrecy, due
to the scope of protection afforded. Trade secret status guards against
discovery by "improper means." 11 "Improper means" does not include
independent development or reverse engineering. Reverse engineering is
"a technique by which the product of a secret formula or process is
analyzed, first to retrace the steps essential to its creation and then to
recreate the formula or process itself.1112 In the case of many computer
programs, reverse engineering may not be difficult. The result may be a
109. Id.
110. One process for manufacturing cymbals has been maintained a family se-
cret for hundreds of years. J. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS: HOW TO PROTECT YOUR
IDEAS AND AssETS 18-19 (1982). Other examples noted are such divergent things as
"[a] process for extracting alcohol from empty whiskey barrels .... [t]he seminar
technique of a group nonsmoking clinic .... [d]esigns for automatic toll collection
equipment [and] [e]mployee benefit information." Id. at 19. In effect, anything main-
tained secret which can comply with the requirements set forth in the Restatement (see
supra text accompanying notes 90 and 93), qualifies for trade secret protection.
111. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
112. P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE
DOCTRINES 157 (1981).
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loss of one's proprietary information:
This freedom to create or recreate independently means that any
number of unrelated firms within a particular industry may eventu-
ally come to possess a single trade secret. Once this possession be-
comes general, and the information becomes widely known in the
industry, the secrecy requisite is no longer met and, under the rule
usually followed, even those to whom the secret was imparted in
confidence may use the information freely.113
C. Current Problems: Trade Secrets on Copyrighted Computer
Programs
The issue today is not whether computer programs can receive
trade secret protection, but rather whether trade secret protection can
be used in conjunction with federal grants of exclusive rights on intel-
lectual property. There is a problem inherent in copyrighting a pro-
gram while maintaining that it constitutes a trade secret. Though the
Copyright Act no longer requires immediate registration, once a copy
of the program is furnished to the Copyright Office it is a matter of
public record. This is obviously inconsistent with the basic requirement
of secrecy with trade secrets. Yet, many program owners are treating
programs as trade secrets while affixing the copyright symbol to their
work. It is an attempt to secure protection for both the expression and
the idea, and to have copyright protection available as a backup should
secrecy be lost. 114
Court decisions reflect the confusion that exists with the attempt
to combine trade secrets with copyrights. In 1974, the Supreme Court
determined that patentable inventions could be protected by state trade
secret doctrines, since federal intellectual property law does not pre-
empt state trade secret protection. 11 5 "The only limitation on the States
is that in regulating the area of patents and copyrights they do not
113. Id. at 157-158. There may be a problem of proof involved in determining
whether a program has been independently created, analyzed and recreated, or simply
unfairly acquired. For a discussion on how to recognize a copy, see Dakin and Higgins,
Fingerprinting a Program, DATAMATION, April 1982, at 133.
114. See generally Lucarelli, Jr., The Supremacy of Federal Copyright Law
over State Trade Secret Law for Copyrightable Computer Programs Marked with a
Copyright Notice, 3 COMPUTER/LAW J. 19 (1981).
115. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 470.
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conflict with the operation of the laws in this area passed by
Congress .... 11
Courts have seized on this language to hold both ways. In
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.,117 the federal
district court refused to grant relief on a state theory of unfair competi-
tion for the use of computer input formats and instruction manuals.
Since relief had already been granted for copyright infringement, the
court expressed its belief that enforcement of the state doctrine would
significantly interfere with federal policy. The court thus declared the
state misappropriation doctrine preempted by federal patent and copy-
right laws." 8 Two years later, a district court in Texas took the oppo-
site view in deciding Warrington Assoc. v. Real-Time Eng. Systems.' 9
The court found that Warrington Associates' common-law trade secret
claim was not preempted by the federal Copyright Act, and thus de-
nied Real-Time's motion for summary judgment. While noting that
copyright disclosure could "strip the underlying idea of its confidential-
ity, and thus its status as a trade secret,"1 20 the court acknowledged
that the two could be interactive. In addition, "the trade secrets tort is
premised on concepts of breach of trust and confidentiality, and not
copying, ' 121 therefore not compelling preemption.
In Technicon Med. Info. v. Green Bay Packaging,2 2 the Seventh
Circuit likewise refused to find a conflict between the federal and state
laws. In a user's manual for Technicon's computer software, a legend
was included, noting that the disclosed information was proprietary
"and shall not be duplicated, used or disclosed, in whole or in part,
except with the expressed permission of the owner."' 3 In addition, a
copyright symbol was affixed. The defendant argued that the symbol
represented publication, which negated the existence of a trade secret.
Technicon's claim was that there was no publication, 24 and that the
116. Id. at 479.
117. 474 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
118. Id. at 44.
119. 522 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
120. Id. at 368.
121. Id. at 369.
122. 687 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1982) (cert. denied) - U.S. _, 103 S. Ct.
732 (1983).
123. Id. at 1033 n.1.
124. The court quoted 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.04 (1981) to note the dif-
ference between the two types of publication:
A general publication 'occurs when by consent of the copyright owner the
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symbol was "included for protection in the event that an inadvertent
publication occurred." 12 5 The court agreed with Technicon's argument,
and declared that affixing the copyright notice as a deterrent consti-
tuted correct usage of the symbol. It was further noted that advancing
alternative theories-i.e., copyright or trade secret-was permissible
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."' Enforcement of both,
however, could present a conflict.1 27
That the law in this area is far from settled is further evidenced in
an opinion issued by the United States District Court for the District of
Nevada.1 28 In what seems to be a reversal of the trend away from pre-
emption since Synercom,12 9 the court found that federal copyright law
preempted the application of the state common-law doctrines of misap-
propriation and trade secrecy. The court acknowledged that evidence
clearly established that the defendant copied the plaintiff's video
game,130 which included software. Despite this, the plaintiff could not
avail itself of state doctrines since the programs involved were eligible
for copyright protection.
Apparently, the desire to take advantage of both trade secret and
copyright protection on computer programs is widespread. Many copy-
right owners, especially authors of computer programs, have requested
that the Copyright Office consider special deposit provisions for works
containing trade secrets.131 The Copyright Office normally requires that
original or tangible copies of a work are sold, leased, loaned, given away or
otherwise made available to the general public, or when an authorized of-
fer is made to dispose of the work in any such manner if a sale or other
such disposition does not, in fact, occur.'
Id. at 1035. This was contrasted with the definition of a limited publication, found in
White v. Kimmel, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.) cert. denied 343 U.S. 957 (1952). "'A
limited publication [is one] which communicates the contents of a manuscript to a
definitely selected group and for a limited purpose, and without the right of diffusion,
reproduction, distribution or sale ... '" Technicon, 687 F.2d at 1035 (quoting Data
Cash, 628 F.2d at 1042).
125. Technicon, 687 F.2d at 1034.
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
127. Technicon, 687 F.2d at 1038.
128. Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Electronics, 564 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Nev. 1983).
129. See supra text accompanying note 114.
130. Videotronics, 564 F. Supp. at 1473.
131. Notice of Inquiry Deposit of Computer Programs and Other Works Con-
taining Trade Secrets, 48 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (1983), reprinted in New Developments:
Comments Requested on Deposits Containing Trade Secrets, 11 COPYRIGHT LAW RE-
PORTS (CCH) 20,229 (1983).
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two copies of the work be submitted for registration. The deposit then
becomes a matter of public record, which would destroy any trade se-
cret that might be included. In response to the concerns expressed, the
Copyright Office published a request for comments in May 1983.132
The request notes in its section on policy considerations that many ap-
plicants have requested the same treatment that secure tests 38 receive.
In such instances, one complete copy is received as a deposit instead of
two. After examination the copy is returned to the applicant, the Copy-
right Office retaining some portion or description to serve as a record of
deposit.' In this manner trade secret status would not be nullified by
virtue of a copy being made available for public viewing through de-
posit with the Copyright Office. Alternative deposit suggestions for
computer programs containing trade secrets have been solicited, and in
particular, answers have been requested to twelve detailed questions.
The notice makes it clear that the policy decisions the Office intends to
formulate, with the aid of responses received, will shape the future of
copyright registration.
IV. Patent Protection
Patent protection offers the software producer a combination of
the most attractive features of copyright and trade secret security. In
addition to being protected against copying and disclosure, the patent
holder is shielded from independent creation and reverse engineering.'"
The federal government's power to grant a patent is derived from
article I of the United States Constitution. 86 The benefit conferred
upon the patent owner is the legal right "to exclude others from mak-
ing, using, and selling an invention" for a period of 17 years. 37 This
132. Id. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 202.20 (1982) for deposit requirements.
133. A secure test is a "nonmarketed test administered under supervision and
specified centers on specific dates, all copies of which are accounted for and either
destroyed or returned to restricted locked storage following each administration." 37
C.F.R. § 202.20(b)(4) (1982)).
134. 48 Fed. Reg. 22,951, 22,952 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(vi) (1982)).
135. See supra text accompanying note 112.
136. "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. As
explained in the text accompanying note 8, supra, the power to grant copyrights is also
derived from this clause.
137. Blumenthal, Lifeforms, Computer Programs, and the Pursuit of a Patent,
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statutory period of protection encourages inventors of patentable sub-
ject matter to disclose their work, since they need not fear infringe-
ment.13 8 It would appear, then, that patent protection is the ideal route
to computer program protection. However, due to the great degree of
protection offered, the requirements for patent eligibility are strin-
gent.139 To meet the requirements, it must first be determined whether
the program sought to be patented constitutes patentable subject mat-
ter. To do so, the item must be a "new and useful process,140 machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof. 1 411 Further conditions are that the subject matter, once
established as patentable, be novel1 42 and non-obvious. 43
The issue of patentability of computer programs has already
reached the United States Supreme Court.144 The programs in question
86 TECH. REV., Feb./Mar. 1983, at 26, 29.
138. [A] patent system provides an incentive to invent by offering the pos-
sibility of reward to the inventor and to those who support him. This pros-
pect encourages the expenditure of time and private risk capital in re-
search and development efforts.
[A] patent system stimulates the investment of additional capital needed for
further development and marketing of the invention. In return, the patent
owner is given the right, for a limited period, to exclude others from mak-
ing, using or selling the invented product or process.
[B]y affording protection, a patent system encourages early public disclo-
sures of technological information, some of which might otherwise be kept
secret. Early disclosure reduces the likelihood of duplication of effort by
others and provides a basis for further advances in the technology involved.
[A] patent system promotes the beneficial exchange of products, services,
and technological information across national boundaries by providing pro-
tection for industrial property of foreign nationals.
Goldstein, supra notes 15-16 (quoting REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
THE PATENT SYSTEM 1-3 (1966)).
139. These requirements are outlined in the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-104
(Supp. V 1981).
140. The word "process" is defined as a "process, art or method, and includes a
new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or mate-
rial." 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1976).
141. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981).
142. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. V 1981).
143. A patent may not be obtained.. . if the differences between he sub-
ject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the sub-
ject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
144. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
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were part of a "useful process,"1 5 as required for subject matter quali-
fication. But if the process contained a program described as consisting
of a mathematical formula or algorithm, it was considered a law of
nature, and therefore not patentable.14 6 "The rule that the discovery of
a law of nature cannot be patented rests, not on the notion that natural
phenomena are not processes, but rather on the more fundamental un-
derstanding that they are not the kind of 'discoveries' that the statute
was enacted to protect. 4 7 However, in the 1981 case of Diamond v.
Diehr,1 48 the Supreme Court saw the program in question as part of an
industrial process, and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical
formula. As a result, processes will now not automatically be precluded
from being considered as patentable subject matter due to the inclusion
of an unpatentable algorithm.4 9
While one author hailed the decision as "the end of some twelve
years of litigation concerning the patentability of computer pro-
grams,"15 0 there are no clear-cut guidelines on exactly what will pass
muster. In fact, the language used in drafting a patent claim may make
a difference as to the final determination:
[A]ssuming that the claims do define a mathematical algorithm, if
the implementation of the algorithm is couched in terms which ei-
ther define the structural relationship between physical elements in
a claimed apparatus or refine or limit steps in the process for which
the patent is being sought, the claim will probably be patentable. 151
(1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 139 and 140.
146. Parker, 437 U.S. at 593.
147. Id. "[A] scientific principle, such as that expressed in respondent's al-
gorithm, reveals a relationship that has always existed." Id. at 593, n.15. The court
notes one author's analogy to the fact that the law of gravity existed even before
Newton's formulation of the law. That the law has been recognized affords no rights to
exclude others from its use. "Patentable subject matter must be new (novel); not
merely heretofore unknown." Id., quoting P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMEN-
TALS 13 (1975). The courts typically exclude scientific principles, laws of nature, ideas
and mental processes. In Re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
148. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). For a number of articles discussing this case and
those leading up to the decision, see section D of the bibliography accompanying this
note.
149. Note, Algorithm Patentability after Diamond v. Diehr, 15 IND. L. REV.
713, 732 (1982).
150. Legal Times of Washington, May 4, 1981, at 27, col. 1, 28, col. 4.
151. Rose, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Computers and Com-
puter Programs: Recent Developments, 9 IEPP miN L. REV. 547, 557 (1982). Rose
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In a paper presented at the Second Annual Software Protection Con-
ference in 1981, one author suggested that "the distinction the Su-
preme Court has attempted to draw between patentable processes and
mathematical algorithms is confusing and unnecessary,"'1 2 as well as
"illogical and artificial." 153 The suggestion is that the statutory require-
ments be applied to algorithms as with any other item sought to be
patented.
The discussion on algorithms was continued by the Delaware dis-
trict court in the 1983 case of Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v.
Merrill-Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.lM The court began with the pre-
mise that computer programs are patentable, but that they must meet
the same statutory requirements as do other inventions. A fair portion
of the opinion on the issue discussed the confusion caused by the lack
of a standard, acceptable definition of the term "algorithm." The court
ultimately accepted a narrow definition so as to enable the claim
presented to constitute a methodology, and not a restatement of a
mathematical formula. 5 While the court determined that the process
involved constituted patentable subject matter, it is clear that congres-
sional action is needed for uniformity.
Patent protection is ideal if the program qualifies. One drawback,
however, is that the application procedure is lengthy,156 which can de-
lay the entry of a product into the market. Trade secret protection can
be used until a patent application ig approved in two or three years, but
the extent of protection, as seen, is not as comprehensive as that pro-
vided by a patent.
is discussing a two-step test for patentability outlined by the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A. 1978) and In Re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980). On
October 1, 1982, after 53 years of existence, the C.C.P.A. joined with the U.S. Court
of Claims to become the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (C.A.F.C.).
Milde, Life after Diamond v. Diehr: The CCPA Speaks Out on the Patentability of
Computer-Related Subject Matter, 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 434, 434 (1982).
152. Gemignani, Should Algorithms be Patentable?, 22 JURIMErRICS J. 326, 334
(1982).
153. Id. at 335.
154. 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983).
155. Id. at 1368.
156. A patent was issued for a system of computer programs for retrieving data
and producing reports on stocks and bonds ten years after the application was made.
The delay was due to the confusion on rules governing patent protection for computer
programs. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1982, at 44, col. 1. In another case, an issue of statu-
tory qualification was finally 'decided in favor of the claimant twelve years after his
application was filed. In Re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912 (1982).
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The essential thing to remember, when considering the viability of
patenting a computer program, is that the program as a process must
be entirely new. The flow chart designed must be entirely novel, and
the overall process must be non-obvious.
V. Conclusion
It is clear that computer programs constitute proprietary informa-
tion deserving of legal protection. Until congressional action is taken,
designating an all-encompassing form of protection to adequately safe-
guard software owners' rights, the public must rely upon the present
systems. While the courts and legislature are slowly molding the law to
accommodate our rapidly-changing, computer-permeated lifestyle, ex-
pertise is needed to determine which avenue best serves a client's needs.
While the general legal practitioner should be familiar with the availa-
ble means of protection for computer software, it is recommended that
advice be sought from an experienced patent attorney who has dealt
extensively with the subject matter.
New technological developments will undoubtedly uncover issues
not conceived of only a short time ago. As a result, some important and
exciting changes will be witnessed as software developers seek legal
protection for their creativity, which is in ever-increasing demand.
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Florida Statutes Section 627.727: Is the Statutory
Right to Reject Uninsured Motorist Coverage Really
a "Right" At All?
I. Introduction
In 1961, Florida joined the ranks of the growing majority of states
to mandate uninsured motorist coverage. This legislation resulted from
consumer outcry over the numerous hardships befalling accident vic-
tims injured by uninsured motorists. The Florida uninsured motorist
statute requires that an uninsured motorist endorsement be issued with
all liability insurance policies for the protection of persons injured by
financially irresponsible motorists." The statute, now designated section
627.727, does afford the insured the right to reject the uninsured mo-
torist coverage.2 However, unless the insured knowingly rejects the un-
insured motorist protection, the insurer is deemed to provide this cover-
age regardless of whether an extra premium is actually paid.'
Despite the obvious good intentions of this legislation, the Florida
uninsured motorist statute has been beset with problems from its incep-
tion. In particular, the insureds' statutory right to reject has produced
extensive litigation on the issue of what constitutes a valid rejection. In
such cases, insurers generally claim that the insured has rejected the
coverage. Policy holders, on the other hand, maintain that they were
never offered this protection or never effectively rejected it. The statute
provides no guidelines in this area whatsoever, and the courts have
struggled to be just in deciding the continual flood of uninsured motor-
ist cases.
The ability of this statute to protect consumers has been rendered
highly questionable in light of certain practices of the insurance indus-
try, the naivete of insureds, and the marked confusion in the Florida
courts. Insurers do not favor uninsured motorist protection, as evi-
l. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1982). The uninsured motorist statute was origi-
nally enacted as section 627.0851, but, in 1970 was changed to the current section
number. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1970).
2. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1982). See Appendix for entire text of the
statute.
3. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1982). See, e.g., Weathers v. Mission Ins. Co.,
258 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
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denced by their use of policies slanted toward discouraging such cover-
age, their failure to adequately explain the protection, and their at-
tempts to exclude or limit the coverage as much as possible. The
frequently mistaken assumptions of insureds regarding the nature and
scope of uninsured motorist coverage further compound the problem.
As presently applied, the "right" of rejection is really no right at all,
but merely a means utilized by the insurance industry to escape the
mandatory inclusion of uninsured motorist coverage in auto liability
policies. Florida courts have been reluctant to aggressively address
these various problems, apparently preferring purely legislative reform.
The latest legislative response was the Sunset Act of 1982 which
amended Florida Statutes section 627.727 by requiring that the rejec-
tion of this coverage be in writing. This requirement, however, is but
one step toward clarifying the uncertainties surrounding the statutory
right of rejection. The legislature and the courts of Florida must work
together to develop standards and policies to effectuate the intent of
this statute, and help rather than hinder those parties suffering from
the negligence of financially irresponsible motorists.
This note examines the statutory development of uninsured motor-
ist coverage in Florida and focuses specifically on various trouble spots
concerning the statutory rejection. The purpose of this note is to
demonstrate the seriousness of this situation and to offer specific guide-
lines to help clarify the vagueness of this subject.
II. Origin of Uninsured Motorist Coverage
In the prosperity following World War II, the manufacture and
sale of automobiles was considerably expanded. Not surprisingly, there
was a rise in auto accidents contemporaneous with the increased num-
ber of vehicles on the nation's highways. Unfortunately, the innocent
accident victim was often virtually without remedy where a tortfeasor
neither carried insurance nor possessed sufficient assets to discharge his
obligations arising from his tort liability.'
Although this problem became increasingly evident during the
4. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(1) (Supp. 1982).
5. See generally 3 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, § 24.01-24.05
(revised ed. 1983); P. PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS 1-5 (1972); 2 I. SCHERMER,
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE § 23.01 (revised ed. 1983); A. WIDISS, A GUIDE
TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 3-17 (1970); Donaldson, Uninsured Motorist
Coverage, 34 INS. COUNCIL J. 57 (1967).
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1940s and 1950s, it had nevertheless existed since the advent of the
automobile many years earlier. The initial legislative response consisted
of the enactment of financial responsibility laws.6 These laws, enacted
as early as 1925, typically required a motorist to establish proof of fu-
ture financial responsibility following an auto accident or face revoca-
tion or suspension of his driving privileges.7 The inadequacy of these
laws soon became evident: they allowed the irresponsible motorist one
"free" accident, and left the victim of the first accident without com-
pensation. For the next thirty years, state legislatures attempted to for-
mulate methods to resolve the inequities in the financial responsibility
scheme. Various forms of insurance legislation engineered to compen-
sate those injured by uninsured motorists proved unsatisfactory as the
numbers of uninsured motorists escalated in the post World War II
era. Increasing pressure was imposed upon state legislatures to imple-
ment further remedial measures. 8 Suggested solutions included compul-
sory insurance laws, unsatisfied judgment funds, and state-sponsored
compensation funds. The insurance industry was vehemently opposed to
such reforms and actively lobbied against them.9 These pronounced ef-
forts "to prevent 'further socialization of insurance' and government
intervention" was most noticeable in the 1953-54 debates in the New
York legislature.10
By 1954, the New York legislature had gained recognition as the
nation's focal point on the financially irresponsible motorist problem.
The insurance industry feared the precedential effect New York's reso-
lution might have on the rest of the country and for almost a year
succeeded in stymieing the passage of a compensatory automobile in-
surance program. Nevertheless, the industry was undoubtedly aware
that this was not a problem that would bury itself and that compulsory
automobile insurance might soon become a reality. Thus, after a year-
long deadlock in the legislature, the insurance industry introduced a
new endorsement to the standard auto liability policy."' Through the
proposed endorsement offered on an optional basis, insureds would be
6. See supra note 5.
7. Id. Connecticut was the first state to enact such a law. 1925 Conn. Pub. Acts
ch. 183 (repealed 1927). New Hampshire followed this lead and passed a similar law
one year later. 1926 N.H. Laws ch. 54.1.
8. See supra note 5.
9. A. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 11 (1970).
10. 3 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, § 24.04 at 24-7 (revised ed.
1983).
11. See supra note 9, at 12, 13.
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indemnified for losses perpetrated by uninsured motorists. If an insured
was without'fault and injured he would be compensated when the
tortfeasor was either uninsured, underinsured, or a hit-and-run driver.12
The majority of states adopted this form of coverage although, only two
years following these debates, 'New York enacted a compulsory insur-
ance requirement. 13 In subsequent years, the National Bureau of Casu-
alty Underwriters made this coverage, commonly known as Uninsured
Motorist Coverage or Family Protection Insurance, available through-
out the United States.1 4 State legislation has made the coverage
mandatory in almost all jurisdictions, but often the insured is granted
the statutory option to reject the coverage.15
In light of the significant amount of litigation in this area, the fact
that the insurance industry itself created and promoted this type of un-
insured motorist coverage should be kept in mind. 6 The insurance in-
dustry was wary that consumer-backed legislation might adversely af-
fect its prosperity, and thus devised this new coverage to appease the
appetites of concerned legislatures. Over the years it has become appar-
ent that uninsured motorist protection has neither gained favor nor
been encouraged by the industry and insurers continually attempt to
deny or curtail this coverage through manipulation of statutory vague-
ness. The problems that this statutory vagueness has spawned are illus-
trated in the remainder of this note. The Florida legislature's response
is examined in the following section.
III. Florida Legislative History
Case law has served to flesh out the ambiguities and inadequacies
that have appeared and often reappear in the amendments to the unin-
sured motorist statute. The Florida legislature has responded by taking
a piecemeal approach in trying to remedy the various controversies as
they arise. The legislature has complacently withheld pronouncement
on those uninsured motorist issues receiving attention in the courts un-
til a legislative response is absolutely imperative. This section explores
the substantive legislative amendments affecting uninsured motorist
coverage and illustrates the legislature's somewhat tedious, step-by-step
12. 12-A G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 45:620 (2d ed. 1981).
13. A. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 14 (1970).
14. Id. at 14, 15.
15. Id. at 127-129.
16. Id. at 16, 17.
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approach in developing answers to uninsured motorist problems.
In 1961, Florida Statutes section 627.0851 introduced uninsured
motorist coverage in Florida by providing that no automobile liability
insurance would be delivered or issued for delivery in Florida unless
coverage was "provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less
than the limits described in section 324.021(7) . . .for the protection
of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover dam-
ages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles." 17 The stat-
ute also provided that this required coverage would be inapplicable if
any insured named in the policy rejected the coverage.18 The 1961 law,
less than one-half the length of the present statute, left many areas of
uninsured motorist coverage statutorily undefined. Although the statute
granted the insured the right to reject the protection, it was silent as to
the elements and form of the rejection. Furthermore, the statute con-
tained no provisions regarding the available amounts of coverage in ex-
cess over the statutory minimum or the applicability of the coverage
requirements to renewal policies. In the years to follow legislative
amendments focused on these areas.
In 1963, Florida Statutes section 627.0851 was amended to fur-
ther provide that, absent a written request by the insured, uninsured
motorist protection need not be provided in or made supplemental to a
renewal policy if the named insured had previously rejected the cover-
age in an earlier policy issued by the same insurer.19 Thereafter, a
steady increase in litigation concerning uninsured motorist coverage re-
newal policies resulted, peaking in the late 1970s and early 1980s.20
17. FLA. STAT. § 627.0851 (1961). This act was effective July 1, 1961. Florida
Statutes section 324.021(7) referred to in the statute is the Florida Financial Responsi-
bility Law. In 1961, it required proof of financial responsibility in the amount of
$10,000 for bodily injury or death to one person, $20,000 for the injury or death of two
or more persons, and $5,000 for injury to or destruction of property to others.
18. FLA. STAT. § 627.0851(1) (1961).
19. 1963 Fla. Laws ch. 63-148.
20. The conflict involving renewal policies arose when the insured added a vehi-
cle or replaced or substituted a vehicle. A new rejection was not required unless there
was a material change in the policy. However, courts often found that changes consti-
tuted material differences making a new rejection necessary. See, e.g., Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. co. v. Sheffield, 375 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). In Hart-
ford, the insurer issued the insured a liability policy with the minimum limits, at which
time she executed a written rejection of uninsured motorist coverage. Near the end of
the policy period the insured complained of high premiums. The insurer responded by
offering to change the policy limits due to the legislature's intervening amendment low-
ering the minimum limits. The insured executed a policy change request and was is-
1983]
150
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss1/9
150 Nova Law Journal [Vol. 8
The confusion arose because the district courts were not uniform in
their determinations of what constituted a renewal policy. The 1980
amendment halted the extensive litigation on this subject by expanding
this exception to encompass any policy that extends, changes, super-
sedes, or replaces any existing policy.2"
sued a second policy without being offered, or rejecting, the uninsured motorist protec-
tion. Subsequently, the insured was injured and the issue arose as to whether the
second policy was a renewal or a new policy. The court relied on United States Fire
Ins. Co. v. Van Iderstyne, 347 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977), in holding
that it was not a renewal policy because of differences in premium and coverage. The
Van Iderstyne court had held that an endorsement to a policy adding an automobile for
an additional premium was a "separate and severable contract" requiring a new offer-
ing of uninsured motorist coverage. Id. at 673. Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Glover, 202 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967). Thus Hartford established the
test that "if the original policy has been changed in any material respect then the
policy is new rather than a renewal." Spaulding v. American Fire & Indem. Co., 412
So. 2d 367, 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co. v. Sheffield, 375 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979)). In situations involving
replacements or substitutions of vehicles the trend was to follow State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bergman, 387 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980), petition for
rev. denied, 394 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1981), per curiam aftd, 408 So. 2d 1043 (Fla.
1982), which held that once an insured rejected full coverage under the uninsured mo-
torist portion of a policy he need not reject such coverage again when he buys a re-
placement vehicle. See United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Wain, 395 So. 2d 1211
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981), petition for rev. denied, 407 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 1981);
Kenilworth Ins. Co. v. McCormick, 394 So. 2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1981). Applying the Hartford test, such a policy change was not considered material
and the policy was merely a "renewal" rather than a "new" policy. Wain, 395 So. 2d
at 1214.
The results were not as consistent in cases involving additions of vehicles. There
was a divergence of authority between the Fourth District and the other districts. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal relied on Van Iderstyne, Hartford, and Wain, and
held that an addition of automobiles with a commensurate increase in premiums consti-
tuted a material change and therefore was outside the renewal exception of the statute.
Spaulding v. American Fire & Indem. Co., 412 So. 2d 367, 370-371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981), modified, 8 Fla. L. W. 479 (Dec. 9, 1983) (No. 62,267). See also Kobert
v. Zarem, 437 So. 2d 730 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The First District rejected Van
Iderstyne and held that the addition of a vehicle by endorsement is not the issuance of
a new policy. Maxwell v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 399 So. 2d 1051, 1053
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981). The Fifth District followed Maxwell in Sentry Ins. A
Mut. Co. v. McGowan, 425 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982). See also Rhodes
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 437 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Cote v.
American Fire & Casualty Co., 433 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
21. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-396. See House Comm. on Insurance, Bill Analysis on
Uninsured Motorists Coverage, House Bill 1175 (sponsored by Rep. Gallagher) (April
17, 1980); stating that once enacted, this amendment would effectively overrule
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It was not until ten years after the enactment of the original stat-
ute that a provision specifying maximum coverage limits was added.
Unfortunately, the language adopted by the legislature was susceptible
to two interpretations regarding the actual amounts of the limits. Con-
sequently, the courts had to wrestle with yet another ambiguity in the
statute.22 This 1971 amendment required minimum coverage in an
amount that was set forth in the financial responsibility law and also
required coverage be provided "in an amount up to one hundred per-
cent (100%) of the liability insurance purchased by the named insured
for bodily injury." 23 Thus, the required limits were raised to 100% of
the bodily injury limits and the named insured could reject the entire
coverage or a portion thereof. Furthermore, the amendment provided
that a long term lessee who is named insured in a policy or on a certifi-
cate of a master policy issued to the lessor shall have the sole right to
Hartford.
22. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-88 stated in part:
No automobile liability insurance. . . shall be delivered or issued for de-
livery in this state. . unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental
thereto, in not less than limits described in 324.021(7), and in amount up
to one hundred percent (100%) of the liability insurance purchased by the
named insured for bodily injury ...
After the 1971 Act went into effect, courts found the new coverage requirements am-
biguous as to the amount of coverage an insured was actually entitled to unless re-
jected. The problem was in determining the meaning of the phrase "in an amount up
to." In Garcia v. Allstate Ins. Co., 327 So. 2d 784, 786 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976),
cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1977), the court interpreted these terms as providing
a minimum (the financial responsibility limits) and a maximum (the bodily injury lim-
its). However, the majority of courts in construing the statute as a whole, held that it
provided uninsured motorist coverage equal to the bodily injury limits absent an offer
or rejection. First State Ins. Co. v. Stubbs, 418 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1982), petition for rev. denied, 426 So. 2d 26, 29 (Fla. 1983); Lumbermen's Mut.
Casualty Co. v. Beaver, 355 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. dismissed,
362 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1978); Riccio v. Allstate Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1978); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Baer, 334 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1976). To construe the amendment otherwise, noted Judge Anstead concurring in
Lumbermen's, would create no change in the statute "other than to impose a limitation
on the amount of such insurance that could be written." Lumbermen's, 355 So. 2d at
445. Furthermore, this interpretation would "be completely contrary to the legislature's
action in requiring uninsured motorist coverage in all policies written in Florida and
would pose serious constitutional questions." Id. Arguably, in retrospect this interpreta-
tion was correct: the 1973 amendment clarified the coverage requirements which con-
form to the holdings of the majority.
23. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-88.
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reject the uninsured motorist coverage."
Two years later, the legislature amended the coverage require-
ments; obviously in response to the frustration courts were experiencing
in interpreting the meaning of the coverage requirements as set forth in
the 1971 statute. Under the 1973 statute the language was simplified;
the amendment required coverage not less than the limits of the liabil-
ity insurance purchased and also provided that the named insured
could select lower limits.2 5
Many uninsured motorist statutes contain provisions for the
purchase of optional uninsured motorist coverages which are in excess
of the standard limits. In 1976, Florida adopted such a provision. Prior
to the amendment, the insurer had to offer uninsured motorist coverage
at least equal to the bodily injury limits. Effective October 1, 1976, the
insurer was required to make available "limits up to $100,000. each
person, $300,000. each occurrence, irrespective of the limits of the bod-
ily injury liability purchased" 6 at the written request of the insured.
24. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-88 states in part:
where a vehicle is leased for a period of one (1) year or longer and the
lessor of such vehicle by the terms of the lease contract provides liability
coverage on the leased vehicle in a policy wherein the lessee is a named
insured or on a certificate of a master policy issued to the lessor, the lessee
of such vehicle shall have the sole privilege to reject uninsured motorist's
coverage....
See Padron v. H.W.G. Leasing, Inc., 436 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dwyer, 421 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982), petition
for rev. denied, 431 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1983); Midland Ins. Co. v. Hochberg, 394 So. 2d
449 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), petition for rev. denied, 402 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1981).
The 1971 statute limited "uninsured motorist and insolvent insurers coverage to
the excess over and not duplicative of benefits available from those liable for the acci-
dent, auto liability, or medical coverage, or from workers compensation." Staff of Sen-
ate Comm. on Insurance, Staff Analysis on Automobile Liability Insurance; Senate Bill
225, companion to House Bill 276, (sponsored by Sen. Thomas). See also 1971 Fla.
Laws ch. 71-88.
25. 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-180. The statute was not retroactive. Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Baer, 334 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
26. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-266 read:
(2) The limits of uninsured motorist coverage shall not be less than the
limits of bodily injuiy liability insurance purchased by the named insured
or such lower limit complying with the company's rating plan as may be
selected by the named insured, but in any event, the insurer shall make
available, at the written request of the insured, limits up to $100,000 each
person, $300,000 each occurrence, irrespective of the limits of bodily in-
jury liability purchased, in compliance with the company's rating plan.
[Vol. 8
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From the time of the passage of the 1963 amendment creating the
renewal exception to the mandatory coverage requirement until 1980,
the courts attempted to decipher the difference between a new and a
renewal policy. The results during this seven-year period were highly
inconsistent. Apparently, the legislatiure concluded that this matter
could not be resolved in the courts and thus included in the 1980
amendment a provision which by its very terms served to clarify the
legislative intent as to the treatment of renewal policies. Prior to this
amendment, coverage need not have been provided in or supplemental
to a renewal policy. This act further extended this exception to apply to
"any other policy which extends, changes, supersedes, or replaces an
existing policy issued to him by the same insurer. ' 27 Furthermore, ef-
fective October 1, 1980, the insurer was required to notify the named
insured annually of his options as to the statutorily required coverage.
Notice was to be part of the premium and "shall provide for a means
to allow the insured to request such coverage and shall be given in a
manner approved by the Department of Insurance. '28
The most recent legislation on uninsured motorist coverage was
the Sunset Act of 1982.29 Three substantive changes affecting Florida
Statutes section 627.727 were made. Most importantly, this amend-
ment introduced the requirement that rejections of uninsured motorist
coverage must be in writing.30 This provision is another legislative re-
27. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-396. For a discussion on the case law development
which led to the passage of this amendment see supra note 20.
28. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-396. See Ferrigno v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 426
So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
29. 1982 Fla. Laws ch. 82-243.
30. Id. at 627.727(1). The requirement of a written rejection of uninsured motor-
ist coverage is clearly in response to the extensive litigation concerning whether an oral
or written rejection was required. In 1978, the First District, in Glover v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 363 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978), held that an oral rejection of unin-
sured motorist coverage was sufficient due to the absence of any statutory requirements
as to its specific form. The court noted that although the State Insurance Department
had issued Bulletin 586 requiring a written rejection, this regulation was not effective
when the policy in Glover had been written. On the Federal court level, the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court, in Harris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 569 F.2d 850 (5th Cir.
1978), had previously upheld the regulation but the Glover court noted that no state
court had yet considered its validity. Glover, 363 So. 2d at 13. Following Glover and
Harris there was a wide split of authority on this issue. A number of courts elected to
mandate a written requirement. See Decker v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 392 So. 2d 965, 966
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), petition for rev. denied, 399 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 1981);
Cohen v. American Home Assurance Co., 367 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1979), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1979); American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Wein-
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sponse to an ambiguity in the statute. For several years preceding this
amendment courts throughout the state were divided on the issue of
whether an oral rejection was statutorily sufficient. The amendment
also expanded upon the notice requirements originally set forth in the
1980 amendment and further required that the insurer annually notify
the insured of the availability of uninsured motorist coverage and the
new excess coverage. Additionally, the Act created a new coverage re-
ferred to as "Excess Underinsured Motorist Coverage."31 As long as
the insured has damages to justify recovery, he may collect the entire
amount of his excess underinsured coverage in addition to, but not re-
duced by, the other party's liability coverage. This coverage is a type of
uninsured motorist coverage but is not to be construed as uninsured
motorist coverage on excess policies. Lastly, the Act extended the pe-
riod offering protection against the insolvency of the liability insurer
from one year to four years to conform with the statute of limitations
for negligence.3 2
IV. Practices Which Frustrate the Statutory Purpose
Pursuant to Florida Statutes section 627.727, uninsured motorist
coverage is included in every auto liability policy unless it is specifically
rejected in clear terms by an insured named in the policy.33 However,
garten, 355 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty
Co. v. Beaver, 355 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. dismissed, 362 So.
2d 1054 (Fla. 1978). Other courts did not require a written rejection where the absence
of coverage was not disputed by the insurance carrier and the contracting insured. See
Del Prado v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 400 So. 2d. 115 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981),
petition for rev. dismissed, 407 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 1981); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Wright, 406 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981), petition for rev. denied, 413
So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1982). Many courts followed the lead of Glover. See Kimbrell v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 420 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (Fla. 1982), aft'd, 428 So. 2d 254 (Fla.
1982); Lane v. Waste Management Inc., 432 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Richmond v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 420 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982),
petition for rev. denied, 426 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1983); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 397
So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981). It is relevant to note that in Del Prado v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 400 So. 2d at 115, the court stated that if there was a "statutory
or other administratively imposed obligation to secure a written rejection, certainly the
named insured can waive this requirement which was designed for its protection. Statu-
tory rights can be waived." Id. at 116.
31. 1982 Fla. Laws ch. 82-243 at 627.727(4).
32. Id. at 627.727(2).
33. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1982). See Weathers v. Mission Ins. Co., 258
So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972). This rule applies to excess or umbrella poli-
[Vol. 8
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aside from requiring the rejection to be in writing, the statute provides
no guidelines for determining what is a valid waiver or rejection of this
coverage. Based on judicial interpretation, a rejection by a named in-
sured must be knowingly made to meet the requirements of the stat-
ute.3' 4 As evidenced by the abundant and confusing case law on the
issue of these rejections, the courts are unable to consistently discern
what exactly is a statutorily valid rejection. Absent additional clarifica-
tion, the issue as to what constitutes an informed or knowing rejection
is hopelessly unclear.
A. Elements of a Knowing Waiver
In uninsured motorist cases, the statutory rejection of uninsured
motorist coverage is also referred to as a waiver of such coverage. A
waiver is comprised of certain basic elements. The traditional definition
of a waiver is "the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known
right." 35 Therefore, one waiving a right must do so on his own accord,
in the exercise of free choice, and with knowledge of the nature of the
waived privilege. Consequently, the validity of the waiver or rejection
necessarily relates to the content and the adequacy of the offer. "There
can be no informed rejection in the absence of an informing offer."'38 If
an insured "selects" lower limits of uninsured motorist coverage be-
cies as well. See Sirantoine v. Illinois Employers Ins. of Wausau, 438 So. 2d 985 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Chicago Ins. Co. v. Dominguez, 420 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1982), petition for rev. denied, 430 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1983); American Motor-
ists v. Bennett, 415 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Aetna Casualty & Sur.
v. Fulton, 362 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Green, 327 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 1179
(Fla. 1976).
34. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1982). Judicial interpretation of the statutory
rejection requires it to be informed or knowingly made. See Government Employees
Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 433 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Realin v. State
Farm & Casualty, 418 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Spaulding v. Ameri-
can Fire & Indem. Co., 412 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Brown v.
American Motorists Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert.
denied, 368 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1979); Wilson v. National Indem. Co., 302 So. 2d 141
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
Generally, a knowing rejection is a factual issue for the jury. Petrou v. South
Carolina Ins. Co., 435 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
35. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1751 (4th ed. 1968).
36. Spaulding v. American Fire & Indem. Co., 412 So. 2d at 371, quoted in
Realin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 418 So. 2d at 432; Lustig v. Colonial Penn
Ins. Co., 406 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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cause the insurer failed to offer a higher amount equal to the liability
coverage and the insurer concedes it would not write the policy for the
higher amount even if requested, it can not be said that the rejection
was voluntary. 37 In these situations, the insured is not only uninformed
but is also deprived of his freedom of choice and is forced to accept the
policy on the insurer's terms or have no coverage at all. Thus, "take it
or leave it" offers by insurers cannot be met with statutory valid rejec-
tions by insureds."8 Likewise, if the insurer furnishes the insured with
false information as to the nature of the coverage, the purported rejec-
tion is ineffective.39
B. Failure of Insurer to Explain Coverage
A large percentage of laypersons applying for auto liability insur-
ance have very little or no knowledge as to the nature and importance
of uninsured motorist protection. To many insureds, this vague and un-
certain coverage simply means payment of an extra premium. Absent a
full and adequate oral or written explanation by the insurer, the in-
sured too often blindly rejects this valuable and relatively inexpensive
coverage.40
The Florida courts have been reluctant to respond to this problem.
In Lopez v. Midwest Mutual Insurance Co.,41 a fifteen year old minor
sued to rescind a written rejection of uninsured motorist coverage exe-
cuted by him as part of an insurance application. The plaintiff claimed
that the rejection was ineffective because he did not understand the
coverage involved, and because it was not explained to him. The waiver
provision in the application did not contain language which defined or
apprised the insured of the protection he was waiving, but was merely a
37. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Fulton, 362 So. 2d at 364.
38. Id. at 365.
39. Wilson v. National Indem. Co., 302 So. 2d at 141.
40. Frequently uninsured motorist waiver provisions are short statements on the
insurer's form reciting the relevant portion of the uninsured motorist statute requiring
this protection unless rejected. The voluminous case law on this issue indicates the
widespread confusion present in the judiciary in interpreting the statutory language.
Arguably it is unreasonable to expect an ordinary insured to adequately understand
this legislation and its extensive ramifications based on this technically formal language
found in most applications.
41. Lopez v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 223 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1969).
[ ol. 8
157
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
Uninsured Motorist Coverage
single statement of rejection.42 The Third District Court of Appeal
ruled-in favor of the insurance company, stating that "the insurance
company has no duty to explain uninsured motorist coverage to an in-
surance applicant unless the applicant asks for an explanation. 43
Other states have responded to this situation by either judicially or
statutorily adopting certain objective standards to ensure a more know-
ing rejection. For example, some courts have held that the rejection
should contain a definition of uninsured motorist coverage which will
"clearly and specifically apprise the insured of the nature of the right
he is relinquishing" 44 in plain terms understandable to the layperson. A
single line on the carrier's form was held insufficient on its face to ful-
fill the requirement of a valid rejection. 5 Other courts simply require
the rejection to expressly refer to the concept of uninsured motorist
protection." The judicial rulings most effective to protect the insured
are those which require the insurer to orally explain the coverage and
record the substance of the conversation as evidence. 7
42. A block near the bottom of the application stated: "UNINSURED MOTORIST
COVERAGE: MUST BE INCLUDED WITH LIABILITY OR PACKAGE POLICY AT ADDI-
TIONAL PREMIUM OF $10.00, UNLESS REJECTED." The applicant was to sign for the
total premium. Above the line for signature were the words: "IN APPLYING FOR THIS
INSURANCE I SPECIFICALLY REJECT INSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, UNLESS IN-
CLUDED IN THE PREMIUM ABOVE." Id. at 551.
43. Id. at 552. The Lopez rule has been followed in a number of other cases. See
Realin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 418 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982); General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Ltd. Corp. v. MacKenzie, 410 So. 2d
558 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982), petition for rev. denied, 419 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.
1982); General Ins. Co. of Florida v. Sutton, 396 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Alejano v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 378 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1979); Auto Owner's Ins. Co. v. Yates, 368 So. 2d 634, 638 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1979), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1979).
44. Dufresne v. Elite Ins. Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 916, 924, 103 Cal. Rptr. 347, 352
(1972). See Bohlert v. Spartan Ins. Co., 3 Cal. App. 3d 113, 83 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1969);
Johnson v. Concord Mut. Ins. Co., 450 Pa. 614, 300 A.2d 61, 65 (1973). For similar
statutory requirements, see CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(a)(2) (Deering Supp. 1983);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3902(a) (Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 516A.1 (West
Supp. 1983); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 500.3010 (repealed October 1, 1973 by no
fault law).
45. Johnson v. Concord Mut. Ins. Co., 300 A.2d at 61.
46. Aldcroft v. Fidelity & Casualty of New York, 106 R.I. 311, 259 A.2d 408
(1969).
47. See Dufresne v. Elite Ins. Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 916, 103 Cal. Rptr. 347
(1972); Hagar v. Elite Ins. Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 505, 99 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1971). See
also Johnson v. Concord Mut. Ins. Co., 300 A.2d 61 (1973).
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The Florida courts have not implemented any rule requiring an
insurer to explain this coverage and the Lopez holding is still fol-
lowed. 48 Furthermore, the present statute imposes a duty on the insurer
only to inform the insured of his statutory options regarding the
amount of uninsured motorist coverage.49
C. Mistaken Assumptions, Slanted Policies, and Exclusions
While providing an element of choice, the statutory opportunity to
reject uninsured motorist coverage simultaneously fosters many poten-
tial pitfalls for the insurance applicant. For example, insureds are often
under the mistaken impression that an insurance broker is an agent of
the insurance company. The general rule is that an insurance broker is
the agent of the insured rather than the insurer even though the broker
receives compensation out of the premium from the insurer.50 Thus,
even if the broker improperly rejects coverage51 or. selects lower limits
in signing for the insurance, 52 the insured is still bound by the rejection
regardless of whether the signature was authorized.
Another trap for insureds may lie in the policy application itself.
Frequently, insurance applications are slanted to discourage the
purchase of uninsured motorist coverage or to limit its scope by exclu-
sions. 53 A common method used is to describe the coverage as "addi-
tional" insurance requiring an "additional" premium. In Lopez,54 the
48. See supra note 43.
49. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1982). Travelers Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 397 So.
2d 358 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981). If the insured has contracted for insurance in
amounts less than the highest limits available, it must be shown that he was offered the
higher limits in order for him to have effectively rejected them. Realin v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co., 418 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982). "The application,
by itself, is not evidence that the higher limits were offered." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Jones, 414 So. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); American Motorist Ins.
Co. v. Weingarten, 355 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978). But see Lumber-
men's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Beaver, 355 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
cert. dismissed, 362 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1978).
50. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Koven, 402 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Auto Owner's Ins. Co. v. Yates, 368 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1979).
51. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Koven, 402 So. 2d at 1352.
52. Auto Owner's Ins. Co. v. Yates, 368 So. 2d at 634.
53. 2 I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE, § 23.04(3) at 23-12, 23-
13 (revised ed. 1983).
54. Lopez v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 223 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1969).
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application in issue contained several boxes which could be checked by
the applicant to select the coverages desired. An additional block at the
bottom of the application had to be checked if uninsured motorist cov-
erage was requested. Furthermore, the insured himself was required to
add the additional premium for the uninsured motorist coverage to the
package policy applied for. 55
The Third District Court of Appeal acknowledged that these pro-
visions encouraged the applicant to order insurance without the unin-
sured motorist coverage and that the provisions demonstrated to the
applicant that he would pay less by rejecting the coverage. The Lopez
court stated that the provisions would better effectuate the purpose of
the statute if the premium and the uninsured motorist coverage were
added automatically (unless a rejection were made), but upheld the re-
jection in the absence of statutory language requiring such provisions.5
The court commented that regulation of insurance companies, includ-
ing the establishment of requirements concerning the provisions of in-
surance applications, is not primarily a concern of the judicial branch
of government.5 The court's attitude in Lopez is typical of the unwill-
ingness of the judiciary to become involved in devising regulations and
standards that might better protect the insured and effectuate the pur-
pose of the statute.
This judicial reluctance was also evident in the more recent case of
Daly v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.58 In Daly, the in-
surer's standard underwriting practice was to prepare a form for the
applicant's signature, on which form the uninsured motorist coverage
was already rejected. This was done prior to any discussion with the
applicant and required him "to reject the rejection" 9 if this coverage
was desired. The Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the rejection
but stated that this practice violated the intent of the statute and ap-
pealed to the Department of Insurance and the legislature for attention
to this matter.60 A response to these situations from such agencies is
certainly warranted. In the interim, the courts should hold similar prac-
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Daly v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 422 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1982). For another example of a "less than above board technique" used by
the insurer, see Realin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 418 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
59. "Daly, 422 So. 2d at 1094.
60. Id.
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tices and provisions void as contrary to public policy and the intent of
the statute.
Insurance policies often attempt to exclude from uninsured motor-
ist coverage certain individuals"1 and vehicles.6 2 The exclusions are
often couched in fine print and ambiguous language. In these cases,
courts should not read them as to exclude coverage. The purpose of the
statute is to protect persons injured by uninsured motorists who are
unable to make the injured party whole."3 The protection is designed
for the injured or damaged person and not for the benefit of insurance
companies or negligent motorists." In light of this purpose, courts must
avoid a construction of the statute which would defeat coverage.65 Fur-
thermore, they must liberally construe policies in favor of the policy-
holder, and strictly construe them against the insurer.66
V. "Full Coverage"
Another serious problem occurs when the insured claims he re-
quested "full coverage. 867 To most insureds, "full coverage" means un-
61. Salas v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 272 So. 2d I (Fla. 1972); Mullis v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1971); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Marino, 370 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Forbes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 210
So. 2d 244 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968); First Nat'l. Ins. Co. of America v. Devine,
211 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
62. Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 428 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 397 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Mason, 210 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1968).
63. Brown v. Progressive Mut. Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1971).
64. Id. at 430.
65. First National Ins. Co. of Am. v. Devine, 211 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1968).
66. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Butler, 314 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1975); National Mer-
chandise Co. Inc., v. United Service Auto Ass'n, 400 So. 2d 526, 530 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Zautner v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 382 So. 2d 106, 107 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1980); Quick v. National Indem. Co., 231 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1970).
67. General Ins. Co. of Florida v. Sutton, 396 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1981); MacKenzie v. Avis Rent-a-Car Systems Inc., 369 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1979), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1979), Riccio v. Allstate Ins. Co., 357
So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Beaver,
355 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. dismissed, 362 So. 2d 1054 (Fla.
1978); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Darden, 338 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1976), cert. dismissed, 353 So. 2d 680 (1977), Garcia v. Allstate Ins. Co., 327
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insured motorist coverage in an amount at least equal to the liability
coverage. However, cases indicate that when the insured requests full
coverage, the insurer often omits the uninsured motorist coverage from
the policy. An insured's mistaken belief that he has this coverage is
sometimes reinforced by a coincidental increase in the policy premium.
Generally, the insured is ignorant of the fact that he is not covered
because when he signs the contract for coverage he is often unaware
that he is also rejecting the uninsured motorist coverage. 6 .
The law is unsettled on the question of whether a request for full
coverage will render the insurer liable for the optional uninsured or
underinsured coverages. A Kentucky court of appeal has held that a
request for full coverage did not require the insurer to provide the op-
tional coverages. e9 The Kentucky uninsured motorist statute, like the
Florida statute, only required the insurer to provide the additional cov-
erage when requested by the insured. The court held that the request
lacked specificity since there were numerous types of optional coverages
available such as fire, theft, or towing.70 Nevertheless, this case has
been strongly criticized because the court failed to distinguish a request
for the aforementioned peripheral optional coverages, which lack the
public policy interest in encouraging their purchase, from a request for
optional uninsured motorist coverages included in the statutory
financial responsibility scheme.7 1 A request for the former unrelated
coverages would not obligate the insurer to furnish them. 2 However, as
one commentator has stated, public policy concerns would support a
finding that a request for full coverage would require the inclusion of
the optional uninsured and underinsured coverages."3
So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1977).
68. See, e.g., General Ins. Co. of Florida v. Sutton, 396 So. 2d 855. Such a
situation also raises the issue of the applicant's duty to read. Generally, "an applicant
may not contest his signed rejection of coverage by contending that he signed the rejec-
tion without reading it." Id. at 856. See also Barnes v. Mangham, 153 Ga. App. 540,
265 S.E.2d 867 (1980). Arguably, in many cases the insurer never offered the coverage
and thus the applicant's failure to read the application or policy and discover the ab-
sence of the coverage is immaterial. Additionally, certain waiver provisions are not
adequate to apprise the insured of the nature of the coverage and thus the insured
cannot knowingly reject the protection.
69. Flowers v. Wells, 682 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. App. 1980).
70. Id. at 180, 181.
71. 2. I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE, § 23.04(2) at 23-21.
(revised ed. 1983).
72. Id.
73. Id. Cf. Parker v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 395 A.2d 507, 510 (N.H. 1978).
1983]
162
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss1/9
Nova Law Journal
The interpretation of "full coverage" was an issue presented in
Riccio v. Allstate Insurance Co.;7 4 the Florida Third District Court of
Appeal reversed a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff's insurer in
an action for a declaratory decree. The court held that a jury question
was presented as to whether the insurer's undertaking to give the in-
sured full coverage included an obligation to provide uninsured motor-
ist coverage. However, in dictum, the court stated that pursuant to the
1972 statute that required uninsured motorist coverage in an amount
up to 100% of the liability insurance, full coverage would mean unin-
sured motorist coverage equal to the liability limits."
In the recent case of Miller v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,"8 the
plaintiff's employer had instructed its insurer to "fully cover" the
leased vehicles which the employees used in their business. Following
the accident, the total amount of uninsured motorist' coverage was de-
termined to be only $10,000. since the employer had limited this cover-
age to $10,000/$20,000. without notifying its employees. The Third
District Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment in favor of the
insurer and interpreted the phrase "fully covered" as including the
"maximum limit of uninsured motorist coverage available under the
statutes of this state which under the particular policy, ...would be
$500,000." 7
Other states have adopted certain practices which can be used to
eliminate these problems. For example, statutory requirements have
74. Riccio v. Allstate Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
75. Id. at 422. This particular statute gave rise to some controversy over the
phrase "in an amount up to one hundred percent of the liability limits." Id. at 422,
423. While Riccio interpreted this to mean uninsured motorist coverage equal to the
bodily injury limits, the court in Garcia v. Allstate Ins. Co., 327 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1977), held that "full cover-
age" was any amount of uninsured motorist coverage between the financial responsibil-
ity limits and the bodily injury limits; one being a minimum, the other a maximum. In
light of the 1973 amendment clarifying the coverage requirements, Riccio is the correct
interpretation. That statute, as well as the present one, requires uninsured motorist
coverage not less than the bodily injury limits. The present statute, however, requires
the insurer to make available limits up to $100,000/$300,000 irrespective of the
amount of bodily injury limits purchased if requested in writing. FLA. STAT. § 627.727
(Supp. 1982). Although Riccio was remanded for a jury trial on this issue, the court's
dictum interpreting the meaning of "full coverage" should be given weight under the
language of the present statute.
76. Miller v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 438 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1983).
77. Id.
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been imposed mandating that the coverage shall be called to the atten-
tion of the named insured at the time the policy is issued. Some Cali-
fornia courts require the waiver agreement to be entirely separate from
the policy and require an additional signature on the agreement.7 9
These rulings evidence judicial approval and encouragement of the
purchase of uninsured motorist protection and a desire to ensure that
the applicant is aware of all his rights and understands the conse-
quences of his actions.
VI. Available Optional Coverages
The Florida uninsured motorist statute provides that "the insurer
shall make available, at the written request of the insured, limits of up
to $100,000 each person, $300,000 each occurrence, irrespective of the
limits of bodily injury liability purchased."80 This is an optional cover-
age which is included in many of the states' uninsured motorist stat-
utes. Once again, the Florida statute offers little from which one can
discern the respective rights and duties of the insured and insurer as
conferred by this provision.
Where a statute requires the insured to request the optional cover-
age from the insurer, it is logical to "read into the statute an assump-
tion that the insurer must first advise the insured that such coverage is
available."81 This analysis would avoid placing an undue burden on the
insured to keep apprised of changes in insurance legislation. Once in-
formed of the optional coverage, the insurer should obtain a written
rejection if the insured chooses not to select the additional limits. How-
ever, if the insurer fails to make known to the insured the availability
of the increased limits, the issue i whether the insured will automati-
cally be entitled to the optional coverage. A determination that such
coverage would be included would be consistent with the intent of the
statute. Nevertheless, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Lustig v.
Colonial Penn Insurance2 indicated that such a finding would not be
78. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01 (Supp. 1983). See Koenig v. Mission
Ins. Co. 106 Ariz. 75, 471 P.2d 271 (1970), Maryland Casualty Co. v. Wilson, 6 Ariz.
App. 470, 433 P.2d 650 (1967).
79. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Meritplan Ins. Co. 205 Cal. App. 2d 133, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 682 (1962).
80. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1982).
81. 2 I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE, § 23.04(1) at 23-20 (re-
vised ed. 1983).
82. Lustig v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 406 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
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the proper result. In Lustig, the insurer provided the insured with a
brochure which indicated that the uninsured motorist coverage could
not be higher than the bodily injury limits which were $50,000.1
$100,000. The insured was not informed that uninsured motorist limits
of $100,000./$300,000. were available upon written request. The court
observed that despite the insurer's error, this would not entitle the in-
sured to a judgment finding his coverage to be $100,000./$300,000.
without a written request, or without a showing that the coverage
would not have been provided even if requested.8
Many states' statutes have been interpreted to impose a duty on
the insurer to inform the insured of the availability of the optional cov-
erage." This explanation should contain information regarding the ad-
vantages, nature, and scope of the optional coverage, as well as its pur-
pose and the cost it would entail. Even absent a statutory requirement
to communicate this information to the insured, it has been held that
the insurer has a duty to "make a commercially reasonable attempt to
explain the availability and operation of such coverage to their
insureds.''85
Additionally, while there are no cases to date, the new statutory
requirement of written rejections should equally apply to rejections of
the optional coverage. Because the statute requires that the insurer
"shall make available" limits in excess of the standard coverage upon
written request, he is once again in the position of the offeror. There-
fore, it is arguable that once the insurer offers the optional coverage
and the insured elects not to contract for the higher amount, the in-
surer should still secure a written rejection to satisfy the statute. Ab-
sent a written rejection, the insured should be entitled to the maximum
coverage allowed by the law.
VII. Persons With Statutory Authority to Reject
The Florida uninsured motorist statute. contains a provision ren-
dering the requirement of uninsured motorist coverage inapplicable
1981).
83. Id. at 544 n.2.
84. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. § 3902(b) (Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. §
3636(F) (Supp. 1983). See also 2 I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE, §
23.04(1) at 23-18 (revised ed. 1983).
85. 2 I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE, § 23.04(3) at 23-23 (re-
vised ed. 1983) (quoting Smedvig v. St. Paul Ins. Co., Henn. County Dist. Ct. (Minn.
2/9/80), file No. 745876 (Per Hon. Win. S. Posten)).
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when any insured named in the policy rejects the coverage in writing.86
In interpreting the statute, courts have drawn a distinction between the
designation "persons insured thereunder" and "named insured" or "in-
sured named."'87 The section of the statute creating coverage contains
the phrase "persons insured thereunder" which as interpreted has a
broad meaning to extend coverage. On the other hand, that portion of
the statute authorizing rejection uses the term "any insured named"
which has a very limited meaning and is only applicable to those per-
sons named in the policy.88 Courts have tended to liberally construe the
former portion regarding the extent of coverage and to narrowly con-
strue the latter portion regarding rejection, as it detracts from public
policy considerations."
Thus, the named insured alone has the power to accept or reject
the uninsured motorist coverage. Furthermore, "the decision of the
named insured accepting or rejecting uninsured motorist coverage is
binding on any additional insureds under the policy." 90 This rule has
been viewed as simply practical in light of the waiver problem; to hold
otherwise would require the insurer to obtain rejections from all addi-
tional insureds and permissive users.9 1 While this analysis may be valid,
the rule nevertheless works a hardship on those additional insureds who
assume the existence of this coverage. When injured, these insureds
suddenly discover that this protection has been waived by the policy
holder.
The statute contains no provisions for notice to the additional in-
sureds; therefore, there is no duty to communicate a waiver of the unin-
sured motorist protection to additional insureds.9 2 Generally, in a fam-
ily situation, this will not pose much of a problem because of the close
relationship. There is a likelihood that a consensus was reached among
86. FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (Supp. 1982).
87. Weathers v. Mission Ins. Co., 258 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966);
Kohly v. Royal Indem. Co. 190 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966), cert. denied,
200 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1967).
88. Weathers v. Mission Ins. Co., 258 So. 2d at 277; Kohly v. Royal Indem. Co.,
190 So. 2d at 819.
89. See, e.g., Protective v. National Ins. Co. of Omaha v. McCall, 310 So. 2d
324 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Weathers v. Mission Ins. Co., 258 So. 2d at 277.
90. Whitten v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. 410 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1982).
91. 12-A G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW, § 45:627 (2d ed. 1981).
92. Darnaby v. Greenstein Trucking Co., 425 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Guardado v. Greyhound Rent-A-Car, 340 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1976).
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the insureds in the selection of coverage or there is at least an aware-
ness as to the contents of the policy.9 3 However, in a commercial set-
ting the rule can have unfair results. The most common cases involve
corporations and car rental agencies. In the former instance, employers
frequently waive the protection for their employees who are usually en-
gaged in an occupation requiring the use of a vehicle. In the car rental
situations, the rented vehicle is typically insured for liability, but les-
sees are commonly unaware that uninsured motorist coverage has been
previously rejected by the lessor.94 Since the waiver is typically not
communicated to the employee or lessee, there is not an opportunity for
the individual to obtain additional protection through an agreement
with the named insured or through a collateral policy. Once again, the
usual judicial response is to acknowledge the problem but to avoid rul-
ing on the issue, instead calling for legislative action.95
Arguably, in the absence of requirements for communication of
the rejection and guidelines for the form of notification, the logical al-
ternative to eliminating this and numerous other problems plaguing the
rejection issue is to eliminate the right to reject entirely. 8 Courts have
stated that "[t]he statute does not contemplate a piecemeal whittling
away of liability for injuries caused by uninsured motorists," 97 yet ap-
parently this is exactly what is happening. Mandatory coverage may be
the best solution to preserving the original purpose and intent of this
93. Lancaster Oil Co. Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 486 F.Supp. 399
(N.D. Fla. 1980); Del Prado v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 400 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1981), petition for rev. dismissed, 407 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 1981); Maxwell v.
United States Fidelity & Guar., Co., 399 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Continental Ins. Co. v. Roth, 388 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Glover v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
94. Darnaby v. Greenstein Trucking Co., 425 So. 2d at 656; Guardado v. Grey-
hound Rent-A-Car, 340 So. 2d at 510; Kohly v. Royal Indem. Co., 190 So. 2d at 819;
Morpurgo v. Greyhound Rent-A-Car, 339 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976);
MacKenzie v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 369 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1979), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1979).
95. Kohyl v. Royal Indem. Co., 190 So. 2d at 819; Guardado v. Greyhound
Rent-A-Car, 340 So. 2d at 510. See also Riccio v. Allstate Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 420,
421-422 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
96. See A. WIDIss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE at 285
(1970), stating that "so long as the present system is maintained, it seems both justifia-
ble and desirable to eliminate the right to reject this coverage in order to assure protec-
tion for those classes of insureds who do not exercise a knowledgeable waiver of the
protection." Id.
97. See, e.g., First Nat'l Ins. Co. of America v. Devine, 211 So. 2d 587, 589
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
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statute, namely, to protect insureds who fall victims to negligent and
financially irresponsible motorists.
VIII. What Constitutes Adequate Proof of Rejection?
Generally, whether the insurer offered the applicant the full
amount of uninsured motorist coverage and whether the insured has
knowingly rejected uninsured motorist protection or opted for coverage
in an amount less than his liability limits are issues for the trier of
fact.98 Nevertheless, it is not uncommon for these cases to be resolved
by summary judgment or directed verdict without submitting the issue
to a finder of fact. For example, in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Spen-
cer,919 the issue before the First District Court of Appeal was what type
of evidence was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the insurer had met the statutory requirement of offering the
insured uninsured motorist coverage. The Spencer court stated that
"[w]hen a statute commands that its provisions can only be met by
following a specific method, and the evidence reveals that its require-
ments were not observed, summary judgment is appropriately entered
because the controversy is considered one of law and not one involving
a disputed issue of material fact."1 °0 The statute requires an "affirma-
tive, informed rejection by an insured of his right to UM protection."101
Without extrinsic evidence, an informed rejection cannot be im-
plied merely from an insured's signature on the application for unin-
sured motorist coverage to lower the limits of this coverage.10 2 The
court's opinion in Southeast Title & Insurance Co. v. Thompson0 3 im-
plies that a rejection of uninsured motorist coverage may be inferred
from acceptance by the insured of a policy containing an endorsement
98. The issue of a knowing selection of uninsured motorist coverage is a matter
for the jury and not to be decided by summary judgment. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v.
Conner, 435 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
99. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 397 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
100. Id. at 360.
101. Id. at 361.
102. Zisook v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Fla. L. W. 2654 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. November 11, 1983) (No. 82-1972). Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., v.
Fulton, 362 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); American Motorist Ins. Co. v.
Weingarten, 355 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978). See also Lumbermen's
Mut. Casualty Co. v. Beaver, 355 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert.
dismissed, 362 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1978).
103. Southeast Title & Ins. Co. v. Thompson 224 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1969), rev'd, 231 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1970).
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which excludes all policy coverage for certain accidents although it
does not specifically mention uninsured motorist coverage. Such an im-
plication can be easily avoided by requiring the insured to reject the
coverage in specific terms. This would demonstrate that the insured
had at least been offered the coverage and would also satisfy the re-
quirement of written rejection.
In Kimbrell v. Great American Insurance Co.,104 the Florida Su-
preme Court stated that "the making of an express offer . . . is not
dispositive of the question of whether there was a knowing selection of
coverage limits." 10 5 The court noted that it may already be within the
insured's knowledge that such coverage is available without an express
offer by the insurer. Additionally, although it is relevant that the in-
surer maintains evidence of an offer, it is not critical in determining
whether a knowing selection was made.106
Frequently, the insurer will attempt to prove a rejection by testi-
mony of his unfailing practice to offer uninsured motorist coverage pur-
suant to Florida Statutes section 627.727, or of his general routine of
mailing notices to the policyholder of changes in the law.107 Such evi-
dence is admissible under the Florida Evidence Code.108 However, the
general rule as set forth in Jarrard v. Associates Discount Corp. by the
Florida Supreme Court is that:
in order to constitute proof of performance of an act on a specific
occasion, it is not sufficient merely to prove the habit, practice, or
custom, but there must also be proof that the practice was followed
in the particular instance in issue, and the evidence should show
performance of the practice by those then charged with it.109
104. Kimbrell v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 420 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1982), aff'd, 428 So.
2d 254 (Fla. 1982).
105. Id. at 1088.
106. Id. at 1089. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright. 406 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1981), petition for rev. denied, 413 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1982).
107. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones 414 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 397 So. 2d at 358; Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., v.
Fulton, 362 So. 2d at 364; American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Weingarten, 355 So. 2d at
821. See also Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Beaver, 355 So. 2d at 441.
108. FLA. STAT. § 90.406 (Supp. 1982).
109. Jarrard v. Associates Discount Corp. 99 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1957) (emphasis
added). See also Scatigno v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1983); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 414 So. 2d at 1169; Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Spencer, 397 So. 2d at 358; American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Weingarten, 355 So.
2d at 821; Bernstein v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 294 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. Agp.
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In light of this rule, courts generally hold as a matter of law that the
statutory requirements are not met when evidence of a knowing rejec-
tion is founded on such testimony of routine practice.110
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jones,"" the Fifth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal went so far as to find that the insurer's testimony
of general routine was not only admissible pursuant to the evidence
code but was also sufficient proof under the rule in Jarrard. Appar-
ently, the only distinguishing factor present in Nationwide was that the
insurer alleged that, in addition to his custom of advising applicants of
such coverage, he was certain that he followed that procedure in that
case. He could not recall the exact language of the conversation but
was sure he had followed his routine. Thus, because the evidence code
does not require corroboration, the court found that this added asser-
tion provided the necessary proof that the practice was followed in the
particular instance. 12 The 1982 statute requiring a written rejection
will alleviate situations where the question is whether the insured actu-
ally rejected the coverage and arguably, such practices should not be
permissible.
IX. Conclusion
The Florida uninsured motorist statute section 627.727 has been
considerably expanded over the more than twenty years pince its origin
in 1961. In the area of rejection of uninsured motorist protection, un-
certainty still exists in spite of numerous amendments. Admittedly, the
recent 1982 amendment requiring written rejections is a step in the
right direction. Although rejections of uninsured motorist coverage
must now be in writing, litigation will continue to revolve around the
intricacies of the required "knowing rejection." The availability of ad-
ditional forms of optional coverages and the apparent need to obtain
knowing rejections for these coverages as well, will in all likelihood ag-
gravate the problem. Nevertheless, as uninsured motorist litigation
maintains its steadily increasing pace, it is obvious that much more leg-
islative and judicial structuring of the rejection procedure is needed. In
1974).
110. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 397 So. 2d at 358; American Motorists Ins.
Co. v. Weingarten, 355 So. 2d at 821. But see Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v.
Beaver, 355 So. 2d at 441.
111. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 414 So. 2d at 1169.
112. Id. at 1169, 1170.
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all cases, it must be remembered that the purpose of the statute is to
protect those injured through the negligence of irresponsible motorists.
The statute does not inure to the benefit of either the uninsured motor-
ist or the insurer. With the abundant confusion in this area caused by
insufficient guidelines governing the offer-rejection procedure, this leg-
islative intent is frustrated too often.
The existence of uninsured motorist coverage in serious accident
cases can be crucial. Damages are frequently in the six-digit range and
lack of insurance can have devastating effects. Because many misun-
derstandings between insureds and insurers stem from ignorance and
lack of adequate explanations regarding uninsured motorist protection,
a statutory duty should be imposed upon the insurer to fully explain
this coverage, including its purpose, benefits, and cost. It may be im-
practical to require an insurer to sacrifice valuable time in order to
orally explain the fundamentals of this coverage, however, a written
explanation on the insurer's form would be a reasonable alternative. If
after reading this explanation the insured had any questions, the in-
surer would be obligated to help answer his inquiries. Such a require-
ment would place no undue burden on either party. This requirement
could be effected by adoption of the following proposed amendment to
Florida Statutes section 627.727:
The coverage under this section shall be determined by a written
selection of each coverage signed by any named insured under the
policy. This selection of desired coverage shall be contained in a
separate agreement in which both the nature and scope of unin-
sured and underinsured motor vehicle coverage and the options are
explained in clear and understandable terms. The agreement shall
explain that this coverage gives the insured the same rights as if he
had been struck by someone with liability coverage. The agreement
shall inform the insured that the benefits of such coverage include
compensation for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and
loss of earning capacity, as well as medical expenses and lost
wages. The amounts of the premiums for the available coverages
shall also be contained in the insurer's uninsured/underinsured mo-
torist agreement. The agreement shall inform the insured of the
available limits of these coverages and, absent a selection to the
contrary, shall require the insured to reject each and every cover-
age option. Additionally, the insured must separately select either,
or reject both, uninsured and excess underinsured motorist
coverage.
Although legislative amendments can undoubtedly cure part of the
[Vol. 8
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dilemma, this is not an area of purely legislative reform. In order to do
full justice to the statute's intent, Florida courts must follow the lead of
numerous states that have recognized the chaos and disorder inherent
in the statutory right of rejection, and which have implemented reforms
to correct the disparities. The task of the judiciary to interpret and
apply laws handed down to them in conformity with their expressed
purpose has been well established. Thus, when the legislative purpose is
clear, courts must resolve cases in a manner which furthers that objec-
tive. For example, when it is evident that certain insurance industry
methods, such as the use of slanted insurance policies, thwart this legis-
lative intent the judiciary should not hesitate to condemn and invali-
date these practices. The courts should not display any reluctance in
dealing with this well-acknowledged problem, but should initiate the
imposition of standards and restrictions to further ensure the fair and
just resolution of the vast amount of uninsured motorist cases. Legisla-
tive amendments coupled with judicial cooperation will hopefully lead
to more definite meetings of the minds between insured and insurer.
Karen E. Roselli
APPENDIX
627.727 Motor vehicle insurance; uninsured and underinsured vehicle coverage; insol-
vent insurer protection.
(1) No motor vehicle liability insurance policy shall be delivered or is-
sued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or
principally garaged in this state unless uninsured motor vehicle coverage is
provided therein or supplemental thereto for the protection of persons in-
sured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or
operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom. However, the coverage required
under this section shall not be applicable when, or to the extent that, any
insured named in the policy rejects the coverage in writing. When a motor
vehicle is leased for a period of 1 year or longer and the lessor of such vehi-
cle, by the terms of the lease contract, provides liability coverage on the
leased vehicle in a policy wherein the lessee is a named insured or on a certif-
icate of a master policy issued to the lessor, the lessee of such vehicle shall
have the sole privilege to reject uninsured motorist coverage. Unless the
named insured, or lessee having the privilege of rejecting uninsured motorist
coverage, requests such coverage in writing, the coverage need not be pro-
vided in or supplemental to any other policy which renews extends, changes,
supersedes, or replaces an existing policy issued to him by the same insurer,
when the named insured or lessee had rejected the coverage in connection
with a policy previously issued to him by the same insurer. Each insurer shall
at least annually notify the named insured of his options as to coverage re-
quired by this section. Such notice shall be part of the notice of premium,
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shall provide for a means to allow the insured to request such coverage, and
shall be given in a manner approved by the department. The coverage de-
scribed under this section shall be over and above, but shall not duplicate,
the benefits available to an insured under any workers' compensation law,
personal injury protection benefits, disability benefits law, or similar law;
under automobile medical expense coverages; or from the owner or operator
of the uninsured motor vehicle or any other person or organization jointly or
severally liable together with such owner or operator for the accident. Only
the underinsured motorist's automobile liability insurance shall be set off
against underinsured motorist coverage. Such coverage shall not inure di-
rectly or indirectly to the benefit of any workers' compensation or disability
benefits carrier or any person or organization qualifying as a self-insurer
under any workers' compensation or disability benefits law or similar law.
(2)(a) The limits of uninsured motorist coverage shall be not less than
the limits of bodily injury liability insurance purchased by the named in-
sured, or such lower limit complying with the rating plan of the company as
may be selected by the named insured; but in any event the insurer shall
make available, at the written request of the insured, limits up to $100,000
each person and $300,000 each occurrence, irrespective of the limits of bod-
ily injury liability purchased, in compliance with the rating plan of the
company.
(b) In addition, the insurer shall make available, at the written request
of the insured, excess underinsured motor vehicle coverage, providing cover-
age for an insured motor vehicle when the other person's liability insurer has
provided limits of bodily injury liability for its insured which are less than
the damages of the injured person purchasing such excess underinsured mo-
tor vehicle coverage. Such excess coverage shall provide the same coverage as
the uninsured motor vehicle coverage provided in subsection (1), except that
the excess coverage shall also be over and above, but shall not duplicate, the
benefits available under the other person's liability coverage. The amount of
such excess coverage shall not be reduced by a setoff against any coverage,
including liability insurance. An insurer shall not provide both uninsured mo-
tor vehicle coverage and excess underinsured motor vehicle coverage in the
same policy.
(3) For the purpose of this coverage, the term "uninsured motor vehi-
cle" shall, subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, be deemed to
include an insured motor vehicle when the liability insurer thereof:
(a) Is unable to make payment with respect to the legal liability of its
insured within the limits specified therein because of insolvency; or
(b) Has provided limits of bodily injury liability for its insured which
are less than the limits applicable to the injured person provided under unin-
sured motorist's coverage applicable to the injured person.
(4) An insurer's insolvency protection shall be applicable only to acci-
dents occurring during a policy period in which its insured's uninsured mo-
torist coverage is in effect when the liability insurer of the tortfeasor becomes
insolvent within 4 years after such an accident. Nothing herein contained
shall be construed to prevent any insurer from affording insolvency protec-
tion under terms and conditions more favorable to its insureds than is pro-
vided hereunder.
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(5) Any person having a claim against an insolvent insurer as defined in
s. 631.54(5) under the provisions of this section shall present such claim for
payment to the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association only. In the event of
a payment to any person in settlement of a claim arising under the provisions
of this section, the association shall not be subrogated or entitled to any re-
covery against the claimant's insurer. The association shall, however, have
the rights of recovery as set forth in chapter 631 in the proceeds recoverable
from the assets of the insolvent insurer.
(6) If an injured person or, in the case of, death, the personal represen-
tative agrees to settle a claim with a liability insurer and its insured for the
limits of liability, and such settlement would not fully satisfy the claim for
personal injuries or wrongful death so as to create an underinsured motorist
claim against the underinsured motorist insurer, then such settlement agree-
ment shall be submitted in writing to the underinsured motorist insurer,
which shall have a period of 30 days from receipt thereof in which to agree
to arbitrate the underinsured motorist claim and approve the settlement,
waive its subrogation rights against the liability insurer and its insured, and
authorize the execution of a full release. If the underinsured motorist insurer
does not agree within 30 days to arbitrate the underinsured motorist claim
and approve the proposed settlement agreement, waive its subrogation rights
against the liability insurer and its insured, and authorize the execution of a
full release, the injured person or, in the case of death, the personal represen-
tative may file suit joining the liability insurer's insured and the underinsured
motorist insurer to resolve their respective liabilities for any damages to be
awarded; however, in such action, the liability insurer's coverage, shall first
be exhausted before any award may be entered against the underinsured mo-
torist insurer, and any such award against the underinsured motorist insurer
shall be excess and subject to the provisions of subsection (1). Any award in
such action against the liability insurer's insured shall be binding and conclu-
sive as to the injured person and underinsured motorist insurer's liability for
damages up to its coverage limits.
(7) The legal liability of an uninsured motorist coverage insurer shall
not include damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconve-
nience unless the injury or disease is described in one or more of paragraphs
(a) through (d) of s.627.737(2).
(8) The provisions of s.627.428 do not apply to any action brought pur-
suant to this section against the uninsured motorist insurer unless there is a
dispute over whether the policy provides coverage for an uninsured motorist
proven to be liable for the accident.
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The Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act
of 1980: Is "Simplification" Better for Both Consumer
and Creditor?
I. Introduction
The Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act of 1980 be-
came effective October 1, 1982.1 The purpose of the Act was to make
the statute and regulation governing all credit disclosures simpler.2 The
changes were designed to ease creditor compliance and to help consum-
ers shop more intelligently for their credit transactions.3 The Act has
aided in deregulating the credit industry, but the question remains
whether the consumer is being adequately protected, especially in the
area of residential mortgage loans.
Deregulation has created a more complex real estate market than
has ever existed before. It is ironic that when the consumer most needs
to receive adequate information about the available mortgages, he may
not be receiving that information because of the recent simplification of
Truth in Lending. The paramount problem that faces today's residen-
tial mortgagor is one of timing. The mortgagor needs information
about all his alternatives before he obligates himself on a contract to
purchase or mortgage his home. Neither the old Truth in Lending stat-
ute nor the new Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act ade-
quately addresses the issue of what type of information the consumer
should receive. A related issue is when should the consumer receive the
needed information. The final question to be resolved is who should be
responsible for giving the consumer the necessary information when he
needs it.
To answer these questions, this note will first illustrate the coin-
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1602 (Supp. V 1981). The Truth in Lending Simplification and
Reform Act of 1980 is Title V of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Mone-
tary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 STAT. 132. The Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 includes other legislation to de-
regulate the credit industry.
2. 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 251, Title V of the Depository Insti-
tutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. [Hereinafter referred to as
DIDMCA of 1980].
3. Id.
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plexity facing today's mortgagor by briefly examining some of the vari-
ous new mortgages. Second, this note will focus on the changes made to
the disclosure laws by the new Truth in Lending Simplification and
Reform Act as they pertain to what information is necessary to the
residential mortgagor and how the new laws could be improved. Third,
the effect of the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act on
the requirements of when disclosure is made is examined. Alternatives
to the new laws will also be discussed. Finally, the problem of who
should be responsible for disclosure is discussed with an emphasis on
the available alternatives.
I. Changing Market Conditions
Since the Depression, the fixed rate mortgage has been the main-
stay for residential mortgagors.4 The mortgage market had been rela-
tively stable until the recent deregulation. Now, the fixed rate mort-
gage is less popular with both lenders and consumers. A combination of
market and regulatory changes introduced a myriad of new types of
mortgages from which the residential mortgagor may select.
A. Reasons for the changes
In the traditional mortgage market, thrift lenders lend long and
borrow short5 from savings depositors. In a relatively stable inflation-
free economy, this practice works.8 However, when there is persistent
inflation, the process fails. As market interest rates rise in response to
inflation, lenders are forced into charging higher rates to compensate
for the below-market mortgages kept in their portfolios. To add to the
problem, many states have maximum usury ceilings which prevent
lending at market rates.8 When disintermediation 9 is added to the mar-
4. Guttmann, Types of Adjustable Rate Mortgages and Their Lien Priority, 55
FLA. B.J. 552 (1981).
5. Landers and Chandler, The Truth-in-Lending Act and Variable-Rate Mort-
gages and Balloon Notes, 1976 AM. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 35, 38.
6. Walleser, Balancing the Interest: The Changing Complexion of Home Mort-
gage Financing in America, 31 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 3 (1981-1982).
7. L. VIDGER, BORROWING AND LENDING ON RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY 226
(1981).
8. Landers and Chandler, supra note 5, at 39.
9. Id. Disintermediation is defined as "[w]hen free market interest rates exceed
the regulated interest ceiling for time deposits, some depositors withdraw their funds
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ket, the lender is faced with lending at higher, unattractive rates to
protect itself.
While the market was operating under the burden of inflation in
the 1970s,"° lenders looked for alternative mortgages they could offer to
compensate for the inherent shortcomings of the fixed rate mortgage.
In the past, the thrift lenders were not authorized to offer mortgages
where the monthly payment rates changed. 1 The Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, which regulates the thrift lenders, asked Congress twice to
change the regulation so that a variable rate mortgage could be of-
fered. 12 Finally in 1978, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board author-
ized the lending of variable rate mortgage.1 3
Since 1978, there has been a flood of measures enacted to further
deregulation of the credit industry: April 1981: The Federal Home
Loan Bank Board permitted federally chartered savings and loan as-
sociations to offer a variety of adjustable rate mortgage loans; 4 July
1981: The National Credit Union Administration permitted credit un-
ions to make adjustable rate mortgages; 15 July 1981: The Federal
Home Loan Bank Board amended the adjustable rate mortgage regula-
tion so that a graduated payment feature could be offered with the
available loans;16 August 1982: The Federal Home Loan Bank Board
replaced the various existing regulations with one that broadly author-
ized federally chartered savings and loan associations to make a variety
of mortgage loans; 7 October 1982: The Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982 authorized state chartered lenders to make
similar alternative mortgage loans that federally chartered institutions
were already authorized to make;18 December 1982: The Office of the
and invest them elsewhere at a higher interest rate." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 421
(5th ed. 1979).
10. Walleser, supra note 6, at 2.
11. Hyer and Kearl, Legal Impediments to Mortgage Innovation, 6 REAL EsT.
L.J. 211, 214 n.10 (1978). The thrift lenders could not make variable mortgages ac-
cording to an interpretation of a regulation governing themh.
12. Id.
13. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-2(a), (c) (1979). Variable rate mortgage was defined as a
mortgage which had an "interest rate ... tied to a reference index; thus, actual future
payments are not known at the time of loan origination." Id. This was an attempt by
Congress to alleviate the credit industry of the problem created by persistent inflation.
14. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1981) (codified in 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4 (1982)).
15. 46 Fed. Reg. 38,669 (1981) (codified in 12 C.F.R. § 701.21-6B (1982)).
16. 46 Fed. Reg. 37,625 (1981) (codified in 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4B (1982)).
17. 47 Fed. Reg. 36,612 (1982) (codified in 12 C.F.R. § 545.6 (1983)).
18. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Title VIII, Pub. L.
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Comptroller of the Currency made the adjustable rate mortgage regu-
lations apply to state chartered banks by amending 12 C.F.R. section
29;19 and March 1983: 12 C.F.R. section 29 was further revised al-
lowing national banks greater flexibility in the provisions of adjustable
rate mortgage. The revised regulation eliminates limits on the fre-
quency of interest rate and payment adjustments, limits on the magni-
tude of the interest rate adjustment, and the cap on negative amortiza-
tion.20 The requirement that the monthly payments be reset to a level
sufficient to amortize the outstanding principal balance at least once
every five years to no later than during the twenty-first year of the
mortgage was also modified.21
More flexibility results from these recent changes. It is now possi-
ble to obtain a completely individualized mortgage. The mortgage mar-
ket has become a grocery store of different mortgage instruments,
which tends to create confusion in the minds of consumers.22 A survey
conducted by the Federal National Mortgage Association in March
and April 1982 found that "most of the consumers who are aware of
the newer types of mortgages do not understand how these instruments
work. '' 23 Today's borrower must be educated not only as to what is
available, but also as to how his selection will affect his future ability to
purchase and to resell his home.
B. Alternative Mortgage Loans
Besides the traditional fixed rate mortgage, the residential mortga-
gor can, as a result of the steps described above, choose from another
group. of mortgages: alternative mortgage loans. An alternative mort-
gage loan is defined as "a single, long-term obligation on which the
interest rate may be adjusted over the life of the loan in accordance
with an interest rate index agreed on in advance by the borrower and
lender and specified in the loan document. ' 24 The residential mortgagor
No. 97-320.
19. 47 Fed. Reg. 55,911 (1982) (codified in 12 C.F.R. § 29.11 (1983)).
20. 48 Fed. Reg. 9,506 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 29).
21. Id.
22. Werthan, Alternative Mortgages and Truth-in-Lending, 69 FED. RESERVE
BULL., 327 (1983).
23. Id.
24. Browne, The Development and Practical Application of the Adjustable Rate
Mortgage Loan: The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation's Adjustable Rate
Mortgage Loan Purchase Program and Mortgage Loan Instruments, 47 Mo. L. REV.
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is confronted with a myriad of different mortgages, each with its own
acronym. A brief examination of some of the available alternative
mortgage loans illustrates the variety and complexity that faces the
consumer.
1. Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM)
One of the most common alternative mortgage loans offered is the
ARM, generally sponsored by national banks. An ARM is defined as
"any loan made to finance or refinance the purchase of and secured by
a lien on a one- to four-family dwelling . . ., where such loan is made
pursuant to an agreement intended to enable the lender to adjust the
rate of interest from time to time."'25
The interest rate of an ARM consists of two components: a margin
and an index. The margin is generally a percentage point or points
added to the index to increase the lender's yield or profit. The margin
varies according to the borrower. 26 The second factor comprising the
interest rate is the index. An index is "a ratio or other number derived
from a series of observations and used as an indicator or measure. "27
To be a valid index for interest rate purposes, it must meet two criteria
before it can be used: 1) it must be beyond the lender's control, and 2)
it must be ascertainable by the mortgagor.28 There are a vast number
of indices available that fulfill the two requirements. Some common
indices are: 1) the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's index of national
average contract interest rate on the purchase of previously occupied
dwellings, 29 2) the weekly or monthly average auction rates on the
United States Treasury bills,30 and 3) the weekly or monthly average
yields on United States Treasury securities.3 1 To be fully informed
about the type of mortgage he is choosing, the consumer needs to know
179, 184 (1982).
25. 12 C.F.R. § 29.2 (1983).
26. For example, one of the ARM plans offered by the Federal National Mort-
gage Association adds 2.9 percentage points to the index for the investor mortgagor.
The margin varies daily. To obtain the margin for a particular day, one would have to
call the Federal National Mortgage Association for a specific plan. FNMA ARM plan
6a as of June 10, 1983.
27. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 427 (1967).
28. 48 Fed. Reg. 9,512 (1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 29.3).
29. 12 C.F.R. § 29.4(a) (1983).
30. 12 C.F.R. § 29.4(c) (1983).
31. 12 C.F.R. § 29.4(b) (1983).
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where to obtain information on the potential indices and, more impor-
tantly, the historical trends for each index. The historical trends will
show the volatility or stability of the selected index. Knowledge about
the index is imperative to accurately evaluate which index is better for
the consumer's needs, especially-when the consumer is offered a num-
ber of loans that appear to be similar.3 2
Once the index is selected, the next question to be addressed is the
effect of an interest rate change. A change in the interest rate can af-
fect the outstanding principal balance, the monthly payment, or a com-
bination of the two.83 Negative amortization will occur if the rate
changes but the payment rate and the maturity date remain constant.
This could seriously jeopardize the homeowner's equity if negative
amortization continues for a lengthy period of time.3
Since these adjustments are negotiable, the borrower must know
the options and the ramifications of his choice. To be adequately in-
formed, the borrower must know at least: 1) how the interest rate is
determined, 2) how adjustments are made if the interest rate changes,
3) how any resulting change may affect his payments, and 4) how any
resulting change will affect him if he resells.
There are advantages to ARMs, both for the lender and the con-
sumer. ARMs provide more diversity to the mortgage market 5 while
allowing more mortgage money to be available because lenders will
have a "hedge" on inflation. Lenders and borrowers receive the advan-
tage of potentially lower initial interest rates because the lender does
not have to compensate for the low fixed rate mortgages in his portfolio
by charging higher rates. 6
Because of the existence of ARMs, borrowers may find it rela-
tively easier to obtain financing through ARMs when interest rates are
changing or money is tight.87 Lenders will not have to exercise a due-
on-sale clause to increase the interest rate to market rates when the
home is sold because an interest rate change is part of the mortgage
32. Walleser, supra note 6, at 33.
33. 12 C.F.R. § 29.2, 29.5(4) (1983).
34. For example, if a borrower made a $50,000. 30-year loan at 12% but was
making monthly payments at an effective rate of 4.9% with annual adjustments for a
period of ten years, at the tenth year the borrower would owe $57,697.10. Negative
amortization, therefore, would increase the principal by $7,697.10.
35. Walleser, supra note 6, at 17.
36. Id. at 18, (quoting Cowan and Foley, New Trends in Residential Mortgage
Finance, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1075, 1081 (1978)).
37. Id.
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contract. An ARM borrower may encounter fewer difficulties in selling
his home because a qualified buyer will find it easier to assume the loan
than a comparable fixed rate mortgage.38 Most ARMs do not have a
prepayment penalty, facilitating resell or refinance. 39 Also, borrowers
will be able to take advantage of declining interest rates without refi-
nancing,40 if rates go down.
2. Graduated Payment Mortgage (GPM)
This mortgage begins with initial payments lower than that neces-
sary to fully amortize the loan by the maturity date. The payments
gradually increase at designated intervals until the level necessary to
amortize the loan is reached .4 A graduated payment feature can be
used with any loan. A graduated payment feature is attractive because
qualification is based on a lower, more affordable payment.42 However,
the borrower faces a negatively amortized mortgage since his beginning
payments are lower than is required to fully amortize the mortgage.
3. Growing Equity Mortgage (GEM)
This mortgage has a fixed interest rate but there are scheduled
annual increases in the monthly payment which allow the final matur-
ity to be shortened considerably than a comparable fixed rate
mortgage.'
4. Reverse Annuity Mortgage (RAM)
The borrower benefits with this mortgage because he receives
monthly payments from the lender instead of having to pay them. The
borrower essentially purchases an annuity44 with a loan against the ac-
38. Id. at 17.
39. 12 C.F.R. § 29.6 (1983).
40. Scheuerman, Adjustable Rate Mortgages: Fundamental New Directions in
Residential Mortgage Lending, Part II, 55 FLA. B.J. 737, 740 (1981).
41. Marcis, The Shakeout in Alternative Mortgage Instruments, REAL EsT.
REV., Spring 1983, at 29, 30.
42. Werthan, supra note 22, at 327.
43. Marcis, supra note 41, at 30.
44. Annuity is defined as "[a] fixed sum payable to a person at specified intervals
for a specified period of time or for life." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 82 (5th ed. 1979).
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cumulated equity in his home.45 Reverse annuity mortgages are advan-
tageous to the mortgagor with a large accumulation of equity in his
home.
5. Pledged Account Loan (PAL)
This plan requires the borrower to place his down payment into an
interest-bearing escrow account with the lender.46 The borrower makes
lower monthly payments while the lender supplements these payments
with funds from the borrower's pledged savings account.47 The bor-
rower essentially subsidizes himself with the help of the lender.
6. Reserve account mortgage
This mortgage is similar to the Pledged Account Loan and has
just been introduced by the Federal National Mortgage Association. 48
It also requires that the down payment be placed in an interest-bearing
escrow account with the lender.49 However, the funds are contributed
by someone other than the borrower, such as the builder, seller, or
some third party.50
There are potential advantages for all involved with this plan.
First, the borrower purchases the property with no money down.51 Sec-
ond, the lender is secure in the event of foreclosure because it has tem-
porary control over the down payment. 52 Finally, the funds will be re-
turned to the contributor as early as three years from the date of the
sale.5 3
However, the reserve account mortgage illustrates the dangers fac-
ing the uninformed borrower. The interest rate of this mortgage is tied
to the Federal National Mortgage Association's three- and five-year
ARMs." The lender has made it extremely difficult for the borrower to
45. Id.
46. Iezman, Alternative Mortgage Instruments: Their Effect on Residential Fi-
nancing, 10 REAL EST. L.J. 3, 18 (1981).
47. Id.
48. The Miami Herald, Sept. 25, 1983, at 18H, col. 1.
49. Id. at col. 2.
50. Id.
51. Id. at col. 3.
52. Id. at col. 2.
53. Id.
54. Id. at col. 3.
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determine the make-up of his interest rate since it is based on an index
which is itself based on an index. The borrower must determine which
index or indices the underlying three- and five-year ARMs are tied to.
Also, the lender receives double profits because it has added a margin
to both the underlying ARM interest rate, which serves as an index,
and the reserve account mortgage.
Because of the potential pitfalls, as shown by the brief introduc-
tion into the reserve account mortgage and other types of alternative
mortgages, today's residential mortgagor must be armed with sufficient
information to understand and evaluate the alternatives without being
overwhelmed by the complexity and variety inherent in the new mort-
gages.55 This is the designated task of the disclosure laws.
III. Disclosure Laws
A. The Truth in Lending Act: Background & Problems
The legislation governing disclosure requirements for all credit
transactions, including residential mortgage loans, is commonly re-
ferred to as the Truth in Lending Act" and its implementing regula-
tion as Regulation Z (referred to as Reg. Z).57 The Truth in Lending
Act is considered as one of Congress' most ambitious consumer protec-
tion efforts to date.58 The purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is to
provide consumers with "meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that
the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit
terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit .. ."59
It was Congress' hope that credit competition and economic stability
would be a by-product of Truth in Lending.60
55. The specific plans mentioned in the note are not an exhaustive list. For exam-
ple, there are rollover mortgages (ROM), shared appreciation mortgage (SAM), dual
rate variable rate mortgages (DRVRM), and constant payment factor variable rate
mortgages (CPFVRM), to name a few. An in-depth discussion of all the alternative
mortgages available is beyond the scope of this note. See Iezman, supra note 46 and
Marcis, supra note 41 for discussion of the different mortgages.
56. The Truth in Lending Act, 82 STAT. 146 (1968) (codified as amended in 15
U.S.C. § 1601-1693(r) (1976 and Supp. V 1981)).
57. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1-226.29 (1983).
58. Landers & Chandler, supra note 5, at 60.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1976).
60. Id.
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The Truth in Lending Act has had a number of problems that
Congress has tried to resolve over the years. One problem resulted from
ambiguous drafting of the original act.61 The poor drafting led to con-
flicting results in the courts and the Federal Reserve Board, which gov-
erns Reg. Z.62 Since courts required strict compliance with the techni-
cal requirements of the Truth in Lending Act, 3 lenders were forced to
constantly update disclosure forms to comply with new court rulings or
Federal Reserve Board advisory opinions. The constant revision of dis-
closure forms increased the chance that the disclosure given would not
be in compliance with the law.6 The cost of creditor compliance and
operational inefficiency, though never evaluated, 65  had to be
phenomenal.
The consumer did not escape from the impact of the complexity of
the Truth in Lending Act. The general feeling is that the consumer has
suffered from an "information overload" under the old Truth in Lend-
ing Act. 6 "Too often implementation of the Act's provisions resulted
not in a better informed, credit conscious consumer, but in an over-
whelmed consumer who ignored all disclosures and failed to attempt to
digest the information provided." 61 There is evidence, for example, that
consumer awareness of the prevailing annual percentage rate has in-
creased, 68 but there have been no studies to measure specifically
whether consumers understood the significance of the annual percent-
61. Woocher & Geltzer, Legislative Background to Truth in Lending Simplifi-
cation and Reform Act, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 506, 508 (1982).
62. Id. 46 Fed. Reg. 20,942 (1981) citing Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts. The Truth in Lending cases represent 2% of the federal civil caseload. By 1980,
Reg. Z had been interpreted more than 1,500 times and there had been more than
13,000 lawsuits filed. Id.
63. Id. at 509.
64. Id.
65. 46 Fed. Reg. 20,944 (1981).
66. Woocher & Geltzer, supra note 61, at 508.
67. Id. at 509.
68. S. Rep. No. 368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 236, 252.
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age rate and whether they actually used it when mortgage shopping."9
B. Trend Toward Simplification: The New Truth in Lending
Act
With Congress' growing awareness of the inherent problems, it be-
came apparent that the Truth in Lending Act needed to be modified. 0
It was not until the enactment of the Depository Institutions Deregula-
tion and Monetary Control Act of 198071 that Congress "simplified"
the Truth in Lending Act. As part of the simplification process, the
Federal Reserve Board was instructed to redraft Reg. Z.7 2 Until Octo-
ber 1982, creditors had the option of complying with the old Truth in
Lending Act or the new Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform
Act of 1980.73
The Simplification Act was enacted with both the consumer and
the creditor in mind. For the consumer, Congress decreased the possi-
bility of information overload by reducing the number of required items
for disclosure. Clarity, economy, and simplification became the stan-
dard instead of the former lengthy, detailed disclosure statements.75
However, the changes made in the disclosure laws by the Simplification
Act are decidedly in favor of the creditor. One of its main goals was to
make creditor compliance easier.7' The decrease in the number of re-
quired disclosure items and an increase in the tolerances for numerical
errors were perceived to facilitate creditor compliance.7 Reg. Z's re-
draft included model forms which aid creditors78 and increase stand-
ardization in the market. A commentary has been added to Reg. Z,
69. Werthan, supra note 22, at 329.
70. 46 Fed. Reg. 20,942 (1981).
71. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (94 Stat. 132) 252. The
Truth in Lending Simplification & Reform Act of 1980 is Title V of this Act.
72. Woocher & Geltzer, supra note 61, at 536.
73. International Banking Facility Deposit Insurance Act, title III, 95 Stat.
1513, 1515 (1981) (amending DIDMCA of 1980, supra note 2, § 625(a)). Creditor
compliance became effective October 1, 1982.
74. Woocher & Geltzer, supra note 61, at 537.
75. Boyd, The Truth-in-Lending Simplification and Reform Act-A Much-
Needed Revision Whose Time Has Finally Come-Part I, 23 AIuz. L. REv. 1, 5
(1981).
76. DIDMCA of 1980, supra note 2, at 251.
77. 46 Fed. Reg. 20,942 (1981).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1981); 12 C.F.R. § 226 (Appendix H, 1983).
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replacing the formal and informal advisory opinions issued by the Fed-
eral Reserve Board.79 Any amendments or interpretations that require
form changes will become effective October first of each year with at
least six months' notice to the creditors.80 Congress estimates that the
Simplification Act "could result in a one year savings of $600 million
by creditors and substantial additional savings from anticipated de-
creases in litigation."81
Besides making creditor compliance easier, the Simplification Act
and the new Reg. Z have weakened sanctions for creditors' violations
relating to certain material disclosure items.8 2 Enforcement of creditor
compliance has been shifted from the private sector to administrative
agencies. 8  Creditors are required to reimburse borrowers for certain
types of disclosure errors.8 ' Creditors may substitute state and/or other
federal agencies' disclosure in alternative mortgages for that required
by the Simplification Act and the new Reg. Z when the forms chosen
offer greater protection.8 5
The Simplification Act and the new Reg. Z have been criticized
from their inception. The harshest criticism emanates from the fact
that Congress made no "systematic attempt to identify and agree on
the fundamental goals of the Act."86 Congress did not adequately ana-
lyze the current mortgage market when it redrafted the statute.87 Crit-
ics note faulty execution, political compromise, and the inability of the
statute to cure the marketplace ills.88
C. Specific Changes in the Simplification Act and Regulation Z
The Simplification Act and the new Reg. Z are designed to give
residential mortgagors a basic outline of certain material credit infor-
79. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (Supp. I, 1983). The commentary is incorporated in what is
referred to as a supplement of Reg. Z.
80. 46 Fed. Reg. 20,942 to 20,943 (1981).
81. DIDMCA of 1980, supra note 2, at 271.
82. 46 Fed. Reg. 20,943 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 93-126 for
discussion of material items.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(0 n.43 (1983).
86. Rohner, Truth in Lending "Simplified". Simplified?, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 999
(1981).
87. Id. at 1000.
88. Id.
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mation. Material terms are the annual percentage rate, finance charge,
the method and balance which the finance charge is computed, amount
financed, total of payments, and payment schedule.89 Material terms
must be disclosed "clearly and conspicuously." 90 Certain items, such as
annual percentage rate, finance charge, amount financed, and total of
payments must be segregated from non-related information. 1 A brief
examination into the new requirements for the items disclosed in the
Federal Box9 2 illustrates the need for further refinement in the disclos-
ure laws. Suggestions for further modification in the legislation will be
advanced.
1. Annual Percentage Rate (APR)
Annual percentage rate was designed as a tool for credit shop-
ping.93 Reg. Z defines APR as "a measure of the cost of credit, ex-
pressed as a yearly rate, that relates the amount and timing of value
received by the consumer to the amount and timing of the payments
made." The descriptive explanation of APR is "the cost of your credit
as a yearly rate. '9 5
The rules for computing APR are more easily stated than applied.
APR computations have been labeled as complex and mysterious for
both the creditor and the consumer." The Simplification Act revised
the rules and equations for APR,7 but they remain as complicated as
before. There are two basic methods for determining APR: 1) the actu-
arial method, and 2) the United States Rule method.98 The appendix to
Reg. Z contains examples for both methods.9 9 The same results will be
obtained under either method when the payments are at equal intervals
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(u) (Supp. V 1981).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1632(a) (Supp. V 1981).
91. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.17(a)(1), (2) (1983).
92. J. GLAZIER, RMIC's GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD'S NEW
TRUTH IN LENDING REQUIREMENTS 23 (1982). Some lenders refer to this segregation
as the "Federal Box" since the information is generally enclosed in a box. The items in
the Federal Box must also have a descriptive explanation for each term. 15 U.S.C. §
1638(a)(8) (Supp. V 1981).
93. DIDMCA of 1980, supra note 2, at 252.
94. 12 C.F.R. § 226.22(a) (1983).
95. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(e) (1983).
96. Boyd, supra note 75, at 56.
97. 12 C.F.R. § 226.22 (Appendix J 1983).
98. 12 C.F.R. § 226.22(a) (1983).
99. 12 C.F.R. § 226.22 (Appendix J 1983).
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or for regular loans. 100 However, when computing APR for payments
made for irregular loans, such as an alternative mortgage loan, the two
methods will produce different results.101 The Federal Reserve Board
has two volumes of APR tables to aid creditors in APR calculations. If
the creditor uses these tables, it is deemed in compliance with the stat-
ute and regulation even though the result obtained by using the Federal
Reserve Board tables will be different from the two methods specified
in Reg. Z.102 This tolerance for discrepancies undermines the credibil-
ity of using APR as a valid shopping tool since the consumer cannot be
assured of its accuracy.
Reg. Z is not only tolerant of variances that result from using dif-
ferent methods of computing APR, but it is also tolerant of the degree
of accuracy with which the calculations are made. The Simplification
Act now requires that the APR be disclosed within 1/8 of 1% of the
actual rates for regular loans 03 instead of the previous 4 of 1%. For
irregular loans, the acceptable variance is even larger: 4 of 1% of the
actual rate.104 To allow the lender to disclose at different margins of
error depending on the type of loan robs the borrower of an effective
method for comparing a fixed rate mortgage to an alternative
mortgage.
As credit information is disseminated today, the consumer may
still not understand what APR means. A frequently asked question by
a borrower at closing is what is his simple o note rate. The question
indicates that the borrower does not understand the significance of the
APR disclosure or may be confused by assuming that the APR affects
the amount of his monthly payment. To alleviate this confusion, the
simple or note interest rate should be disclosed with the APR to give
the borrower a basis for comparison.
The disclosure of APR is deceptive as it is used now. APR ex-
presses the cost of credit as a yearly rate. However, a number of items
that make up APR are paid only at closing and are not part of the
yearly credit cost. If Congress wanted to give consumers helpful infor-
mation, it would require that the APR be disclosed at two different
time periods. First, consumers would receive an APR based on the ma-
turity date of the mortgage, which is the method presently used. The
100. 12 C.F.R. § 226.22(a) (Supp. 1 1983).
101. Id.
102. 12 C.F.R. § 226.22(b) (1983).
103. 12 C.F.R. § 226.22(a)(2) (1983).
104. 12 C.F.R. § 226.22(a)(3) (1983).
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second APR would be the yield if the consumer sold the house within
five years from the date of purchase. The second figure would be a
more accurate standard for measuring the cost of credit for the con-
sumer as the average home is owned for that period.105
If Congress modifies the Simplification Act to implement these
proposals, arguably creditors will object to disclosing the simple inter-
est rate or the second APR. Creditors will probably be concerned that
disclosing the actual cost to the consumer during the first five years of
the mortgage, which is very high, will scare borrowers away from buy-
ing houses. This is the same line of reasoning lenders used when the
Truth in Lending Act was first enacted. First mortgage loans were ex-
empt from disclosure of the total of payments because creditors were
afraid that disclosure of the high cost of a dwelling over the life of the
loan would frighten the borrower.'06 However, there seems to be little
effect on the market since lenders began giving disclosure of the total
of payments.
2. Finance Charge
The descriptive explanation given by the new Reg. Z for the
finance charge is "the dollar amount the credit will cost you.' 07 Fi-
nance charge includes any cost charged to the borrower which he
would not pay if he had paid cash for the dwelling.'0 8 Costs such as
late charges, seller's points, and fees for title examination, abstract,
survey, title insurance, credit reports, and escrow deposits are not in-
cluded in the finance charge.10 9
3. Amount Financed
Amount financed is defined as "[t]he net amount of credit ex-
tended"" 10 to the borrower. The descriptive explanation provided in the
Federal Box is "the amount of credit provided to you or on your
behalf.""'
105. Landers & Chandler, supra note 5, at 62.
106. Id. at 63.
107. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(d) (1983). The amount financed and finance charge are
needed to calculate the APR.
108. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (1983).
109. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.4(c)(1) to (8), 226.4(d) (1983).
110. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(b)(1) (Supp. 1 1983).
111. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(b) (1983).
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Creditors are not required to itemize the amount financed,"," as
they were under the old the Truth in Lending Act. The creditor may
inform the borrower that an itemization of the amount financed can be
obtained upon written request or give the "itemization as a matter of
course."113 If the loan comes under the Real Estate Settlement Proce-
dures Act,114 which requires a "good faith estimate," then the creditor
is exempt from complying with the itemization requirement of Reg.
Z."1 5 This exemption is applicable even when the "good faith estimate"
discloses different items and the timing for disclosure is different from
that under the Simplification Act and Reg. Z. 16 Congress felt that
eliminating itemization of amount financed would give consumers more
meaningful disclosure while easing the potential for "information
overload. 117
However, an explanation of the amount financed to the borrower
will frequently prompt the question of what is the loan amount. This
question indicates that the borrower is confusing the term amount
financed with loan amount. To prevent this confusion, the loan amount
should be included when disclosure is given. The inclusion of this item
may prompt the borrower to request an itemization of amount financed
to determine what, if any, is different between the loan amount and
amount financed.
4. Total of Payments and Other Disclosure Items
The descriptive explanation of the total of payments is "the
amount you will have paid when you have made all scheduled pay-
ments." 8 It is calculated by adding together the amount financed and
the finance charge. 19
There are additional required disclosure items which do not have
to be segregated and disclosed conspicuously as is required of those in
the Federal Box. 120 The balance of the items for disclosure consists of:
1) the name of the creditor, 2) reference to variable rate feature, if
112. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(c)(2) (1983).
113. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(c) (Supp. 1 1983).
114. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617. The Real Estate Procedures Settlement Act is
referred to as RESPA.
115. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(c) n.39 (1983) and (Supp. 1 1983).
116. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(c) (Supp. 1 1983).
117. DIDMCA of 1980, supra note 2, at 266.
118. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(h) (1983).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981).
120. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a) (1983).
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applicable, 3) payment schedule, 4) demand feature, if applicable, 5)
prepayment options, 6) late payments, 7) security interest, 8) insurance
information, if applicable, 9) certain security interest charges, 10) con-
tract reference, 11) information on the assumption policy, and 12) re-
quired deposits, if applicable. "21 For residential mortgage loans, the
creditor must disclose whether the mortgage loan is assumable.1 22 This
information is very helpful to the borrower as it is a major considera-
tion when credit shopping.
The Simplification Act and Reg. Z allows creditors, at their op-
tion, to disclose the entire monthly payment, including escrow depos-
its.123 However, creditors often will list only the principal and interest
and the monthly mortgage insurance premiums, if applicable, when dis-
closing the monthly payment.1 2 This practice is misleading since the
consumer's natural tendency is to think that the payment disclosed is
his entire monthly payment. This is incorrect. Generally, the consumer
must also pay escrow deposits monthly. This problem can be easily
remedied by requiring the creditor to make some reference to the fact
that escrow deposits need be added to the principal and interest pay-
ment to obtain the monthly payment, or list the monthly payment with
a notation that the figure includes escrow deposits that may vary over
the life of the loan.
Besides the required items, the creditor can add items "as applica-
ble."1 25 The "applicable" terms may be combined or listed sepa-
rately. 26 Having the flexibility to add other terms Will make it easier
for the creditor to comply with the Simplification Act and Reg. Z as
well as with state and other Federal agency regulations.
D. Timing of Disclosure
1. Traditional or Transactional Method
The old Truth in Lending Act required that disclosure be given
"before the credit [was] extended ... . The old Reg. Z determined
that disclosure was required when there was a "creation of a contrac-
121. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(a) to (r) (1983).
122. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(g) (Supp. 1 1983).
123. RMIC, supra note 92, at 26.
124. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(q) (1983).
125. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(1) (Supp. 1 1983).
126. Id.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(1976).
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tual relationship, a matter normally determined by reference to state
law. ' 128 When the Simplification Act was enacted and Reg. Z re-
drafted, consummation of the credit transaction determined the time of
disclosure.129 This is a major shift away from the test of economic suf-
fering or payment of a non-refundable fee requirements to that of
whether there is a contractual obligation.130
There is an inherent problem in using consummation as the focal
point for determining when disclosure should be given because disclos-
ure made at consummation is too late. By the time of consummation of
the credit contract, the borrower has already negotiated the details of
the purchase of his home and is "psychologically committed to the
transaction and unlikely to go credit shopping."131 Yet, encouraging
credit shopping is one of the primary purposes of the Simplification Act
and Reg. Z disclosure.13 2 The borrower needs disclosure prior to being
obligated on the sales contract. Alternatives to the traditional method
of disclosure are examined in the following sections with suggestions
for changes to solve the consumer's problem.
2. Early Disclosure
There was no special provision for early disclosure under the old
Truth in Lending Act and Reg. Z.13 3 The Simplification Act and the
new Reg. Z add a provision requiring that certain residential mortgage
transactions give early disclosure.134 To come within the early disclos-
ure requirement, the loan must be both a "residential mortgage trans-
action" under the Simplification Act and Reg. Z135 and be a federally
related mortgage under the provisions of RESPA.136
If the residential mortgage transaction meets the two-part test,
128. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(13)(1) (Supp. 1 1983).
129. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(13) (1983). Consummation is defined as "the time that a
consumer becomes contractually obligated on a credit transaction." Id.
130. Id.
131. Rohner, supra note 86, at 1021.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b) (1983).
133. 46 Fed. Reg. 20,881 (1981).
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981); 12 C.F.R. § 226.19 (1983).
135. Residential mortgage transaction is defined as "a transaction in which a
mortgage, deed of trust, purchase money security interest arising under an installment
sales contract, or equivalent consensual security interest is created or retained against
the consumer's dwelling to finance the acquisition or initial construction of such dwell-
ing." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(w) (Supp. V 1981).
136. 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1) (1976).
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then initial disclosure must be made within three days of receipt of the
written application by the lender.1 17 The initial disclosure is made by
giving the RESPA "good faith estimate," which now complies with the
provisions of the Simplification Act.138 Estimates used in the "good
faith estimate" must be disclosed as such.1
39
If subsequent events create a situation where the APR is no longer
within the tolerable rate for variances, new disclosures must be made
no later than consummation. 140 The creditor can comply by either re-
doing the entire disclosure statement or only the affected portion.14 1
However, if a term other than the APR changes, such as the assump-
tion policy, 14 2 redisclosure is not required. Arguably, the Simplification
Act and Reg. Z should be modified so that any change of the informa-
tion required on the Truth in Lending disclosure statement would ne-
cessitate redisclosure for those loans requiring early disclosure.
Problems occur when the consumer relies on the estimates he re-
ceived when early disclosure is required, only to discover at settlement
that the estimates were dramatically different from reality. The con-
sumer in this situation may find himself without a remedy since there is
no liability for a creditor when it uses estimates if the information nec-
essary to make accurate disclosure is not available at the time disclos-
ure was given.
1 43
3. Alternative Methods of Disclosure
A proposed solution to the consumer's need for early information
was considered by the Federal Reserve Board when Reg. Z was being
redrafted. The Federal Reserve Board suggested that an "alternative
shopping disclosure" 1' be used to provide consumers with credit infor-
mation at a time when they were more likely to be credit shopping.
137. 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(a) (1983).
138. Id.
139. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(c)(2) (Supp. 1 1983).
140. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(0 (1983).
141. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(0(3) (Supp. 1 1983).
142. Assumption is defined as "[t]he undertaking or adoption of a debt or obliga-
tion primarily resting upon another, as where the purchaser of real estate 'assumes' a
mortgage resting upon it, in which case he adopts the mortgage debt as his own and
becomes personally liable for its payment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 133 (5th ed.
1979).
143. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(e) (1983).
144. 45 Fed. Reg. 29,703 (1981).
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Basically, the creditor would have chosen to disclose either by the
transactional or traditional method or by the alternative shopping dis-
closure.145 If the creditor chose the alternative shopping disclosure,
then disclosure could be done by using preprinted forms with general
credit information for typical mortgage plans being offered. 4"
Disclosure made with the alternative shopping disclosure could be
done at the time of application or as soon as possible thereafter. 147 If a
subsequent change rendered the APR inaccurate, redisclosure would be
required 148 as it presently is for RESPA mortgages. However, the pro-
posal received a number of unfavorable responses from creditors, and
the idea was dropped. 149
The alternative shopping disclosure could easily have been, in the
Federal Reserve Board's words, "the single most effective mechanism
for achieving the statutory goal of fostering the informed use of
credit."150 It is still possible for the alternative shopping disclosure to
be used without changing the existing regulation or statute. If the con-
sumer received disclosure of the available mortgage plans whei he be-
gan shopping for his home, the lender could comply with the statute
and regulation by using the early RESPA disclosure provisions,""'
while providing the consumer with the information when he needs it.
E. Disclosure Laws for Alternative Mortgage Loans
There are two periods when a mortgagor making an alternative
mortgage needs disclosure of certain information: 1) prior to deciding
which alternative mortgage loan, if any, to choose and, 2) after the
loan is made, but prior to a payment change. 52 The consumer needs
the disclosure information at each of these times to evaluate his options
intelligently. For pre-loan disclosure, lenders are required to disclose
either: 1) no later than when the loan application is made or at the
borrower's request, under the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's regu-
lations, 53 or 2) no later than three days after loan application as re-
145. 45 Fed. Reg. 29,724 (1980).
146. Id. at 29,722.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 29,723.
149. 45 Fed. Reg. 80,676 (1980).
150. Id. at 29,702.
151. 12 C.F.R. § 226.19(a) (1983). See also Rohner, supra note 86, at 1022.
152. Walleser, supra note 6, at 23.
153. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4(g) (1982).
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quired by the RESPA for the new Reg. Z.1 14
Under the new Reg. Z, a lender making an alternative mortgage
loan is required to disclose the following: 1) the circumstances sur-
rounding a rate change, 2) "the limitations on the increase," if any, 3)
"the effect of an increase," and 4) an example of what the payment
would be if there is an increase. 155
However, the pre-loan disclosure requirements are inadequate for
the consumer in a number of ways. First, the consumer receives the
information after he has become contractually obligated to the seller,
which is too late for him to evaluate his choices. Second, the borrower
obtaining an alternative mortgage needs to know what the comparable
costs are for both the loan he is making and a fixed rate mortgage.1 56
The consumer needs to know such information as the alternative mort-
gage's "potential cost; the cost of a comparable SMI [standard mort-
gage instrument] securing the same principal; minimum and maximum
rates of interest charge permitted; frequency of rate change; and avail-
able methods for implementing the rate change.1 157 The lender is not
required to give a "'worst case' example of rate and payment in-
creases" or to give a historical trend of the index selected.1 58 Yet, with-
out the disclosure of this information the consumer cannot shop
intelligently.
After the loan is closed, but prior to a change in the monthly pay-
ment, the consumer needs disclosure of the new payment rate and the
outstanding principal balance in sufficient time for the borrower to
budget for the impending change or to consider the possibility of refi-
nancing. The new Reg. Z is silent as to what constitutes adequate no-
tice for imminent payment changes, though the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency has promulgated regulations which require national
banks to give the borrower notice "[a]t least 30 days and no more than
45 days before any interest rate change. . . ."59 Since the laws gov-
erning alternative mortgages are not uniform, the borrower must be
sensitive to this factor when deciding on which mortgage plan is best
154. 12 C.F.R.§ 226.19(a) (1983).
155. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(0(1) through (4) (1983).
156. Walleser, supra note 6, at 23.
157. Id.
158. Scheuerman, Adjustable Rate Mortgages: Fundamental New Directions in
Residential Mortgage Lending, Part 1, 55 FLA. B.J. 649, 653 (1981).
159. 12 C.F.R. § 29.8(b) (1983).
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for him.
IV. Responsibility of Disclosure: On Whom it Should Rest
A. Real Estate Brokers and Agents
The disclosure laws have been modified to make compliance easier
for the creditor and to avoid information overload by the consumer, yet
the Simplification Act fails to adequately address the basic question of
who should be required to give disclosure. Congress must examine the
issue and determine whether the law should be changed to require
someone other than the lender to give disclosure, such as the real estate
broker or a mortgage information broker, or whether existing require-
ments for disclosure by the creditor should be stricter. An examination
into this issue and suggestions for changes follow.
The logical person to be responsible for the pre-loan disclosure is
the real estate broker or agent. In today's market, most buyers use
realtors to help them find homes. During their time together, the buyer
and realtor develop a relationship of trust; the realtor is the buyer's
"agent" in many respects. It is only natural for the buyer to turn to the
realtor for financial advice. The realtor is in the best position to help
the buyer grapple with the complexity of today's real estate market.
There is a growing trend toward recognizing the realtor as an agent for
the buyer. Traditionally, the principal of caveat emptor applied and the
buyer was strictly on his own. °10 Now, the realtor generally owes the
buyer a duty of honesty and good faith.1" 1 In California, Florida, Loui-
siana and Connecticut, the courts have adopted a "public interest" ap-
proach1 62 when dealing with the realtor's duty to the buyer. The es-
sence of the public interest approach is that, because realtors deal with
the public and their function is "affected with the public interest ... ,
[it is] proper to impose a duty on brokers in favor of purchasers and
prospective purchasers which would not exist under the traditional
rules of agency,"1 3 thus giving a realtor a duty to the public that
160. Comment, A Reexamination of the Real Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller Rela-
tionship, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1343, 1345 (1972).
161. Currier, Finding the Broker's Place in the Typical Residential Real Estate
Transaction, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 655, 665 (1981).
162. Sinclair, The Duty of The Broker to Purchasers and Prospective Purchas-
ers of Real Property in Illinois, 69 ILL. B.J. 260, 266 (1981).
163. Id.
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would not be found in traditional agency laws.'"
Another theory that the courts have developed to protect the
buyer, but avoid problems with agency law, is the malpractice ap-
proach.165 Under this theory, "the broker owes all persons a duty of
disclosure and explanation as to the implications and consequences of
certain legal documents, while he owes his principal [the seller] even
more ... "lee
To more effectively deal with the problem, other solutions have
been proposed such as "alternative brokers"1 7 or "buyer's brokers."
The buyer's broker works for the buyer for a flat fee or on an hourly
basis. 68 Part of the broker's duty to his client is "[n]egotiating the
terms of the purchase, providing the buyer with appropriate protections
in the contract, and selecting the best financing alternative[s] .... 1s9
One of the advantages of having a buyer's broker is that the broker will
closely advise the buyer in two key areas: 1) pre-loan disclosures, and
2) the types of mortgages available. 17 0 Another is that the possibility of
a conflict of interest disappears when the concept of the buyer's broker
is used.17 1 Also, the broker would have an incentive to show all prop-
erty, including that for sale by owner, since he would be working in the
buyer's interest.1
The relationship between the buyer and his broker would have to
be made very clear. Generally, the law recognizes the broker as the
seller's agent 1 7 3 To implement the idea of a buyer's broker, existing
multiple listing agreements will have to be rewritten deleting the sec-
tion making a cooperative broker the subagent of the seller.1 74 Even if
164. Id.
165. Romero, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability: Arizona's Emerging
Malpractice Doctrine, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 767, 790 (1978). Arizona allows real estate
brokers to prepare certain legal documents in connection with the closing. Id. at 767.
166. Id. at 792.
167. Comment, Dual Agency in Residential Real Estate Brokerage: Conflict of
Interest and Interests in Conflict, 12 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 379, 382 n.20 (1982).
168. Id.
169. Levine, Does The Home Buyer Need His Own Broker?, 13 REAL EST. REV.
98, 100 (1983).
170. Comment, supra note 167, at 381.
171. Levine, supra note 169, at 99.
172. Id.
173. Currier, supra note 161, at 660. An in-depth discussion of agency law and
its effects on the broker-buyer-seller relationship in real estate transactions is beyond
the scope of this note.
174. Comment, supra note 167, at 399.
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the common law and custom changed to permit the buyer's broker con-
cept, there would be obstacles to be removed before it could be re-
quired that realtors give disclosure. There would be a natural resistance
on the realtor's part to the increase in his duties and liabilities. Also, an
affirmative obligation would be imposed on realtors to remain current
on all changes in the disclosure laws, a process cumbersome even for
creditors.
B. Mortgage Information Broker
Since it appears that requiring realtors to give disclosure may not
be a viable solution from a practical standpoint, another possible an-
swer is to have a mortgage information broker. The borrower could go
to the mortgage information broker before he begins to shop for his
new home. The information broker would be responsible for being up-
to-date on all the various mortgage plans. With this information, the
information broker would analyze the buyer's liabilities and assets to
determine which type of mortgage would be most suitable for him. The
information broker could advise the buyer which of the various com-
plex financing plans would be best not only for him, but also for the
seller. 175 This information is necessary for the consumer, not only to
shop adequately for credit, but to negotiate the best contract with the
seller.
Arguably, there are problems with using a mortgage information
broker to disclose information to the consumer. First, the mortgage in-
formation broker must be paid by the buyer, which increases the cost
of obtaining financing. Second, the mortgage information broker may
have a difficult time keeping current information on all the available
plans offered by all of the mortgage companies. Unless the mortgage
companies were required by statute to provide this information, the
mortgage information broker could disclose only the information he
could obtain. Finally, there is the possibility that a mortgage informa-
tion broker may direct all of his business to a particular lender, thus
frustrating the Truth in Lending Act's goals of promoting credit
competition.
175. For example, the mortgage information broker could indicate which plans
take the least amount of time to process or incur the least amount of cost in such items
as discount points.
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C. Creditors
If the real estate broker or the mortgage information broker is not
the best alternative for disclosing the needed credit information to the
consumer, then who is? The creditor is the logical choice and it should
retain responsibility for the disclosure.
The creditor has received tremendous benefits from the Simplifica-
tion Act. The disclosure procedure has been simplified, with the credi-
tor obviously in mind. To be fair, the creditor should be responsible for
giving disclosure of the necessary information to the borrower when he
needs it, when the consumer is credit shopping. The creditor should be
required to analyze the consumer's needs and provide him with infor-
mation on the best plans offered by that mortgage company. Then the
borrower can shop for credit intelligently by going to as many mort-
gage companies as he wishes and obtaining information on their plans
and how they differ from their competitors before he signs his sales
contract. Then disclosure would be simple for the creditor and fair to
the consumer.
V. Conclusion
The old Truth in Lending Act and Reg. Z received the substantial
overhaul they needed. The Simplification Act and Reg. Z are now sim-
pler both for the residential borrower and the creditor. However, while
creditor compliance has been made easier, there has not been great
strides towards protecting borrowers. The content of disclosure needs to
be modified to protect the residential mortgagor adequately. The mort-
gagor needs to know his simple interest rate and the rate he pays in five
years, as well as the annual percentage rate. The amount financed
means nothing to the borrower without knowing the loan amount. The
borrower receives some disclosure now, but it is still not adequate. The
residential mortgagor is still inadequately protected, especially in the
area of timing of disclosure. The professed purpose of the Simplifica-
tion Act and Reg. Z is to give borrowers the necessary information so
they can shop for credit intelligently.178 To shop intelligently, the credit
information must come before the borrower is obligated on the sales
contract, not the credit contract.
Disclosure could be made by the real estate broker, a mortgage
information broker, or the creditor. There are problems of requiring
176. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b) (1983).
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any of these to give disclosure. However, the logical choice is the credi-
tor. It is only fair that the creditor, who has received so many benefits
from the recent simplification of the Truth in Lending Act, should be
required to disclose the information needed by the borrower and the
Simplification Act should be amended accordingly.
Elizabeth J. Keeler
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Transferable Development Rights: An Innovative
Concept Faces an Uncertain Future In South Florida
I. Introduction
Once hailed as a novel and exciting land management concept,
transferable development rights1 have met with limited success. The
doctrine, which recognizes the severability of development potential
from land,2 has not generally met expectations. Beginning in 1977, sev-
eral South Florida counties and municipalities implemented TDR zon-
ing ordinances.3 These regulations' were enacted primarily to preserve
environmentally sensitive lands.5 However, only in Collier and Dade
Counties have sales of development rights been reported, and only in
Collier County have development rights actually been used. Therefore,
Florida planners who once recommended the TDR approach as a
method of preserving historic landmark sites, land in environmentally
sensitive regions, open space, and farmland now speak in more cautious
terms. This note will analyze some of the obstacles encountered in im-
1. Transferable development rights will be referred to throughout this note by
their common acronym, TDRs.
2. See generally J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT (1974) [hereinafter cited as SPACE
ADRIFT]; THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS: A NEW TECHNIQUE OF LAND USE
REGULATION (J. Rose ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as TDR]; Merriam, Making TDR
Work, 56 N.C.L. REv. 77 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Making TDR Work].
3. A zoning ordinance in which TDRs are granted to landowners in conjunction
with restrictive zoning placed on their properties is the usual mechanism for implemen-
tation of a TDR program.
4. Six South Florida regulations have been evaluated: Dade County, Fla., Ordi-
nance 81-122 (Jan. 1, 1982); Palm Beach County, Fla., Ordinance R-81-28-30 (Nov.
23, 1981); Collier County, Fla. Ordinance 82-2 § 9 (Jan. 5, 1982); Pinellas County,
Fla., Zoning Reg. § XXXIII-D(1)(d) (Dec. 16, 1980); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE
art. II, § 64.09 (1977); HOLLYWOOD, FLA., ZONING AND LAND DEv. CODE art. 32A
(1978).
5. The State of Florida has also employed the concept as a preservation tech-
nique but uses a different approach. Florida Statute § 193.501 provides a mechanism
whereby the owner of environmentally sensitive land may convey to the state or local
government the development right of that parcel or covenant with the government that
the "land shall not be used by the owner for any purpose other than outdoor recrea-
tional or park purposes." Fla. Stat. § 193.501 (1) (1981). In return, the state agrees to
reduce the tax assessment on that property. Fla. Stat. § 193.501 (3) (1981).
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plementation of TDR ordinances and will attempt to explain why
South Florida regulations have enjoyed only minimal acceptance.
II. Principles of Transferable Development Rights
Land may be viewed as an assemblage or bundle of rights.' Ac-
cording to TDR theory, the right to develop one's property may be sev-
ered from the land and sold, much in the same way as mineral rights
are severed and sold.7 But while mineral rights do not "leave" the land,
TDRs are separated from their land source and re-established on a des-
ignated recipient site. The usual vehicle for implementation of a TDR
program is a zoning ordinance. Such a regulation empowers the local
government entity which has responsibility for zoning to grant TDRs to
landowners, along with use restrictions placed on their properties. The
restrictions generally dictate that development on the transfer site be
kept to a marginal level.
Although several variations of the TDR scheme exist,8 four basic
steps are involved. First, land which the local government wishes to
preserve must be identified and placed in a restrictive zoning classifica-
tion. Second, a determination of the number of rights which will be
granted to owners in the preservation area must be made and assigned.,
Third, recipient sites to which development rights can be transferred
must be identified. Fourth, the actual sale and transfer of rights must
take place.10 Additional development is then precluded at the transfer
6. Rose, The Transfer of Development Rights: A Preview of an Evolving Con-
cept, 3 REAL EST. L.J. 330, 331 (1975).
7. For a discussion of the legal precedents for development rights transfer, see
Carmichael, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use Control, 2
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 35 (1974), excerpts reprinted in TDR, supra note 2, at 27.
8. See, e.g., Costonis, The Chicago Plan Incentive Zoning and the Preservation
of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972), excerpts reprinted in TDR, supra
note 2, at 95; J. COSTONIS & R. DEVoY, THE PUERTO RICAN PLAN: ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION THROUGH DEVELOPMENT RIGHT TRANSFER (1974), excerpts reprinted in
TDR, supra note 2, at 200 [hereinafter cited as PUERTO RICAN PLAN]; Development
Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338 (1972) [hereinafter cited as New
York City].
9. See infra text accompanying notes 81-82. See, e.g., Collier County, Fla., Ordi-
nance 82-2 § 9.1(h)(5) (Jan. 5, 1982) which provides for the assignment of one half of
a residential unit per acre of preservation zone land.
10. The rights are treated as an interest in real property and, therefore, must
comply with recording statutes. See, e.g., Dade County, Fla., Ordinance 81-122 §§ 4,
5F (Jan. 1, 1982). The landowner may choose to use the rights himself on the recipient
202 [Vol. 8
202
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss1/9
Transferable Development Rights
site. This is accomplished by means of a restrictive covenant placed on
the preserved land after its development rights have been sold or used
by the landowner on a recipient site. Title to preserved land may be
retained by its owner or dedicated to the government.11
While the South Florida TDR programs evaluated allow rights to
be purchased and sold directly on the open market,12 more elaborate
schemes exist. For instance, local government may act in an intermedi-
ary capacity for ihe purchase and sale of rights. The landowner, in the
absence of a private purchaser, may sell his rights to the government
which maintains a rights "bank."1" The advantage to the seller is ap-
parent: he has an immediate market for his rights. However, the local
government must then expend funds to purchase those rights. Once the
rights are sold by government, some commentators maintain that the
system operates at no cost to anyone.1 4
Because the property owner is compensated for his inability to de-
velop his property, TDRs have been advocated as an answer to
"wipeout." 15 The landowner is wiped out by the economic loss suffered
when his property is either downzoned16 or frozen in a low zoning clas-
sification. While payment for downzoning is not required in the absence
of a taking,17 TDRs function to ameliorate the harshness of such
regulation.
site or sell them to another, or he may hold them and not utilize them. Thus far, in
South Florida, only Collier and Dade Counties have reported transfers of rights. See
infra text accompanying notes 111-115.
11. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 193.501 (1981) which provides for retention of the
title by its owner.
12. No government rights bank system exists in the six South Florida regions
evaluated.
13. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE
L.J. 75, 87 (1973) [hereinafter cited as An Exploratory Essay]. Cf PuERTO RICAN
PLAN, supra note 8, at 208, 209 (buyer is required to purchase through government
"bank").
14. Shlaes, Who Pays for Transfer of Development Rights?, 40 PLAN., July
1974, at 7-9, reprinted in TDR, supra note 2, at 330, 336 [hereinafter cited as Shlaes].
But see infra text accompanying notes 96-97.
15. Hagman, Windfalls and Wipeouts in THE GoOD EARTH OF AMERICA, ex-
cerpts reprinted in TDR, supra note 2, at 265, 273. Windfall and wipeout refer to the
gains and losses in value of real property its owner incurs as a result of government
regulation. For example, a single zoning change could cause appreciation in value in
one parcel (windfall) while causing depreciation in another (wipeout).
16. Downzoning refers to the assignment of a lower zoning classification to a
parcel which acts to further restrict its use and/or density.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 20-24.
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Successful uses of TDRs produce numerous benefits: vital land is
preserved; the landowner receives compensation for his inability to fur-
ther develop his property; development is directed toward a more desir-
able location;18 and land preservation is accomplished without financial
outlay on the part of government.1 9 While the TDR concept appears
disarmingly simple, the complexity in implementation soon becomes
evident.
III. Constitutional Considerations
A. The Taking Issue: Compensatory Aspects of TDRs
A local government's ability to regulate private property derives
from its constitutionally implied police power. This power is limited in
that any ordinance in which "provisions are clearly arbitrary and un-
reasonable, having no substantial relationship to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare" 20 will be declared unconstitutional.
When regulation so restricts private property as to deprive its owner of
all reasonable beneficial use, a landowner may bring suit in inverse con-
demnation; the court must then determine if a taking has occurred.21
The usual judicial remedy for excessive regulation is to invalidate the
ordinance rather than to compel compensation to the landowner under
the power of eminent domain.2 Courts generally hesitate to extend the
18. See Wilson, Precedent Setting Swap in Vermont, 61 AM. INST. ARCHITECTS
J. 51 (1974), reprinted in TDR, supra note 2, at 256; Lynch, Controlling the Location
and Timing of Development by the Distribution of Marketable Development Rights
(June, 1973) (unpublished mimeo), reprinted in TDR, supra note 2, at 259, 260.
19. See supra note 14.
20. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
21. See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125,
136 (1978).
Compensation is required if a "taking" has occurred. "[N]or shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No pri-
vate property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation
therefor paid to each owner. . . ." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
The federal "taking" clause is applied to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment to the Constitution which provides "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law."
22. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The California Supreme
Court had held that a landowner could not sue in inverse condemnation when challeng-
ing the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance. In the event the ordinance constitutes a
taking, the California court ruled that the only remedies available are mandamus and
declaratory judgment; damages are not recoverable. Id. at 259, 263. On appeal to the
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"taking" language of the fifth amendment to include burdensome regu-
lations.2 Instead, excessive restrictions imposed by zoning regulations
have been described by one court as deprivation of property rights
without due process of law,24 a noncompensable violation requiring in-
validation of the enactment.
The argument has been made that it is sometimes necessary for
government to regulate private property by means of harsh zoning en-
actments. 25 For example, government may seek to preserve property by
placing strict limitations on development.2 By granting TDRs to the
landowner in conjunction with harsh use restrictions on his property,
the government body acquires a basis for defending its zoning ordi-
nance against an inverse condemnation challenge.27 According to this
rationale, the landowner is not deprived of all reasonable beneficial use
of his property once TDRs are granted. 8
United States Supreme Court, the Court found that no "taking" had occurred and thus
refused to consider what the appropriate remedy for excessive regulation should be. Id.
at 263.
But see San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
(1981) (inverse condemnation) in which the United States Supreme Court held that
since no final judgment had been entered, the taking issue would not be addressed. Id.
at 630, 633. The San Diego dissent, written by Justice Brennan, argued that a final
judgment had been entered and, further, that a regulatory taking demands that govern-
ment pay just compensation for the period during which the taking occurred. Id. at
646, 647, 653. Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell joined the dissent. Justice Rehn-
quist, in his concurring opinion, stated that if this were an appeal from a final judg-
ment, he would agree with much of what was said in the dissenting opinion. Arguably,
therefore, five of the nine justices believe that just compensation is mandated for a
regulatory taking, but the dissent is not yet the law.
23. See Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587,
593, 594, 350 N.E.2d 381, 384, 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8 (1976).
24. Id.
25. See generally Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation
Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L.
REv. 1021, (1975) [hereinafter cited as "Fair" Compensation].
26. Noted commentator, John Costonis, has advocated that where government
enacts burdensome zoning regulation, the landowner should receive fair compensation
for his economic injury, a new judicial standard. Id. at 1022. Rather than evaluating
compensation based on the parcel's highest and best use, a traditional assessment made
under eminent domain proceedings, Costonis proposes a standard keyed to a lesser eco-
nomic return. Fair compensation may be paid in "dollars or by some non-dollar but
market worthy alternative." Id. Transferable development rights fulfill the require-
ments for fair compensation. Id.
27. Id. at 1044, 1045, 1051.
28. Id.
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The New York Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Fred F.
French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York.29 In French, the mort-
gagee of a Manhattan residential complex sued to have a New York
zoning amendment which applied only to his property declared uncon-
stitutional. The resolution rezoned his private parks, which were part of
a residential complex, from a high density residential and office build-
ing classification to a "Special Park District,"3 thus precluding on-site
development. The regulation provided the property owner with TDRs
usable elsewhere in Manhattan but did not identify a specific parcel as
the recipient site. Affirming the decisions of the trial and appellate
courts, the New York Court of Appeals held that the zoning amend-
ment was unconstitutional since "it deprive[d] the owner of all his
property rights, except the bare title." 1 The court chose to invalidate
the ordinance rather than force the city to compensate the land own-
er.3 2 Under the facts of the case, the granting of TDRs was not suffi-
cient to uphold an excessively burdensome zoning ordinance against an
inverse condemnation challenge.
In evaluating the economic injury to the landowner, the court ex-
amined the compensatory aspect of the TDRs granted. Viewing them
as a "potentially valuable ...commodity [which] may not be disre-
garded in determining whether the ordinance has destroyed the eco-
nomic value of the underlying property," 3 the French court said, "in
this case, [they] fall short of achieving a fair allocation of economic
burden.'34 However, in dicta, the court recognized that where a land-
owner is able to sell his interests to an existing rights bank and is paid
"instantly and in money . . . he is paid just compensation for them in
eminent domain."35 In sum, while acknowledging that development
rights are valuable, the French court indicated that they are not the
equivalent of just compensation in the absence of an immediate dollar
29. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
30. Id. at 592, 350 N.E.2d at 384, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
31. Id. at 597, 350 N.E.2d at 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
32. The French court regarded excessive regulation as frustration of property
rights without due process of law as opposed to a compensatory taking. Thus, the court
regarded invalidation, rather than just compensation, as the appropriate remedy. Id. at
593, 594, 350 N.E.2d at 384, 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 8. Cf. supra note 22 (California
Supreme Court's holding that for a regulatory taking, damages are not recoverable).
33. Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc., 39 N.Y.2d at 597, 350 N.E.2d at 387,
385 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
34. Id. at 600, 350 N.E.2d at 389, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
35. Id. at 598, 599, 350 N.E.2d at 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
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exchange, and could not, therefore, sustain the excessive zoning
regulation.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the concept of trans-
ferable development rights in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City.36 Grand Central Terminal, because of its age and architec-
tural features, had been designated a landmark site under New York
City's Landmark Preservation Law. 7 According to the law, no exterior
structural changes could be made to the building without obtaining the
city's permission. The ordinance also provided that owners of landmark
sites who had not utilized the maximum density permitted under cur-
rent zoning laws were allowed to transfer development rights to speci-
fied parcels. The rights were equivalent to the difference in square feet
between the permitted density, if the site were not a landmark, and the
existing density.38
Penn Central had contracted to construct a multi-story office
building above the terminal, but the city rejected two consecutive plans
for aesthetic reasons and denied permission to build. Penn Central
brought suit against the City of New York, alleging a taking had oc-
curred.3 9 Although Penn Central prevailed in the trial court, that deci-
sion was reversed by the Appellate Division. The New York Court of
Appeals sustained the ruling in favor of the city, firmly rejecting Penn
Central's argument that Grand Central Terminal was not providing a
reasonable economic return. °
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the validity of the
New York Landmark Preservation Law was upheld. The Court deter-
mined that no taking had occurred in view of Penn Central's concession
to the Court that Grand Central Terminal could indeed earn a reasona-
ble return.4 1 This had been the focus of intense litigation in the state
courts. 2 In essence, Penn Central conceded the taking issue. The
36. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
37. New York City adopted its Landmark Preservation Law in 1965. See
N.Y.C. AD. CODE ch. 8-A § 205-1.0 (1976).
38. For example, if the landmark site contains 75,000 square feet of office space
(existing density) and the property, if unrestricted by the landmark law, were zoned for
100,000 square feet, the TDR value would equal 25,000 square feet.
39. Penn. Central Transportation Co., 438 U.S. at 119. Penn Central sought a
declaratory judgment, injunctive relief barring the city from using the Landmark Law,
and damages. Id.
40. Id. at 104, 105.
41. Id. at 129 n.26, 138 n.36.
42. Id.
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Court, therefore, avoided determining whether transferable develop-
ment rights afforded just compensation under the fifth amendment.
However, the Court did recognize that the rights were valuable, stating
"[w]hile these rights may well not have constituted 'just compensation'
if a 'taking' had occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate
whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants and...
are to be taken into account in considering the impact of regulation. 43
There are few cases subsequent to Penn Central which discuss
TDRs; however, the concept was judicially approved in Florida by the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in City of Hollywood v. Hollywood,
Inc. 4 At issue was the validity of a zoning ordinance which contained a
TDR provision. Under the ordinance, a narrow strip of undeveloped
beachfront was zoned for single family density. The western portion of
the land, separated from the beach by a road, was zoned multiple-fam-
ily. The beachfront area had a transfer of development rights proviso
which would have permitted the developer, at his option, to build an
additional 368 condominium units to the west45 in return for dedicating
the beachfront to the city.
The trial court invalidated the ordinance, stating that although the
regulation was nonconfiscatory, it was arbitrary since (1) its density
cap was predicated on an erroneous traffic study and (2) it was unrea-
sonable to assign single-family zoning to beachfront property.4 Fur-
ther, it stated that "the transfer of development rights concept as con-
tained within this ordinance is unsupportable in fact or law."47
The Fourth District reversed the trial court's ruling, citing addi-
tional controlling factors besides the traffic study which were consid-
ered when the ordinance was written. Further, the court found the ap-
plication of the single family zoning classification to the beachfront
43. Id. at 137.
44. 432 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 83-92 where the related issue of density is
discussed.
46. City of Hollywood, 432 So. 2d at 1334.
47. Id. (quoting the trial court). Lack of familiarity with the TDR concept is an
ever present problem. In the instant case, the Fourth District noted that both parties
had failed to cite in their briefs the Florida statute which provides for transfer of devel-
opment rights, FLA. STAT. § 193.501 (1981). See supra note 5. Perhaps the difficulty
arose because the statute appears under "Assessments." The court, in regarding the
absence of the statute from the briefs, commented, this "leaves us nothing short of
mystified." Id. at 1337.
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parcel to be "compatible [and] fairly debatable, ' 48 i.e., reasonable and
not arbitrary. The court then examined the TDR segment of the ordi-
nance and had "no trouble upholding the particular provision em-
ployed.""' Applying the taking criteria set forth in Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City,50 the court stated it had "already
found the government action to be proper and reasonably related to a
valid public purpose." 51 In its assessment of the economic impact of the
ordinance on the developer, the court declared that it could not quarrel
with a gain of 368 multifamily units against the loss of 79 single family
units and upheld the provision. The developer contended that requiring
actual transfer of title to the city "goes too far."52 The Hollywood
court responded that if the developer accepted the transfer proposal,
the court would be "suspicious of any motives for keeping a hold on
[the beachfront]."5 Since the transfer was optional under the terms of
the ordinance, the developer was still free to build the seventy-nine
units permitted on the beachfront property.5 4
The French, Penn Central, and Hollywood decisions suggest that,
in analyzing the effects of a TDR zoning regulation, courts will initially
determine if the regulation is a proper exercise of the police power. The
focus will then shift to remaining beneficial uses which exist on the
restricted property. As long as no taking has occurred, any transferable
development rights granted by the government will be regarded as miti-
gation or amelioration of financial loss. If the regulation has resulted in
a taking, i.e., is held to be excessively restrictive, the courts most com-
monly will invalidate the ordinance. In the alternative, courts may up-
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1337, 1338.
50. Id. at 1338. The three "taking" criteria the court applied were (1) character
of the government action, (2) whether the land use restriction was related to a valid
public purpose, and (3) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant. Id.
(citing Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
51. City of Hollywood, 432 So. 2d at 1338.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Shortly after this case was decided, the City of Hollywood, although having
won the appeal, announced it would buy the litigated property. Funds were available
from the State of Florida under the "Save Our Coasts" program. Both the transfer site,
i.e., the beachfront, and the recipient site, i.e., the westernmost portion of the land
across the street from the beach, will be acquired. Thus, the Hollywood TDR regula-
tion is rendered moot since it was specifically implemented for this geographical region.
See HOLLYWOOD, FLA., ZONING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE art. 32A (1978).
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hold the regulation but require just compensation.5" These cases sug-
gest that in the event just compensation is mandated and transferable
development rights have been granted to the landowner under the ordi-
nance, courts must assess the present economic value of the TDRs so as
to determine if they constitute just compensation. As the French court
acknowledged, without the ability to immediately market the TDRs
and convert them to dollars, the prospect of judicial recognition of
transferable development rights as just compensation is unlikely. In
conclusion, the granting of TDRs not susceptible to an immediate dol-
lar exchange is not likely to sustain an excessive zoning regulation.
B. The Uniformity Issue: Do TDRs Violate State Zoning Ena-
bling Acts and Equal Protection?
A TDR ordinance requires recipient sites to accommodate the
density transferred from the preservation zone.5 6 According to the
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, the act on which state zoning
enabling legislation is based, "all zoning regulations shall be uniform
for each class or kind of building through each district. 57 Allegations
that TDR ordinances violate this uniformity requirement and constitute
spot zoning stem from the fact that some buildings in the recipient
zone will be afforded greater densities than others due to the acquisi-
tion of development rights. Commentators give little weight to this ob-
jection, applying the rationale that all property owners in the receiving
zone have the same opportunity to purchase rights. 8 In the event land-
owners in the recipient zone do not have a reasonable opportunity to
acquire development rights, the TDR ordinance could fall as violative
of the constitutional requirement of equal protection. 9 Since commen-
tators agree that "the statutory requirement of uniformity is simply
duplicative of the constitutional requirement of equal protection," 60
55. See supra notes 22, 32.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
57. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ZONING, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD
STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING
REGULATIONS 2 (rev. ed. 1926), quoted in SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 2, at 158.
58. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 2, at 158, 159. See also Marcus, A Comparative
Look at TDR, Subdivision Exactions, and Zoning as Environmental Panaceas: The
Search for Dr. Jekyll Without Mr. Hyde, 20 URB. L. ANN. 3, 45-48 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as A Comparative Look].
59. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 2, at 158.
60. Id.
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they are treated as "single in nature."61 Therefore, assuming no court
would invalidate TDR ordinances based on equal protection objections,
it is likely that objections based on the uniformity requirement would
also be unsuccessful. Further, the claim that TDRs effectuate spot zon-
ing,62 can, according to one commentator, "be overcome . . . upon a
showing that the special treatment accorded the landowner involved is
reasonably necessary to further the efforts of the municipality in imple-
menting its comprehensive plan." s
IV. Pragmatic Considerations: Problems in Implementing and
Administering South Florida TDR Ordinances
While TDR systems have been advocated for many purposes, it
is beyond the scope of this article to examine all of their applications.
The focus of this section will be limited to the three uses of TDRs in
South Florida: preservation of environmentally sensitive land and open
space, preservation of farmland, and preservation of historic landmark
sites.6 5
61. Id.
62. A Comparative Look, supra note 58, at 52.
63. Id.
64. See generally SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 2 (preservation of historic landmark
sites); TDR, supra note 2 (preserving landmarks, open space and fragile ecological
resources; as a primary system of land use regulation; as a method of encouraging low
and moderate income housing; as a method of regulating location and timing of com-
munity growth); Danels and Magida, Application of Transfer of Development Rights
to Inner City Communities: A Proposed Municipal Land Use Rights Act, 11 URB.
LAW. 124, 129 (1979) (transfer of parking rights, transfer of rights to erect outdoor
advertising, transfer of uses permitted by local zoning ordinances but unexercised,
transfer of various licenses and easements).
65. The six south Florida regulations evaluated provide for the following pur-
poses: Dade County, Fla., Ordinance 81-122 (Jan. 1, 1982) (preservation of environ-
mentally and ecologically sensitive lands, specifically the East Everglades wetlands);
Palm Beach County, Fla., Ordinance R-81-28-30 (Nov. 23, 1981) (preservation of ag-
ricultural and environmentally sensitive land); Collier County, Fla., Ordinance 82-2 § 9
(Jan. 5, 1982) (preservation of environmentally sensitive lands and historic sites); Pi-
nellas County, Fla., Zoning Reg. § XXXIII-D(l)(d) (Dec. 16, 1980) (preservation of
environmentally sensitive areas and open space); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CODE art. II,
§ 64.09 (1977) (preservation of environmentally and ecologically sensitive land);
HOLLYWOOD, FLA., ZONING AND LAND DEV. CODE art. 32A (1978) (preservation of
North Beach and West Lake areas, i.e., preservation of environmentally sensitive lands
in these specific locations).
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A. Identification of Land in the Preservation Zone and Estab-
lishment of Program Goals
The first step in any TDR program is the identification of land for
preservation coupled with the determination of the goals of the pro-
gram. If the land identified for preservation is unimproved, the TDR
ordinance should allow for some margin of development in order to sur-
vive judicial challenge in inverse condemnation actions.6 6 Where land is
already improved so that a reasonable beneficial use is easily estab-
lished, courts will be more apt to sustain the ordinance as
nonconfiscatory.
When the goal of community planners is preservation of historic
landmarks, the regulation necessarily concerns improved property. The
owner usually retains the reasonable beneficial use of his property and
the regulation should survive a taking challenge. From a conceptual
framework, this system is easier to implement than others because it
deals with density values that are certain. Since planners know exactly
how much development would be allowed on the landmark site under
present zoning, they know exactly how much density must be trans-
ferred.68 Moreover, a relatively small number of buildings are involved;
under urban TDR ordinances, development occurs in the same general
area as the preserved site.69 In South Florida, only the Collier County
ordinance provides for the granting of TDRs to owners of historic
landmark sites.7° Thus far, no rights have been transferred for this
purpose.
On the other hand, in South Florida environmental and open space
preservation programs, land is usually undeveloped or marginally devel-
oped. Where no prior development has taken place, a zoning ordinance
which seeks to preserve land by precluding all development on it, thus
leaving its owner with no reasonable beneficial use, is likely to be
66. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35. But see Just v. Marinette County,
56 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972) (limited use of private property to its
"natural use").
67. See supra text accompanying notes 36-43.
68. See supra note 38.
69. E.g., Elliott and Marcus, From Euclid to Ramapo: New Directions in Land
Development Controls, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 56, 72-78 (1972). Under the New York
City Landmark Preservation Law, development rights could only be transferred to con-
tiguous sites. The law was later amended to allow transfer to designated non-contigu-
ous lots within a radius of a few blocks. Id. at 72, 73.
70. Collier County, Fla., Ordinance 82-2 § 9.1(a) (Jan. 5, 1982).
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deemed confiscatory. This appears to be true regardless of the issuance
of TDRs to the regulated landowners."1 Therefore, when government's
preservation goals require barring all development on unimproved land,
as opposed to simply placing limits on its development, direct govern-
ment purchase by means of eminent domain actions may prove the bet-
ter way.72 Direct purchase eliminates the risks inherent in enacting ex-
cessively restrictive zoning regulation, namely, the taking challenge
that burdened landowners will surely raise and the possibility that the
regulation will be struck down by the courts, thus opening the way for
undesirable development. Application of a TDR ordinance to unim-
proved property should be limited to situations where development is to
be restricted rather than precluded altogether.
An added consideration is that in South Florida, typically much of
the land designated as environmentally sensitive has poor development
potential. Frequently these areas consist of swamp or mangrove or are
subject to flooding. Often, other environmental restrictions have al-
ready been placed on the land. Implementing a TDR program to pre-
serve land of this kind has met with objection.73 Existing physical con-
ditions and legal restrictions already minimize development in these
areas. Arguably, providing these landowners with TDRs is to accord
them development rights for land with no development potential, a re-
sult contrary to espoused TDR principles. 4 In essence, such landown-
ers are getting something for nothing. Some community planners fear
that developers who bought swampland incapable of development for a
small investment will reap a windfall by exchanging it for valuable de-
71. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35, 55.
72. TDRs and condemnation under the power of eminent domain are by no
means the only preservation techniques available. See generally Netherton, Environ-
mental Conservation and Historic Preservation Through Recorded Land Use Agree-
ments, 14 REAL PROP., PROB. TR. J. 541 (1979) (use of easements, covenants and
equitable servitudes); Marcus, A Comparative Look, supra note 58, at 20, 27 (use of
subdivision exactions, natural area zoning); Carlo and Wright, Transfer of Develop-
ment Rights: A Remedy for Prior Excessive Subdivision, 10 U.C.D.L. REv. 1 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Carlo] (use of downzoning, service moratoria); Making TDR
Work, supra note 2, at 78-80 (use of conventional zoning, density zoning, tax relief);
Markham, Selling Mother Nature, Miami Herald, July 17, 1983, at HI, col. 1 (use of
density and construction techniques to preserve environmentally sensitive area).
73. See A Comparative Look, supra note 58, at 44-45.
74. See, Rose, The Transfer of Development Rights: An Interim Review of an
Evolving Concept, reprinted in TDR, supra note 2, at 14, 15 [hereinafter cited as An
Interim Review] (Sonoma County, California TDR plan provides that no development
rights are granted to land incapable of supporting development).
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velopment rights. These fears have been realized in Collier County
where mangrove has been exchanged for rights to build residential con-
dominium units." A moratorium on the use of TDRs has been effected
in Collier County so as to allow for analysis of the program.76
An area where TDR ordinances are purportedly more likely to be
successful is in the preservation of agricultural land." Land which is
actively farmed provides its owner with a reasonable beneficial use. By
locking farmland into an agricultural zoning designation and providing
its owner with TDRs, government can accomplish its preservation pur-
pose while compensating the landowner today for loss of speculative
profits. At the same time, the farmer is allowed to continue using his
land productively. Palm Beach County enacted a TDR ordinance pri-
marily for preservation of agricultural land.78 However, to date no
rights have been transferred. Farmland in Palm Beach County is both
expensive and physically capable of supporting development. Where
land possesses both of these attributes, owners have expressed reluc-
tance to relinquish development potential. This is due in part to a lack
of confidence in the continued existence of the TDR system.79 Land-
owners believe that by retaining their rights without using or selling
them, they are retaining the development potential of their farmland.
They maintain that at some later date the zoning law will change, and
development will be permitted to greater intensity.80
Transferable development rights solve few preservation problems.
South Florida planners must be reasonable in their expectations and
realistic in identifying the purposes which such an ordinance might ful-
fill. The physical characteristics of the preservation zone land and its
75. See Spagna, Transfer of Development Rights: The Collier County Experi-
ence, FLA. ENVTL. URB. ISSUES. Jan.-Feb., 1979, at 7, 9 (owner of a 70 acre "mangrove
island" dedicated the island to the county in exchange for rights to build an additional
353 condominium units on other land he owned).
76. Another factor for consideration is that once land in Collier County is desig-
nated as a "special treatment" district, i.e., preservation zone, its tax assessment is
greatly reduced which represents a sizeable tax loss to the county. A Comparative
Look, supra note 58, at 19.
For a detailed discussion of the personal tax consequences of purchase and sale of
rights, see Note, Tax Consequences of Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory
Essay, 33 TAX LAW. 283 (1979).
77. See Richman and Kendig, Transfer Development Rights - A Pragmatic
View, 9 URB. LAW. 571 (1977) [hereinafter cited as A Pragmatic View].
78. Palm Beach County, Fla., Ordinance R-81-28-30 (Nov. 23, 1981).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 111-115.
80. Id.
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level of development will dictate whether application of a TDR ordi-
nance is practicable. Where land is incapable of supporting develop-
ment, TDRs should not be granted. Where land is physically capable of
supporting development, experience teaches that landowners have not
supported the program; they will not relinquish potential for
development.
B. Calculating Transferable Development Rights, Locating the
Recipient Zone and the Density Issue
Once the preservation area has been identified, the number of
rights which are to be assigned to the landowner must be calculated.
By necessity, potential development rights for urban and rural transfer
or preservation sites are computed differently. In the case of the urban
landmark site, its TDR value is the difference between that density
which presently exists in the landmark structure and the maximum al-
lowed under current zoning if the site were not occupied by a
landmark.81 On the other hand, the formula for determining the TDR
value of a rural site is much more complex since rights are not trans-
ferred in kind, i.e., square feet are not transferred as square feet.82 The
acreage of preservation zone parcels must be converted into dwelling
units or square feet of commercial space transferable to the recipient
site.
The ultimate goal, however, is to effect the transfer of develop-
ment rights without an increase in the overall combined allowable den-
sity of the transfer and recipient zones.83 Thus, a loss of fifty dwelling
units from the transfer site should, in theory, result in an increment of
no more than fifty dwelling units at the recipient site. 4 While the ex-
81. See supra note 38.
82. Several formulas have been proposed: distribution based on the number of
acres of land owned irrespective of value; distribution based on the proportionate value
of the owner's land to the total value of all land preserved; assignment of value "fac-
tors" to land based on proximity to center of development. An Interim Review, supra
note 74, at 4. See also Making TDR Work, supra note 2, at 115, 116 (calculation of
rights based on the difference in value of a parcel with and without development rights;
calculation based on the value of land alone).
83. See An Exploratory Essay, supra note 13, at 88 n.57; Schnidman, Transfer-
able Development Rights: An Idea in Search of Implementation, 11 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 339, 348 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Schnidman].
84. Chavooshian, Norman and Nieswand, Transfer of Development Rights: A
New Concept in Land Use Management, RUTGERS U. Coop. EXTENSION SVCE. (1974),
excerpts reprinted in TDR, supra note 2, at 173 [hereinafter cited as Chavooshian].
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pressed goal is maintenance of a constant overall density, the effect of
the increased density occurring at the recipient site must be evaluated.
In preservation programs in which density is transferred to moder-
ately developed recipient sites, planning efforts are usually made to ac-
commodate the increased bulk85 and to avoid conferring hardship on
those occupants already in the transfer zone. But, when the recipient
zone is located in a highly developed region such as an urban area,
even small increments in density can strain the existing infrastruc-
ture.8" Ideally, the recipient site for TDRs should be limited to unde-
veloped or moderately developed regions in which planning efforts have
been made to support the increased bulk.17
Planners do not always adhere to espoused TDR principles with
regard to density considerations. Disregard of the constant density goal
is illustrated in application of the City of Hollywood's TDR ordi-
nance."" Under the regulation, an owner-developer was offered the
rights to build 368 additional condominium units on the receiving site
in exchange for the loss of 79 single family units from the beachfront
transfer site.89 The transfer site was located across the street from the
recipient site. The mathematics of this transfer suggest that the num-
ber of rights were calculated on the basis of the owner's economic loss
rather than in an attempt to keep density constant.
Landowners have objected to using a density per acre formula as a
basis for calculating the number of TDRs allocated to the preservation
zone when its real estate is recognized as extremely valuable.90 In an
attempt to overcome this objection, some planners have suggested mar-
But see City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (right to build 79 single family units in preservation zone exchanged for TDRs
to build 368 condominium units at recipient site).
85. Schnidman, supra note 83, at 350.
Often the bulk established by the zoning ordinances for the recipient site is delib-
erately reduced so as to allow for an increase through the TDR mechanism. See
Chavooshian, supra note 84, at 173.
86. New York City, supra note 8, at 365-367.
87. See, e.g., Palm Beach County, Fla., Ordinance R-81-28-30 § IA(4), 1B
(Nov. 23, 1981) which allows rights to be transferred to specific recipient zones within
the urban service area. But see Dade County, Fla. Ordinance 81-122 § 5(B) (Jan. 1,
1982) which allows rights to be transferred to any portion of unincorporated Dade
County designated for urban development.
88. HOLLYWOOD, FLA., ZONING AND LAND DEv. CODE art. 32A (1978).
89. City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1332, 1338 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1983).
90. See Making TDR Work, supra note 2, at 115, 115 n.234, 116.
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ket value as an alternative to density for computing the number of
rights allocated.91 To do so, however, would result in a highly objec-
tionable increase in overall density. As previously stated, if zoning law
dictates that a developer could build one hundred units on his preserva-
tion zone property, under TDR theory, he should be granted rights for
no more than one hundred units. However, the developer argues that
this does not adequately reflect his financial loss if the recipient site is
not as valuable as his transfer site, i.e., his profitability will be less
because of its less desirable location. Therefore, it has been suggested
that a developer in this situation receive an increment in rights above
that density which his preservation zone property could support under
present zoning. The effect is to increase the overall combined density of
the transfer and recipient sites which is an objectionable result. 2
Transferable development right ordinances based on economics de-
serve close public scrutiny. Public acceptance of the TDR concept is
not likely when it promises one thing, constant density, but delivers
another.
C. Valuation of Rights, Marketability, and Administrative
Costs
It is generally recognized that to have a successful TDR program
the rights must be readily marketable.9 3 In times of an uncertain real
estate market and a weak economy, immediate sale of rights is un-
likely. Additionally, recognition of development rights as just compen-
sation is judicially doubtful in the absence of a ready purchaser and/or
a specific transfer site. 4 In response to these problems, it has been sug-
gested that local government administer a rights bank which would
purchase any rights that a preservation zone landowner could not use
himself or sell privately.95 The government would recoup its funds
when such rights were sold to developers in the recipient zone.
Several problems are inherent in this approach. The most signifi-
cant is cost. One of the primary advantages of the TDR concept is that
TDRs allow government to preserve land with no financial outlay.9 6 To
91. Id. at 115, 116.
92. Id. at 115 n.234.
93. Id. at 116. See A Comparative Look, supra note 58, at 11.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35.
95. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
96. Rose, Psychological, Legal, and Administrative Problems of the Proposal to
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place government in the position of maintaining a bank would divert
funds from other needed areas. Government, too, is subject to the un-
certainties of the real estate market, and the prospect of holding rights
for long periods of time, as well as administering the system, could
prove very costly.
A further consideration in assessing the marketability of develop-
ment rights is the selling price of the rights. The seller, of course,
would like to receive the highest price possible, but does not know how
to assess the value of his rights.97 The buyer, however, knows the limi-
tations of his pocketbook. A buyer-developer selling luxury units with
presumably greater profitability can afford to pay more for a right than
a developer of less expehsive units. Since the seller may not know the
exact location of the recipient site of his rights or the type of develop-
ment the buyer has planned, he is uncertain as to what to ask a pro-
spective purchaser.
Although the difficulty in obtaining a purchaser may be circum-
vented by the use of the government rights bank, ascertaining a fair
price remains problematic. If rights are sold by the government at fixed
prices, developers of luxury units may be reaping large windfalls.
Equating land cost per unit with the cost of a right per unit, it is possi-
ble that the luxury developer may be paying considerably less per unit
for those obtained through the TDR mechanism than he is for his other
units. Although TDRs are advocated as a way around the "windfall-
wipeout" dilemma,98 this arrangement simply shifts the windfall. If
rights are sold at variable prices, the seller may not realize fair com-
pensation for his burdened land and the potential for abuse is present.99
In sum, a rights bank would unquestionably support the TDR system,
but, considering costs and administration, it may be seen as replacing
one set of problems with another. 100 No South Florida TDR program
provides for a rights bank.
D. Rigidity of the System and Potential for Abuse
In order to enjoy support of developers, the TDR system must be
Use the Transfer of Development Rights As a Technique to Preserve Open Space, 6
URBAN LAW 919 (1974), reprinted in TDR, supra note 2, at 293 [hereinafter cited as
Psychological, Legal, and Administrative Problems]; Shlaes, supra note 14, at 336.
97. See A Comparative Look, supra note 58, at 17.
98. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
99. Id. at 15-17.
100. Id.
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rigid. If the additional density planned for at the recipient site can
readily be obtained by means of a variance or zoning bonus,10 1 the
market for rights will suffer.10 2 Therefore, exceptions to density limits
should be granted only in cases of hardship 0 3 or where planned in con-
junction with the sale of TDRs.0 4 The public tends to look at zoning
ordinances in general and variances in particular with a jaundiced
eye.10 5 Lack of familiarity with the TDR concept feeds the skepticism
which exists,106 but the potential for abuse is present and is not lightly
regarded by the public.107
In Dade County where TDRs have been granted to landowners in
the flood prone East Everglades area, the first sale of rights has been
reported. 0 8 Prior to this sale of rights, the State of Florida, for pur-
poses of preservation, announced its intention to purchase a portion of
the Everglades wetlands.109 This raises the possibility of the State
101. A zoning bonus is an increase in density granted to a developer in exchange
for his providing an amenity such as a plaza or walkway to the building he is
constructing.
102. SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 2, at 160.
103. Although "hardship" is recognized as the statutory requirement for grant-
ing a variance, it is frequently ignored. Id. See also Zaldivar and Lowe, Zoning Laws
Like Putty to Developers, City, Miami Herald, May 22, 1983, at Al, col. 1 (hardship
standard ignored in granting variances; politically appointed zoning board overturned
91% of planning department's recommendations that variances be denied).
104. Psychological, Legal, and Administrative Problems, supra note 96, at 298.
105. See supra note 103. See also Zaldivar and Lowe, Miami Zoning: Growing
Without a Plan, Miami Herald, May 22, 1983, at Al, col. 1; May 23, 1983, at A1, col.
1; May 24, 1983, at Al, col. 1; May 25, 1983, at Al, col. 2; May 26, 1983, at Al, col.
2 (five part expose of City of Miami's zoning practices which revealed (1) Zoning
Board and City Commission ignore laws in granting exceptions from zoning restric-
tions, (2) land development industry is largest single source of campaign money for
incumbent city commissioners, (3) variances are routinely granted without regard to
hardship).
106. See Psychological, Legal, and Administrative Problems, supra note 96, at
294, 295.
107. See generally New York City, supra note 8, at 361-367 (attempt to amend
zoning ordinance to permit builders of high rises to exceed bulk limitations by purchas-
ing development rights which would be assigned to old townhouses); Id. at 361 n.124
(attempt by New York to sell air rights belonging to federal government); Meakin v.
Steveland, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 3d 490, 137 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1977) (sale by city of public
street to developers for purpose of allowing developers to use street's air rights to con-
struct additional bulk on their abutting building sites).
108. Rights to Use of Land Are Sold, Miami Herald, Oct. 16, 1983, at H20, col.
3.
109. Id.
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purchasing land for which development rights have already been sold,
an occurrence which is purportedly eliminated when a TDR program is
implemented. 10 According to TDR theory, once rights are sold, the
land is sufficiently restricted so that direct government purchase is un-
necessary. Preservation is accomplished without financial outlay on the
part of government. If Florida purchases land for which development
rights have already been sold, Dade County residents will be burdened
twice: one time when the residents must accommodate the increased
density at recipient sites and a second time, when as state taxpayers,
they must pay for the acquisition of the title to the preserved land.
E. Permanency of Zoning Classification: Reason for Success or
Failure?
Traditionally, the right to-develop one's property is integrally re-
lated to the land itself. When one purchases land, he purchases loca-
tion. Conceptually, it is difficult for the landowner to sever development
from its earthly source. Such an abstraction is offensive to many and
explains in part the lack of acceptance of the TDR concept. More sig-
nificant, however, is that according to TDR doctrine, once the land-
owner sells his development rights, he is forever precluded from further
development on that parcel."" Some TDR provisions are more flexible;
rather than preclude development altogether, they severely restrict de-
velopment on the transfer site." 2 Under either circumstance, it is the
element of permanency which prevents many landowners who possess
development rights from selling them.
Landowners lack confidence in the continued existence of the TDR
system. Many believe it will be abolished in the future, and the land-
owner who has not sold his rights can once again develop his property
to greater intensity than presently permitted. Reluctance to give up po-
tential for development has been cited most frequently as the reason for
unwillingness to sell development rights in South Florida." 3
Where, however, the preservation zone consists of land with ques-
tionable development potential, for example, land in the flood prone
East Everglades area of Dade County or mangrove areas of Collier
110. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
111. See An Interim Review, supra note 74, at 9; Carlo, supra note 72, at 3.
112. See, e.g., A Pragmatic View, supra note 77, at 582, 583.
113. This information was obtained in phone conversations with planning officials
in Palm Beach and Pinellas Counties and the City of St. Petersburg.
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County, owners have been more willing to actively participate in the
TDR system."1 4 Presumably, these landowners recognize that the possi-
bility of development is limited at best and are motivated to realize
whatever profit they can as quickly as possible. But where land is capa-
ble of supporting development, as in the case of Palm Beach farmland,
its owners will not part with its potential. 1 5
V. Conclusion
A TDR zoning ordinance is a tool used by local government to
further its land preservation goals. Development rights are granted to
landowners in conjunction with the restrictive zoning regulation im-
posed. The restrictions limit development of the land; the TDRs
granted to the landowner mitigate the economic injury caused by these
restrictions. However, the zoning ordinance is only the preliminary step
in preserving the regulated property. It is not until after the landowner
uses his rights on a recipient site or sells them to another that a restric-
tive covenant is placed on the land. The property may then be viewed
as permanently limited in its development. Therefore, when South Flor-
ida landowners refuse to use or sell their rights, the TDR system is in
jeopardy. Communities may be forced to abandon this alternative for
land preservation.
Drafters of TDR zoning ordinances must allow for some margin of
development on the regulated property to survive a judicial challenge in
inverse condemnation actions. Case law indicates that TDRs are not
the equivalent of just compensation in the absence of an immediate
dollar exchange. Therefore, the granting of TDRs will not be sufficient
to sustain an excessively burdensome regulation against a taking
challenge.
Adherence to TDR principles is essential to realize the goals of the
program and develop public confidence. Calculation of rights based on
market value of preservation zone land, as in the City of Hollywood's
regulation, results in objectionable density increments and violates the
114. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. In Dade County, where
TDRs have been granted to landowners in the flood prone East Everglades area, rights
to portions of 17,280 acres of land have been bought by the mortgagee of the property.
He, in turn, has sold an option to purchase the rights to a major North Dade County
motel operator. Rights to Use of Land Are Sold, Miami Herald, Oct. 16, 1983, at
H20, col. 3.
115. No rights have been transferred in Palm Beach County. Palm Beach
County's TDR ordinance is primarily for preservation of agricultural land.
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goal of constant density. Government purchase of land for which devel-
opment rights have been sold is abusive and should be avoided; the
State of Florida should not purchase land for preservation which is al-
ready restricted by covenant. Transferable development rights should
not be granted to land incapable of supporting development. In South
Florida, transfers of rights have been effected for properties incapable
or marginally capable of supporting development such as mangrove ar-
eas in Collier County and the flood prone East Everglades region in
Dade County. These landowners are reaping a windfall. Where land is
capable of supporting development, planners have seriously overesti-
mated the willingness of property owners to sell their rights; these prop-
erty owners will not relinquish potential for development.
Legal and administrative problems can be overcome; problems in-
herent in changing commercial realities are infinitely more difficult.
The TDR concept in South Florida has experienced a disappointing
past and faces an uncertain future.
R. Barbara Ressler
[Vol. 8
222
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss1/9
